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       Chapter 1 Introduction and Research Proposal  
 
International intervention has emerged as an important aspect of global politics. The 
dissertation focuses on the interventions in the humanitarian crisis of third countries, 
in which great powers often hold different and even contrasting positions. The EU is 
more inclined to intervene when a crisis occurs, while China often refrains from 
coercive interventions and occasionally opposes the proposal of intervention in the 
UN. For instance, regarding the crisis of Syria, China, together with Russia, has vetoed 
three times against European and American-backed UN Security Council resolutions 
that threatened sanctions against the Assad regime if it did not immediately halt its 
military crackdown against rebels. At the same time we can observe the obvious 
correlation with their alleged principles: Countries adhered to the principle of 
sovereignty are usually reluctant to intervene in a domestic crisis, whereas countries 
often attempts to intervene are more emphasizing the ideas of human rights. The 
principal purpose of this dissertation is to identify the roles of these principles in the 
policy-making for multilateral intervention. Here I will only examine the two 
important international actors, the EU and China.  
 
The principle of sovereignty is a defining pillar of the UN system and international law. 
We can trace the principle back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The principle of 
sovereignty emphasizes a state’s freedom and independence from external 
interference regardless of their size, material power and domestic political system, 
thereby could restrain most powerful states from imposing their own interests or 
values on less powerful states in the name of altruistic concerns. 1  Hence, 
                                                             
1 See Article 2(4) of UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
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sovereignty and the concomitant principle of non-interference in states’ domestic 
affairs, is especially championed by developing countries which had been vulnerable 
to intervention. In the Post-Cold War era, however, the conventional interpretation of 
sovereignty has been challenged by the increasing interventionist practices in fragile 
states. For instance, the intervention powers could reinterpret the sovereignty of 
target states by deciding who can represent the people, as the American invasion in 
Iraq showed (Delcourt 2006). Nevertheless, China remains the stubborn defender of 
state sovereignty for two reasons. First, it has an unpleasant ‘humiliating century’ of 
being intervened by foreign powers in the past. Second, nowadays Beijing still 
perceives the potential threat of regime change since some powerful 
liberal-democracies advocate democracy as the sole legal form of governance.  
 
The idea of human rights has played a salient, but still contested role in world politics 
since the end of World War II. As an important international norm, human rights 
practice has developed in multilateral framework such as the UNHRC and the ICC. On 
the other, human rights challenge the traditional sovereignty as the core principle of 
multilateralism by issuing the potential license to humanitarian interventions, which 
aim to protect human rights where states may fail to protect their own people. 
Perceived as a normative power, the EU actively supports both multilateralism and 
human rights, on which the political integration of Europe has been based. However, 
the EU faces a dilemma that certain human rights standard it claims to promote in 
other countries have limited legal support in a multilateral system which is on the 
basis of sovereign states, unless human rights become a universalistic principle 
applied to all countries in practice. The shift of focus from state sovereignty to 
human rights in international law would be extremely difficult, considering the 
resistance from non-Western states that are wary of the foreign intervention. 
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Nevertheless, the EU’s discourses of ‘Human Security’ and ‘R2P’, as well as the 
practices of external interventions have posed alterations to the traditional principles 
of international law.  
 
The dissertation starts with these principles and concepts. The first section of the 
introductory chapter will conceptualize the multilateralism, the intervention and in 
particular the multilateral intervention. This conceptual framework aims to 
operationalize these interrelated concepts in the research. The subsequent section 
proceeds to outline historical practices and current debates on multilateral 
intervention in the international forum. In the final section, we will briefly review the 
EU-China ideational divergences concerning intervention and introduce my research 
proposal on the issue.  
 
(I) Defining Multilateral Intervention 
1.1 Multilateralism  
Plenty of attempts have been made to define the nature of multilateralism. Among 
them John Ruggie may be the most prominent interpreter of the elusive conception. 
Beyond Robert Keohane’s literal definition of multilateralism as ‘the practice of 
coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc 
arrangements or by means of institutions’ (Keohane 1990: 731), Ruggie emphasizes 
that multilateralism is built on ‘generalized’ principles of conduct, which specify 
‘appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to particularistic interests 
of the parties or the strategic exigencies’ (Ruggie 1992:571). Therefore, 
multilateralism could involve justice, obligation, and international law, which makes it 
matters more than the number of parties or degree of institutionalization. Combining 
Keohane’s ‘nominal’ definition as a contrast to strictly unilateral or bilateral initiatives 
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and Ruggie’s emphasis on normative principles, I agree with a modern definition of 
multilateralism as: “Three or more actors engaging in voluntary and (essentially) 
institutionalized international cooperation governed by norms and principles, with 
rules that apply (by and large) equally to all states.” (Bouchard & Peterson 2011: 10) 
 
Multilateralism could find its application in the international disarmament and 
security, international trade, the monetary system, and the environment issues. In 
these fields challenges are too vast and complex for any single state, no matter how 
powerful, to effectively manage on its own, thus international cooperation seems 
desirable in the pursuit of clear common interests. However, the practical role of 
multilateralism varies between issue-areas: it has played more crucial role in 
so-called ‘low politics’ areas such as trade cooperation, while in ‘high politics’ 
concerning national security multilateralism have often proved less effective and 
regulative. Correspondingly, we can find different forms of multilateral institutions at 
the global level. On the one side of the spectrum, WTO and IMF represent a more 
rule-based institution where certain principles receive comparable wide recognition 
and effective enforcement; on the other side, UN General Assembly is typical cases of 
‘soft’ multilateralism where contrasting principles display and empty talks often 
happen. Another type of multilateralism is the case of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) which represents a series of strong principles such as judicial intervention. 
However, its enforcement is limited since several great powers are still out of the 
legal framework of the ICC.  
 
Today, although most of countries agree with, at least not oppose multilateralism in 
principle, their attachments to multilateralism in practice vary significantly. At least 
two factors account for this result—the material powers disparities and the 
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ideational divergences. Taking account of power distribution, multilateralism is 
usually regarded by realists as the tactic of the weak, at least the militarily weak. The 
best illustration may be the European Union, which supports the UN and the 
international law because of its limited capacity for coercive unilateral action. For the 
EU, supporting multilateralism has strategic payoffs with little cost, whereas the 
more powerful U.S has much less motives in pursuing multilateralism which may 
constrain its freedom of actions (Kagan, 2002).2Considering ideational factors, the 
successful experience of integration and multilateral governance represents a 
conscious rejection of the European realpolitik in the past, while this is not the case 
for U.S, as well as the emerging powers. Nevertheless, the EU seeks to build 
partnership with BRICS countries in the pursuit of ‘effective multilateralism’ (Grevi 
and de Vasconcelos 2008), while they may differ considerably with one another on 
the principles underpinning the multilateralism. The ‘contested multilateralism’ with 
competing coalitions and shifting institutional arrangements is identified in a wide 
variety of multilateral institutions (Morse & Keohane 2014). 
  
1.2 Intervention: Unilateral and Multilateral 
With regard to international interventions, multilateralism is often perceived as failed 
and unilateral actions prevail. In the dissertation, I define international intervention 
as an external action exercised by one state, group of states, or international 
organizations, which aims at the domestic affair of another state. Besides, according 
to the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1986 (Nicaragua vs. U.S), 
these domestic affairs must be “matters in which each state is permitted, by the 
principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely” (Jamnejad and Wood, 2009:347). It is 
                                                             
2 As suggested by Robert Kagan, Europeans and Americans hold very different strategic 
cultures at present: U.S. is more willing to resort force and more inclined to unilateral actions 
than the EU and its member states. Surely, the Obama administration shows more respects 
and demands to multilateralism than his predecessor. 
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not feasible here to discuss all the issues surrounding the international intervention. 
Therefore, this dissertation will confine the intervened ‘domestic affairs’ to internal 
security crises, namely the intrastate conflicts.  
 
It should be noted that, when discussing the ‘non-interference’ in domestic affairs, 
we need to be clear on whether we are talking about relative or absolute 
non-interference. The absolute non-interference refers to the complete 
non-involvement in the domestic affairs of another country, which has become 
increasing unrealistic between countries of interdependence. Since one country by 
unilateral action in its internal policy-areas could cause harm on or provide benefits 
to other countries, governments concerned would find it difficult to stay aloof from 
these domestic affairs particular a crisis. In this light, certain bilateral agreements and 
regional organisations were designated to legitimate the unavoidable mutual 
involvement in the domestic affairs. In contrast, relative non-interference emphasizes 
the non-coercion and the respect for sovereign government. This dissertation uses 
the terms of ‘non-interference’ (as a principle and practice) in their relative meaning. 
Otherwise, an absolute non-intervener is hardly the research target if it literally did 
nothing in a crisis.  
 
An international intervention can be made by various measures (Table 1). The entire 
gamut of intervention tools includes (1) diplomatic interferences, namely declaratory 
polices including the rising international judicial involvement, are non-coercive (2) 
economic interventions, either providing assistances to conflict parties or imposing 
sanctions or embargoes against them, which are coercive, but non-forcible and (3) 
military intervention actions such as air raid, occupation and forcible peacekeeping, 
which are most coercive and aggressive. As empirical studies illustrate, crisis 
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interventions conducted by regional or international organizations usually involved 
elements of all three means. (Wolff & Dursun-Ö zkanca 2012: 301) 
 
Table 1  The toolbox of the international intervention in domestic crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, there exists the fourth category of intervention: (4) political, which is 
non-coercive but different from formal diplomatic measures. Its indirect 
interventionary activities include patronage, propaganda, advertising and so on, 
which aim to gain political support for a political reform or regime change in another 
state. For example, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in U.S, whose 
funding mostly comes from the American governmental appropriation by the 
Congress, only supports democratization programs in foreign countries, thus 
belonging to the fourth kind of international intervention. In fact, the fourth kind of 
intervention was identified by the UN Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States in 1981. The law-making 
UN declaration confirmed “the duty of a State to refrain from the promotion, 
encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities 
within other States, under any pretext whatsoever, or any action which seeks to 
• Prevention, Investigation, Mediation, 
Condemnation, Judicial Intervention, 
Recognition,etc. 
Diplomatic 
• Sanctions on a target's economy or trade, 
Arms Embargo   
• Humantarian and Ecomoic Assistance 
Economic 
• Traditional Peacekeeping  
• Air Strike/Occupation/Naval Patrol,etc. Military  
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disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of other States”.3  
 
There is a significant difference between the narrow definition of intervention in 
international law and the broad use of this concept in state practices. In the light of 
international law the essence of the intervention is coercion (Jamnejad and Wood, 
2009), thus only the military action can constitute an undisputed intervention while 
whether diplomatic, economic or political action counts as non-forcible interventions 
was highly contingent on the degree of coerciveness and varied from case to case. 
However, considering the wide range of actions and cases that the EU and China 
concerned and involved, I adopt a broader definition of intervention to start with. 
First, it does not reduce the measure of intervention to the use of armed force. This 
point is not only for the EU, which lacks military capabilities and relies on civilian 
means, but also considering China’s political rhetoric that non-coercive means such 
as meeting Dalai Lama also could present interferences in China’s domestic affairs. 
Secondly, it does not necessitate an explicit ‘non-consent’ of target state as some 
legal definition emphasizes, because in practice it is difficult to measure the degree 
of consent which could be ambiguous or forced. Third, the definition does not rely on 
the humanitarian purpose of preventing widespread human rights violations, which 
is sometimes suspected to conceal other motives for interests. 
 
Meanwhile, a distinction needs to be drawn between unilateral and multilateral 
interventions. On the one side, an action through the UN Security Council, often for 
peacekeeping initiatives, is definitely a multilateral intervention which survives from 
                                                             
3 “The duty of a State to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or 
indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities within other States, under any pretext 
whatsoever, or any action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the 
political order of other States” A/RES/36/103, 9 December 1981 
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the check of veto-wielding powers. On the other, the Bush doctrine and United States 
realpolitik are the quintessence of pursuing unilateral foreign intervention, which 
even triggered a transatlantic quarrel during the Iraqi war in 2003. On this view, this 
criterion distinguishes unilateral and multilateral intervention seems whether the 
intervention secures the UN authorization. However, according to the definition of 
multilateralism, a multilateral cooperation among three or more states could also 
take place in regional organization or other groups of states, not only within the UN 
framework. For instance, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 comes to mind. 
NATO’s air bombing of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a multinational 
military action among 13 NATO member states, but without advance authorization 
from the UN Security Council.  
 
Here I argue that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo is not a multilateral intervention by 
adding the threshold of jurisdiction: the target state should be the member of the 
organization which undertakes the intervention. Only if so, the norms and principles 
governing this multilateral intervention could be naturally applied to the intervened 
state, which is assumed to comply with these principles and mechanism which may 
result the forward-looking intervention since it became a member voluntarily. This is 
because multilateral intervention is different from ordinary multilateral cooperation 
among ‘three or more states’ in other fields since its policy target is also a sovereign 
state, which must be taken into account. Concerning this precondition, UN 
intervention in Gulf War during 1990-91 was multilateral since both Kuwait and Iraq 
are UN member states; ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was multilateral since Liberia 
was its member state;4 while NATO’s intervention in Kosovo cannot meet the 
criterion because neither the former Yugoslavia nor Kosovo was a member of NATO. 
                                                             
4 UN also authorized ECOWAS intervention in 1992, S/RES/788 (1992), 19 November 1992 
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Instead, we may grant NATO’s intervention another title: collective intervention, 
which refers to activities that require the coordination of efforts by two or more 
individual states. Furthermore, we can find another realist reason to refute the 
intervention in Kosovo as multilateral if we believe that the validity of multilateralism 
is predicated on the multiple centres of power (‘multi-polarity’), in which we count 
NATO or the West as one polarity, and thus unilateralism only. In short, NATO was 
regarded as one actor rather than ‘three or more’ in cases like Kosovo. 
 
(II) Multilateral Intervention on Domestic Crisis: Practices and Debates 
A rigid definition usually raises more questions than it answers. Here I do not claim to 
provide the definite solution to the long-standing debate in the literature on 
intervention. Nevertheless, now we get an operational definition of multilateral 
intervention, as a fragile alliance of two different conceptions: multilateralism and 
intervention, as follows: 
 
‘Three or more actors engaging in a policy aims at the domestic affairs of another 
state through institutionalized international cooperation governed by norms and 
principles. In addition, the target state should be a member of this international 
institution or organization’.  
 
According to this definition, the most frequent multilateral interventions are through 
the United Nations, which includes almost all the countries of the world, whereas 
interventions undertaken by regional organization could be the exception if they can 
meet the additional precondition of jurisdiction. However, different international 
organization held different principles in respect of intervention, or even the same 
organization could have different principles.  
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The practice of multilateral intervention is not as recent as is often thought. The early 
case of multilateral intervention can be traced back to the Concert of Europe in the 
19th century. Its founding powers were Austria, Prussia, Russia and the Britain, later 
France joined as a fifth member of the concert. Largely as a reaction to the radicalism 
of the French Revolution, they share an important principle: suppressing liberalism 
and nationalism, and revert to the Status quo of Europe prior to 1789. Among the 
five the Prussia, Austria and Russia formed the Holly Alliance with the expressed 
intent of preserving Christian values and traditional monarchism. Based on their 
shared principles and obligations, the Concert of Europe intervened or attempted to 
intervene in domestic revolutions of third countries. For example, in 1822, the 
Congress of Verona met to decide the issue if France could intervene on the side of 
the Spanish royalists in the Trienio Liberal. After receiving permission, Louis XV III 
dispatched five army corps to restore Ferdinand VII of Spain.5 After its 40 year’s 
success in preserving peace, the shared principle of the Concert of Europe was 
eroded by the surge of nationalism and liberalism after the European Revolutions of 
1848, followed by a series of war and the First World War eventually.  
 
In the mid-20th century, the United Nations lent the strength of multilateralism from 
the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations, by establishing an institution that 
managing issues of security and intervention in a multilateral fashion, and requiring 
the coordination of great powers: in 1945 were the United States, Soviet Union, 
United Kingdom, France and China who possess privileged permanent membership 
with veto power until now. As suggested in the UN chapter, shared principles such as 
                                                             
5 Strictly, Spain is not a member of Concert of Europe. But this intervention at least reached 
a fair consensus of multi-polarities in Europe except Britain, which prevented the allies from 
interfering with the revolts occurring in Spanish America and created enough discord among 
the allies to cause a breakdown in the congress system. 
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preventing aggressive war, promoting human rights and social/economic progress, 
which are far away from that of the Concert of Europe, should be the cornerstones of 
multilateralism in the UN. However, the problems arise as these various principles 
increasingly intertwined particularly in the aftermath of the bipolar world. The 
question of how to intervene is regularly debated in the UN and the consensus is 
more difficult to reach: When different principles and rules are in conflict in a case, 
which one is more suitable? A typical example is the high-profile debate about 
humanitarian interventions: Should we lift the general prohibition on the use of force 
(E.g. The Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) to intervene in a sovereign UN member 
states for the exception of protecting their people from wholesale human rights 
violations such as genocide (E.g. The 1948 Genocide Convention)?  
 
Before the 1990s the principle of non-intervention was prevalent and the concept of 
humanitarian intervention was not accepted in the international society from the 
West to the East (Wheeler 2000). There are two main reasons: (1) during the Cold 
War any intervention or proposal for intervention from either the Soviet bloc or the 
Western camp was easily suspected and objected by the other side; (2) in the era of 
decolonization a large number of post-colonial countries who cherished the 
self-determination were strongly opposing any international intervention (Roberts 
2004:78-80). Moreover, after the defeat of Saddam Hussein in 1991, there is no more 
war of aggregation, which can trigger the conventional multilateral intervention of 
the UN according to the Article 39 of the UN Charter.6  
 
                                                             
6 “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. ” 
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From the 1990s onward, however, the scope of Article 39 has been extended. A less 
clear turning point also occurred in 1991 and in Iraq, when the UN Security Council 
Resolution 688 first time concerned the refugee crisis caused by repression of the 
Iraqi Kurdish as a “threat to International Peace and Security”,7 which was used by 
France, the UK and the US to intervene in Iraq with no-fly zones. Until 2004, the UN 
Security Council explicitly referred 8 cases involving domestic humanitarian crisis in 
1990s to the Chapter VII: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Albania, 
Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor (Roberts 2004: 82). The strengthened 
cooperation of great powers in the UN throughout the 1990s was partly attributable 
to the less antagonistic structure of the international system.  
 
Since then, the intervention aiming at humanitarian crisis becomes frequent but also 
controversial. It is frequently because intrastate conflicts between regimes, ethnical 
and social groups have mushroomed in the third world (notably Africa) since the end 
of the Cold War. Sometimes they are labelled as ‘wars of the third kind’ (Holsti 1996), 
which often resulted horrendous human rights violations such as pillage, rape, 
deportation and even massacres in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur. It gives rise to the 
attempt to correct the situation from the international community, in particular 
countries which are more sensitive to the intensification of refugee flows and media 
effects. Meanwhile, it is controversial because various standards or legal definitions 
of humanitarian intervention, including divergences on (1) whether humanitarian 
intervention is limited to cases where there has been explicit UN Security Council 
authorization for action; and (2) whether humanitarian interventions is limited to 
instances where the principle of sovereignty is respected, say, there is a consent of 
the host state.  
                                                             
7 S/RES/688 (1991), 5 April 1991 
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As regards the first debate about who should intervene, the rule-based 
multilateralism usually achieves legitimacy. For the convenience of the analysis, I 
have made a pragmatic definition of multilateral intervention which emphasizes the 
fundamental role of the UN in multilateral intervention while leave the room for 
regional organizations in occasional situations. Two reasons further support the 
exception for regional organization: (1) to limit the monopoly of the UN in 
multilateral intervention. Such an absolute monopoly may encourage the overuse of 
veto in the Security Council, thus any objection from the permanent five, possibly 
only for the purpose of supporting their allies, could thwart the proposal for a 
legitimate intervention; (2) to recognize the active role of regional or sub regional 
organizations. Due to their geographical proximity, states in the same region are 
usually more affected by the domestic situation of their neighbours, thus may have 
stronger political willingness and need less preparation time for a rapid deployment 
if there is a need.8 
 
Nowadays multilateral intervention is regarded as legitimate by ‘signalling broad 
support for the actor’s goals’ (Finnemore 2004:82), whereas unilateralism is often 
associated with illegitimacy in the global policy areas. Nevertheless, here we do not 
exclude the ethical validity of an intervention that cannot meet the criteria of 
multilateralism. For example, NATO’s unilateral intervention was regarded as “illegal, 
but legitimate” by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000: 4), 
because the intervention served as the last resort after the exhaustion of all 
diplomatic means and had the positive effect of liberating the majority population of 
Kosovo from a long period of oppression. However, there is no opinion Juris in favour 
                                                             
18 This point is also recognized by ICISS report on responsibility to protect. (ICISS 2001: 53) 
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of this kind of unilateral humanitarian Intervention because the practice has been so 
haphazard, parochial, and controversial that it cannot create a customary norm 
(Tyagi 1995:893). Generally, unilateralism should be avoided as much as possible in 
international intervention since it pays inadequate respect to both the will of target 
state and the consensus of international society thus may damage the stability of the 
international order.  
 
What the dissertation explicitly concerned is the second debate of what principles 
and rules could underpin the multilateral intervention. This debate directly affects 
the effectiveness of a multilateral intervention and the credibility of UN institutional 
framework, and thus could cause significant consequence in international relations in 
a long term. For example, considering the humanitarian crisis and proposed 
multilateral interventions in Darfur, arguably, China emphasized the need to respect 
Sudan’s sovereignty that signifies the requirement of Sudan’s consent to any 
international intervention, while the EU demonstrated its commitment to human 
rights and the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect in Darfur. In the 
subsequent section, the article will demonstrate the EU-China ideational divergences 
and further inquire whether their ideas matter.   
 
(III) A Puzzle between Europe and China: ‘Conceptual Gaps’ on intervention 
In March 2008, the Tibetan unrest highlighted the political divergence between 
Europe 9 and China, which marked the nadir of EU-China relations since the 
Tiananmen incident in 1989. European reaction to the unrest was to concern the 
Tibetan human rights condition by blaming Beijing’s policy, announcing critical 
                                                             
9 Here ‘Europe’, or the magic word ‘EUrope’ (Wood 2011), is an umbrella term for European 
Union as well as its (powerful) Member States which could act collectively or individually. 
The dissertation will further elaborate the actorness of Europe in Chapter 3. 
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parliamentary resolutions and even threatening to boycott the Beijing Olympics. In 
response to Europe, China made a diplomatic protest against the ‘interference on 
China’s internal affairs’, cancelled the EU-China summit in Lyon, together with a 
popular campaign of boycotting Carrefour, because the former French president 
Nicolas Sarkozy planned to meet the Dalai Lama (He did it in November 2008), and a 
story said the LVMH Group, the largest shareholder of Carrefour, has donated much 
money to the Dalai Lama. It is conceivable that EU-China relations once suffered from 
the quarrel over Tibet in 2008, and even now Europeans and Chinese probably are 
not better comprehending each other’s standpoints on it.  
 
Tibet is not the only case. On the one side, normative concerns which range from 
democracy to human rights, from sustainable peace to rule of law, have long played a 
driving role in the EU’s engagement policy toward China. On the other, Beijing’s 
foreign and domestic policy has developed in a way which has paid little attention to 
these European advocated ideas and norms, and China even constantly runs counter 
to them in several cases, from Tibet to Darfur, from nuclear proliferation to climate 
change (Fox and Godement 2009). Despite European unremitting efforts in 
promoting their cherished values and norms in bilateral relations and multilateral 
institutions, why China still does not fully share these ‘good ideas’ with Europe, but 
often disputes happened? Does the fact indicate that these shifts of norms are 
confined to the West, rather than a global diffusion? This could be a big puzzle in 
EU-China relations as well as world politics. 
 
Is it just due to the geopolitical and economic competitions? We are familiar with this 
kind of realist account in media reports. For example, China has substantial economic 
interests in Sudan and vital security concerns in Tibet. Therefore, Beijing tends to 
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object any potential intervention in these areas in order to keep the status quo, 
whereas the EU seeks to increase its economic and geopolitical influence in these 
areas thus approved of interventions. From this view, both China and the EU are just 
doing the material cost-benefit calculation. However, we can find some anomalies in 
which economic or geopolitical motivations are less convincing. For instance, the EU 
still keeps the arms embargo against China and insists a critical human rights 
dialogue with China, which actually costs in economic terms and not without 
sacrifices in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the EU sometimes adopted theses 
‘interventionist’ policies on China, although it is difficult to maintain them 
continuously owing to the attendant high material costs. For China, its traditional 
non-intervention policy is sometimes inadequate to protect the huge Chinese 
investments in several trouble spots. But why does Beijing still keep the policy?  
 
The study associated the EU-China puzzle with ideational factors has gained 
significance over the last few years. In January 2011, a Europe-China symposium on 
‘Conceptual Gaps in China-EU Relations’ was held at Fudan University, Shanghai. 
Scholars’ discussions revolved around six core conceptions: sovereignty, human 
rights, normative power/soft power, multilateralism/multipolarity, global governance 
and strategic partnership, in which they think European and Chinese have 
‘conceptual gaps’ rather than ‘shared Ideas’. Experts from Europe and China 
generally believed that these ‘conceptual gaps’ have a conspicuous negative impact 
on EU-China relations, especially in cases of Tibet, Taiwan, arms embargo, Africa and 
Iran nuclear issue (Pan and Zhu 2011:92).  
 
Conceptions of sovereignty and human rights were considered as the widest 
conceptual gaps between Europe and China. From a Chinese perspective, 
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sovereignty was a concept invented by Europeans and imposed on Chinese in the 
19th century, today it is the one that the Europeans try to bury and the Chinese make 
every effort to defend. For example, China perceives a Tibet issue as a concern of 
sovereignty which may endanger China’s territorial integrity, while Europe tends to 
perceive a Tibet issue as an issue of human rights. As a result, China blamed the EU 
and its member states’ interference in China's internal affairs, while Europe criticized 
China for using sovereignty as an excuse to violate Tibetan human rights (Pan & Gao 
2011: 68). Several other cases, including issues of Taiwan and Africa, which display 
the similar divergence on the concept of sovereignty between Europe and China. 
 
The issue of human rights is one of the most controversial topics in the EU-China 
relationship. Freeman and Geeraerts find that the notable difference in perception of 
human rights between China and the EU is not confined to their official positions, 
which may be accused of propaganda for deception, but is also reflected in how the 
ordinary Europeans and Chinese regard their human rights (Freeman and Geeraerts 
2011). In Europe, a widespread view which argues that as economic development 
takes place in China there will be increasing demands for human rights and 
democracy. But the data from the World Values Survey indicates a strong possibility 
that this expectation is misplaced. Instead, there may be a growing gap between the 
views on human rights held by the Europeans and Chinese. 
 
Men Jing, a Chinese professor in the College of Europe, asserts that the concerns of 
state sovereignty and of human rights are often in conflict. The EU’s approach to 
promote democracy and human rights is regarded as ‘new interventionism’, which 
actually challenges the principle of sovereignty. Then she elaborates China’s 
preference on sovereignty and collective rights. The concept of sovereignty was only 
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introduced to China after Western powers established their concession areas in 
Chinese territory. As a result of this humiliated historical experience, Chinese always 
prioritizes sovereign rights over human rights. She concludes that the different 
understandings of sovereignty and human rights help to explain the difficulties in 
EU–China political relations, and the EU should not intervene in China’s human rights 
issues which are perceived by Beijing as China’s domestic affairs.  
 
The common theme in the articles is that these conceptual gaps, in particular on 
human rights and sovereignty, may have a notable impact on EU-China relations and 
their approaches to international interventions. It seems commonsensical that 
ideational factors could be the reason of the EU and China’s foreign policy if not the 
cause of them. It is also true that these conceptual gaps between China and Europe 
have deep-rooted origins: We have to recognize that conceptions of human rights 
and sovereignty do vary with cultures, and that this something has to be taken into 
account in the making of policy, for example, to ‘manage the gaps’ on sovereignty by 
‘mutual avoidance, mutual assurance and mutual accommodation’ (Pan 2010).  
 
Before we congratulate for finding a plausible factor to disentangle the puzzle, 
however, the very nature of the subject requires our attention on two aspects. First, 
it is obvious that more than one factor could be responsible for the occurrence of the 
EU and China’s foreign policies, so it is difficult to assert that ideas or other single 
factor can determine their (non-)intervention policies alone. Instead, the dissertation 
suggests that ideas, as well as material interests have causal weights in a general 
explanation, but only taking ideas into account, we can resolve empirical anomalies 
in some specific cases where economic and geopolitical motivations are inadequate. 
Second, the larger issue in IR is not whether ideas matter, but how they 
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matter—under what conditions, to what extent, in what respects, through what 
process? Just describe some particular ideas existing in a specific society, is not 
enough to establish the causation in the making of foreign policy. Correlation is not 
equal to causation. Even the EU and China often interpret their policies with their 
principles and norms, it does not necessitate that they really act in accordance with 
these ideas. Previous researches were inclined to focus on the content of their 
ideational divergences rather than the actual effects of these ideas. Instead, this 
dissertation examines whether these ideational claims fit with the empirical records 
in cases of international intervention. For this purpose, the dissertation selects the 
Darfur Crisis (2003-2009) and Libyan Civil War (2011) as the two key case studies, 
mainly for explanatory analysis of ideational factors, rather than a comparative study 
between the EU and China’s foreign policies.  
 
(IV) Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The key research question of the dissertation is: Why did China and the EU make 
such intervention or non-intervention policies in Darfur and Libyan crises, and to 
what extent their policy-makings were influenced by ideational factors such as 
principles, values, cultures and public opinions, vis-à-vis the material factors like 
economic interests and security concerns. The following sub questions will form the 
framework and basic contents of the dissertation:  
 
1. In theory, why the ideas could matter in international relations and the foreign 
policy making process? (Chapter 2) 
   
2. Why have human rights and democracy ideas been embedded in Europe? How 
ideational factors could shape the foreign policy makings of the EU and key 
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member states? (Chapter 3) 
 
3. Why the principle of non-interference emerged and evolved in China? How 
ideational factors could influence the Chinese foreign policy makings? (Chapter 4) 
 
4. To what extent the above ideas and principles affect the EU and China’s 
policy-makings on the interventions in Darfur and Libya crisis, comparing to 
economic and geopolitical factors? (Chapter 5 & 6) 
 
The dissertation has two explanatory hypotheses: First, China and the EU acquire and 
maintain their contrasting principles and norms through pre-existing but persistent 
political and social interactions at the domestic and international level. Secondly, I 
surmise that once certain ideas and principles were embedded in institutions, they 
often exert a major lasting impact on the formulation of foreign policies and general 
stances on interventions. To demonstrate this argument, we will mainly lend strength 
from constructivism and institutionalism: the former accounts for the first hypothesis, 
while the latter serves for my second one. The second hypothesis is the focus of the 
dissertation, and the institutionalization serves as the mechanism linking the ideas 
and the policies.  
 
My main rival hypothesis in this dissertation is a realist account, which claims that 
the (non-)intervention in a foreign crisis can be explained solely on the basis of 
material factors, such as security concerns and economic self-interests. A Neo-Realist 
argument usually maintains that ideas, principles and norms are simply a function of 
power and interests and thus produce no independent analytical leverage. Regarding 
the actor’s motivation for crisis intervention, realists tend to repudiate the existence 
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or the discernible effect of ideational concerns. I will show, in contrast, the ideational 
factor has an autonomous effect and that an explanation combining the normative 
component could better account for the policies of intervention and 
non-intervention. A detailed discussion of the theories will be given in the Chapter 2.  
 
(V) Methodology 
Methodological Holism but…: Methods of research are not discrete, but inevitably 
related to certain theoretical position. On the basis of constructive theoretical 
framework briefly mentioned above, the dissertation will mainly concern collective 
social ideas more than individual ideas.10 However, we will not go so far to the 
extent of negating institutional agencies, which serve as the entrepreneurs and 
carriers of social ideas, and thus are essential units of analysis. It is possible that 
“One can continue to study ‘beliefs’ in terms of what is inside people’s minds and 
simultaneously insist that these beliefs are representations and enactments of social 
and intersubjective culture” (Risse 2000:5). In addition, the holist approach of ideas 
may also lend the strength of individualistic methods, notably psychology. For 
example, the psychological concept of ‘identification’ and ‘categorization’ may be 
respectively useful in explaining the convergence within the EU and the divergence 
between the EU and China.  
 
Process Tracing in Case Study: An intensive within-case analysis of the Darfur and 
Libyan crisis will be used in Chapters 5 and 6. The main advantages of case study 
methods in this research project include identifying and examining ideational factors 
in individual cases, developing historical explanations of particular events, and 
                                                             
10 Two basic tenets of ‘constructivism’ in IR: (1) the ‘Idealist’ approach, believes that the 
structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than 
material forces, and (2) the ‘holist’ approach asserts that identities and interests of purposive 
actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (Wendt 1999:1). 
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investigating the trace of preconditions. During the process tracing, we must 
continually ask “if this explanation is accurate in this case, what else must be true 
about the processes through which the hypothesized causal mechanisms unfolded in 
this case” (Bennett and Elman 2008: 503). To fulfil the goal, my case study will 
combine the techniques of investigation with the approach of counterfactual 
reasoning. Investigations require getting inside the hearts of political institutions 
even the heads of decision-makers, which is the key challenge to any case study. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of meaning through empathetic understanding is 
possible, by searching for their justifications in archives and asking them questions in 
interviews. A common problem for archival researches and interviews is to what 
extent we can trust what they said and wrote. Therefore, a counterfactual reasoning 
is a beneficial complement to the case study. We should explore what might have 
happened had the ideational factors not occurred or changed, and considering the 
possibility of alternative hypotheses, for instance, of commercial or security factors.  
 
Descriptive and Discursive analysis: Ideas are conveyed through discourse. With 
theoretically informed narrative and discourse analysis, our research focus could shift 
from ‘what actually happened between Europe and China?’ to ‘how do the EU and 
China make sense of what happened’ and ‘why the EU and China make sense of a 
same international intervention in different ways’, in which international actors 
interpreted events in terms of their own ideas. The dissertation will provide a 
descriptive detailed account of what goes in the EU and China’s calculations on 
international interventions, so as to emphasize a contextual understanding of their 
foreign policy. In this way, a foreign policy that may appear irrational at first glance 
may make sense when understood in the particular domestic or global context within 
which that foreign policy takes place. The application of the approach to any given 
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country or political system requires a great deal of knowledge about them. For 
example, to investigate the ideas of the EU and China, the dissertation will utilize key 
texts on the EU and China’s external relations, and relevant sources from the 
EU/China’s official policy statements, speeches of the leaders, records of meetings, 
research papers. Besides, pertinent quantitative data on public opinions and 
economic statistics is helpful. 
 
Interviews with scholars and officials in relevant fields will be necessary for the 
research, because actors or observers who experienced a case often observed 
unrecorded evidences. Besides, the dissertation will draw on insights from academic 
works, policy analyses by leading think tanks, official documents, press coverage and 
interviews. Like other case studies, due to my resource constraints in terms of time 
and access to informants, to some extent my analysis of cases would never be 
completed. Instead, any new information or evidence founded in the future could 
further confirm or correct my explanations. 
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Chapter 2 Theories: Why Ideas Matter in International 
Relations and Foreign Policy Makings 
 
The literature associated with ideas is burgeoning in International Relations Studies 
since the Third Great Debate, namely Reflectivism versus Rationalism in this 
discipline (Lapid 1989). Nevertheless, the fact that ideas or ideology is an important 
factor in foreign policy makings is still sometimes overlooked. There are diverse 
theoretical opinions as to whether ideas have a valid place in Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA). The principal goal of the chapter is to explain why we need to take ideas into 
account in analysing the phenomenon of international intervention, by lending these 
theoretical insights.  
 
The chapter is divided into two primary sections. The first part gives a critical review 
of theoretical approaches, namely Realism, Marxism, Liberalism, Constructivism and 
Institutionalism that represent distinct approaches to the study of ideas in 
international relations. In the second part, I focus on the foreign policy makings and 
develop my eclectic theoretical framework, which grapples with the significant 
influence of ideas. The two parts are somehow inextricably linked. On the one hand, 
the debates canvassed in the grand theories have benefited and structured the 
Foreign Policy Analysis. On the other, the complex and emerging particular foreign 
policy issues do inspire theorists to rethink and improve their theories, by generating 
new questions to answer.  
 
(I) Different theoretical approaches to ideas in IR 
In numerous textbooks and classrooms, international relations theories are taken as 
a deep-seated paradigmatic contest consists of three or four Great Debates, in which 
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each such paradigms stick to contrasting ontology or epistemology positions, and 
thus emphasize on mutual exclusive explanatory determinants. For example, ideas 
should be the domain of constructivism, as power is for realism and domestic factors 
are for liberalism. If so, researches on ideational factors would be inevitably opposed 
by realists. However, this is not the case. No single grand IR theory can fully seize the 
empirical and conceptual connections due to the complexity of specific international 
affairs. Focusing on the given problem—the role of ideas in foreign policy makings of 
international actors, there exist relatively superfluous debates, but also productive 
interactions amid this welter of competing theoretical traditions. The following 
theoretical literature serves more than provide the ‘state of the art’, but also 
attempts to reinforce my theoretical framework stand up to the criticism from 
hard-core realists and materialists, by synthesizing what might be considered 
conflicting approaches to the study of International relations.  
 
i. Realism 
The traditionally dominant elaboration of foreign policy is the realism, which 
apparently contests the assumption that substantive contents of peoples’ idea could 
essentially influence the policies. Instead, on the basis of the premise of egoism, 
rationality and power politics, realists assume that self-interested unitary 
international groups (primary including but not limited to nation-states) always aim 
to maximize their given utility like material power, security or social influence, and 
can correctly anticipate the results of their actions in most cases. During this rational 
action process, ideas may serve no more than masks: political elites and 
policy-makers utilize some popular ideas to cover and legitimize their real material 
interests, as Edward Carr suggested, “Supposedly absolute and universal principles 
are not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based on a 
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particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time” (Carr 1946:87), in 
which ideas only play a minor constraint role rather than a causal role.  
 
We should recognize the diversity within the intellectual tradition of realism. 
Neorealist Kenneth Waltz establishes an elegant universal theory of international 
politics, which “bears on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to explain only 
certain aspects of them” (Waltz 1979: 72), and further himself states that 
“international politics is not foreign policy” because foreign policy is driven by both 
internal and external factors rather than coherent logic of ‘autonomous realms’, thus 
we should not strive for a truly theoretical explanations of it (Waltz 1996). By 
contrast, neoclassical realism attempts to narrow the gaps between general theories 
and particular foreign policy problems. For neoclassical realists, foreign policy is 
driven first and foremost by a state’s position in the international system and 
specifically by its relative material power capabilities, but the impact of systemic 
pressures and material power is indirect and problematic since they must be filtered 
through domestic-level intervening variables, such as perceptions of policy-makers 
and domestic political structure, through which states interpret, assess and respond 
to their external environment. (Rose 1998: 146-152) 
 
Here ideas have a place as domestic intervening variables, but only a subordinate 
place. Relative power is still in the foremost place, since foreign policy cannot beyond 
the limits and opportunities defined by international environment over a long term. 
Nevertheless, the translation from capabilities into external behaviour is often 
inaccurate and inconstant over a short and medium term, because ideational factors 
have an impact on this process. It is for this reason that neoclassical realists 
appreciate the theoretical development in “explicating how various psychological, 
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ideational, and cultural factors may affect how political actors perceive their own and 
others’ capabilities and how such perceptions are translated into foreign policy” 
(Rose 1998: 168). William Wohlforth (2008: 146), a self-identified realist, echoes 
Rose’s argument and admits that they indeed “increasingly incorporate theory and 
findings from other disciplines, notably psychology” (See Wohlforth 1993). For 
instance, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) finds its application in realist 
researches (See Tailiaferro 2004).  
 
Realism has one more point that I would like to touch on briefly. Considering the 
principled beliefs, early realists like Hans Morgenthau and Edward Carr once made 
famous claims of moral relativism like “Universal moral principles cannot be applied 
to the actions of states” (Morgenthau 1954:9), “no ethical standards are applicable to 
relations between states” (Carr 1946:153). However, their meritorious counterviews 
against an excessive embrace to the universality of one’s own ideas may be misread 
as an unshaken amoral declaration more than a half century later. Contemporary 
international issues, range from the a just/unjust war to humanitarian interventions, 
from international aids to the climate negotiation, indeed concern the ethics and 
moral standards which distinguish right and wrong. Even the strongest realist 
argument against moral consideration in international relations, such as raison d’état 
(reason of state), should be itself considered as a particular ethical argument 
upholding this school of thought (Donnelly 2008: 154). 
 
In sum, realism is not invariably resist the analysis of ideational factors, but reminds 
us the relative power still matters in the shaping of foreign policy, although in fact 
few states are prepared to spend their entire military hardware or economy 
strengths in pursing any single policy goal. Hence, we should never ignore the 
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significance of international environment, otherwise, the other determinants we long 
search for may be just epiphenomenal. Meanwhile, as Gideon Rose put it (Rose 1998: 
168), “future work in this vein should therefore focus on continuing to specify the 
ways intervening unit-level variables can deflect foreign policy from what pure 
structural theories might predict”. For example, realists should explain why China still 
keeps a status quo foreign policy and thus be reluctant to intervene abroad, even if 
its power and overseas interests grow remarkably in the past two decades. Following 
this way, (neoclassical) Realists will encounter Marxists, who are always inclined to 
domestic explanations of foreign policy.  
 
ii. Marxism 
Marxism is not a theory of international relations per se, but it studies the actions 
and motivations of the state including its external behaviours. According to the 
premise of historical materialism that history is determined by the material basis of 
society, Marxism would agree with realism that the international relation and foreign 
policy have more to do with material aspects than ideational factors. Despite the 
common materialist assumption, as a theory of capitalism, Marxism centres on 
economic interests of particular countries, instead of the unitary concerns of the 
state security as realists emphasize. In fact, as a radical approach, Marxists and 
Neo-Marxists in IR bash both realism and idealism as self-serving theories which are 
used by the upper socioeconomic class to justify their foreign policies. Rejecting the 
pure foreign policy analysis based on the coherent national interests, Marxism insists 
that domestic and foreign political spheres are fundamentally intertwined in which 
the class relations matter.  
 
Through the worldview of Marxism, the world is dominated by the capitalist class, 
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who is not only controlling the means of production, but also the instruments of 
statecraft in their respective societies, because the former is the base of the latter 
(superstructure). Among the instruments the most prominent one is the government 
and all its agencies, including defence and international relations agencies. Therefore, 
the state’s foreign policy usually reflects the preferences of the capitalist class, 
notably the further accumulation of capital. According to the Marxist theory of 
imperialism, this dynamic led to the stage of imperialism in which individual capitalist 
states were struggling to seize the markets and resources by war (Lenin 1916). While 
the capitalist world wars proved too destructive in the first half of the 20th century, 
the new strategy of domination was developed in the post-colonial world. The 
Western countries, the core, defend a world system where surplus materials are 
distributed from the periphery countries to the core countries (Wallerstein, 1974), 
and control this dependency with military force and economic regulations. (Cardoso 
& Faletto, 1979) 
 
No Marxist in IR can claim to represent all strands under the single label. Instead, 
there existed different schools of Marxism regarding the role of ideas. The strong 
deterministic school subscribes to economic reductionism and the 
base–superstructure theory, in which ideas are only the automatic reflections of 
material circumstances, while Neo-Gramscianism acknowledges the relative 
autonomy of the superstructure and embraces human ideas, culture and identity as a 
part of reality. It is relevant to the concept of hegemony, which was defined by 
Antonio Gramsci as the ‘combination of force and consent’ in his Prison Notebooks. 
The ruling ideas in every epoch come from the ideas of the ruling class, who have 
their own ‘organic intellectuals’ to establish the ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. 
Therefore, the above hegemonic world order is also partly based on the consent to 
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certain ideas. Robert Cox distinguishes two types of ideas: shared notions of the 
nature of social relations such as Westphalian system, and collective images of social 
order held by different groups of people, like the several and even opposed meanings 
of public good and justice (Cox 1981:136). Interacting with material capabilities and 
institutions, the factor of ideas is an essential sphere to analyse the historical 
structure and framework for action. 
 
To sum up, although largely left discredited by the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Communism in Europe after 1989, Marxism remains a valid perspective for analysing 
contemporary phenomena of international relations for two reasons. First, Marxism 
is still influential in certain countries like China in practice. Though embracing 
capitalism through its economic reform since 1978, China continues to proclaim 
Marxism as the official doctrine of its politic system. Beijing’s perceptions of the 
American and European foreign policies have been long shaped by the Marxism. For 
example, Beijing criticized the Western for inventing the concept of humanitarian 
intervention as a part of hegemony aims at legitimating the behaviours of pursuing 
material resources. Secondly, in theory, Marxism provides the insight that the foreign 
policy decision-makings are relevant to the domestic bargain particularly on 
economic issues. It is less radical to recognize that powerful interest groups can 
influence the external behaviours of a state to some extent. This point is shared by 
other IR theories but elaborated in different ways.  
 
iii. Liberalism  
One of the major progresses in international relations study is the growing 
recognition of the interplay between the domestic and international politics. The 
central insight of liberal international relations theory is to search for domestic roots 
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of international relation and domestic consequences of globalization.11Andrew 
Moravcsik, the principle exponent of liberalism in IR, argues that the behaviour of 
states (or other actors12) in world politics is fundamentally caused by their preference, 
which is defined by demands of individuals and groups in their domestic societies, 
while the globalization has dramatically changed the condition to realize their 
demands. Therefore, a central theoretical task of liberal theory is to focus on 
state-society relations and trace the state preference from social preference, during 
which “socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational 
interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through political 
exchange and collective action”. (Moravsick 1997: 517) 
 
Ideational factor matters as one source of state preference,13 “Contradictory or 
irreconcilable differences in core beliefs about national, political, and social identities 
promote conflict, whereas complementary beliefs promote harmony and 
cooperation” (Moravcsik 2008: 237). Three types of “social identities” are taken into 
consideration by liberals (Moravcsik 2008: 240-242). The first regards the identity 
concerns the scope of political community like ‘nation’. Moravcsik argues that the 
potential of conflict increases in some area where inconsistent competing claims of 
identity as borders of community exits. For example, the Tibet issue has provoked a 
diplomatic quarrel between China and European Union while the Taiwan issue has 
                                                             
11 Moravcsik distinguishes the liberal IR theory from the “neoliberal institutionalism” (E.g. 
Keohane). The former concerns about the social sources of state preferences while the latter 
focuses on international regimes and take state preferences as fixed or exogenous. 
(Moravsick 1997: 536) 
12 In some cases, the primary interests and allegiances of individuals and private groups are 
partly transferred to supranational institutions empowered to represent them effectively, for 
example, European Union. 
13 Moravcsik identifies three specific variants of liberal theory: Ideational, Commercial and 
Republican liberal theories, which share above liberal assumptions but stresses on particular 
type of state preferences. Anomalies within one variant of liberal theory may be resolved by 
considering other variants. 
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the biggest potential to trigger a military conflict between China and United States. 
The second one concerns the political ideology. The Cold War is a quintessential case 
where the irreconcilable ideological divergence between the Soviet Union and United 
States played a critical role in the international confrontation. On the contrary, 
democratic peace theory asserts that the democracies which share the similar 
democratic ideology do not go to war with each other. The third type of social 
identity concerns socioeconomic public goods provision embedded in local societal 
compromises. Such compromises underlie varying regulations on religious freedom, 
environmental protection, cultural promotion, and many other public goods 
increasingly discussed in international negotiations, ranging from the Conferences on 
climate change to human rights dialogue.  
 
Moravcsik reminds us, furthermore, a recent trend of social movements. Some 
activists within modern societies have adopted a more cosmopolitan view of political 
identity and rights which beyond the nation state, thus mobilized increasing social 
campaigns to defend the human rights of remote peoples, by pressuring their 
governments to act (Carpenter 2007). We should realize that some intervention 
became possible only because of this changed normative context at the domestic 
level in Western states (Wheeler 2004: 30). However, such cosmopolitan view may be 
in conflict with other states which hold a more communitarian view of political 
identity and rights, for instance, China. 
 
The form of representation is a key determinant of state preferences in liberal IR 
theory. As we have seen, no government is based on an ideal egalitarian political 
representation, but always lies somewhere between an extreme democracy in which 
representation empowers everybody equally, and an extreme dictatorial system in 
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which only one dictator has the supreme power. Therefore, Liberalism is not only 
applicable for the analysis of liberal state, whose representative institution serves as 
a “transmission belt” by which the preferences and social power of individuals and 
groups are translated and filtered into foreign policy,14 but also applies equally to 
states where “large inequalities in domestic social or political influence may permit 
certain groups to evade cost of costly conflict or rent-seeking behaviour, even if the 
result is inefficient for society as a whole”. (Moravcsik 2008: 237)  
 
In brief, the liberal theory confirms that complex foreign policies are rarely 
determinate by a single factor, but varying patterns of state preferences, which is not 
purely domestic but also reflect patterns of transnational societal interaction. 
Instead, a multicausal synthesis of a two-stage process is recommended by Moravcsik 
who claims that the investigation of state preference must receive analytical priority 
in such a synthesis (Moravsick 1997: 544-545). Following this way, we need to explain 
the formation of the state preference in the first stage, then introducing other 
exogenous systematic or environmental variables like relative capabilities in the 
second stage, rather than a reverse process as realists or neoliberal institutionalists 
maintain. Moreover, the liberal analysis of preferences is not only suitable to a single 
actor’s external behaviour, but also to international relations when the configuration 
of preferences is investigated—whether their preferences are conflicted or 
harmonized in an interdependent world? 
 
iv. Constructivism 
The contemporary theoretical debate about ideas in IR is not on whether ideas 
                                                             
14 Even a formally fair and open representative government also represents some individuals 
and groups more fully than others, due to the relatively inegalitarian distribution of wealth, 
power and talent. 
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matter, but primarily on how they matter. Based on the presupposition of Homo 
economicus, Realists assume that states pursue individual advantages by calculating 
costs and benefits, but also acknowledge that the rationality is usually bounded by 
the information, the time and the ideas as cognitive limitations of individual minds. 
Comparing to realists, liberals like Moravcsik grounded on a milder rational baseline, 
are more generous to recognize the role of ideas as one of determinants of state 
preferences. However, liberal theories lack a further discussion of how rational actors 
come to possess preferences in the first place (Simpson 2008:257). In other word, if 
ideas matter in the formation of preferences, where are the particular ideas from? Is 
it possible that these influential ideas are also political and socially constitutive? If 
not, we must assume that the ideas are ‘pre-political’ as Moravcsik appears to do 
(Reus-Smit 2001:584). Besides, is there a possibility that the preferences are not only 
shaped by the interactions of individuals and groups on domestic level but also by 
that at international level? If not, we must assume a very separation between 
domestic and international politics, which Moravcsik attempts to close. 
 
It was not until the rise of constructivism since 1990s that the above questions 
receive a great deal of attention. For constructivists, the ideas shaping international 
politics are first ‘inter-subjective’ as shared among people rather than individual 
beliefs. In addition, the ideas are institutionalized as expressed practices and 
identities (Hurd 2008:301). Regarding the emergence of ideas, Jeffrey Legro (2005: 
4-6) states that new foreign policy ideas are shaped by dominant Ideas embedded 
not only in human brains but also in the ‘collective memories’, government 
procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft. These instruments 
are all constructed by social interactions rather than taken as given.  
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With regard to the international influence on the state preferences, constructivism 
stresses the role of international norm and identity. In respect of norms, Ian Hurd 
summaries that “the action of states contributes to making the institutions and 
norms of international life, and these institutions and norms contribute to defining, 
socializing and influencing states”. He gives an example that when states claim they 
using force only in self-defence, they inevitably reconfirm the UN Charters which 
forbid aggressive war, while redefine the norms by specifying how they wish the 
concepts of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘self-defence’ to be understood (Hurd 2008:304). With 
regard to identities, Alexander Wendt says actors acquire relational identities by 
participating in collective meanings. A state may have multiple identities as 
‘sovereign’, ‘leader of the free world’ and so on, and “each identities is an inherently 
social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold 
about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social 
world” (Wendt 1992:397-398). Though using different terms, both the two 
constructivists recognize the mutual constitution of states and international 
structures.  
 
Although constructivism focusing on ideational factors, it does not imply that thus it 
is inapplicable to the analysis of rational strategic foreign policy. Like realism and 
liberalism, constructivism admits that states usually behave rationally to pursue their 
interests. What distinguishes these theoretical approaches are their different 
opinions about the source and the content of interests. Constructivism says 
“identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt 1992:398), which require interpreting 
how states perceive their needs and interests through their constructed identities. By 
contrast, realism usually claims states usually are motivated by non-differentiated 
material incentives, while liberalism underscores preferences which mix ideational, 
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commercial and institutional motivations. In other words, constructivism may be not 
incompatible, but complementary to rationalistic theories such as realism and 
liberalism, since they are aim to answer different questions (Hurd 2008:304): 
constructivism specializes in explaining how actors acquire their identities and 
interests through social interactions; liberalism is suited to answer how these 
identities transform into state preferences through representative institutions; and 
realism is strong in exploring how actors utilizing and constrained by power politics in 
pursuit of their already constructed interests.15 
  
v. Institutionalism 
The study of political institutions is indispensable to this dissertation, in particular 
the part of policy analysis. Institutions can be defined as “formal and informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions, embedded in the organizational 
structures of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). What are 
the consequences of institutions for external behaviours? Within an institutional 
perspective, any political behaviour is not just a pursuit of self-interest, but also 
follows the logic of appropriateness and a sense of rights and obligations provided by 
their belonged institutions, which are carriers of identities and norms and makers of 
a polity’s character, history and vision. In brief, if social ideas can play a role in 
policy-makings, they must play through institutions. Hence, the basic units of analysis 
should be the rules, routines, norms, identities of an ‘institution’, rather than 
micro-rational individuals or macro-social forces (March & Olsen 2006). Take the 
example of the EU, whose member states’ foreign policies may need to be in 
                                                             
15 Samuel Barkin identifies two kinds of constructivist: liberal-constructivists believe that 
anarchy has few effects independent of the norms and identities of actors, thus good norms 
and ideas can transform world politics by overcoming powers. Realist-constructivists agree 
with liberal-constructivists about anarchy being a social construction, but not about the 
degree to which power can be transcended in world politics. (Barkin 2003:334) 
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accordance with their membership and the ethos, practices and expectations of the 
Union, although the causal relation between institutional arrangements and 
particular policy is indirect and contingent.  
 
Similar to the debate among theories of international relations, there exist multiple 
conceptions of political institutions which also differ greatly about the role of ideas. 
Inspired by economics and mathematics, Rational-Choice Institutionalism (RI) focuses 
on the micro-level game between preference-given individuals within institutional 
environment, and usually treats ideas as a constraining factor on actors’ calculus logic. 
By contrast, Normative Institutionalism considers institutions as static norms and 
cultures. Institutions embed rules and routines, which can affect actors’ preferences, 
perceptions, and identities, for example, by defining what constitutes an appropriate 
action. Focusing on the ‘path dependence’, Historical Institutionalism (HI) does not 
deny the calculus logics while draw more attention to ideas which are perceived as 
relational and often normative. “For institutional actors themselves, ideas serve as 
the glue that holds an administration, party, or agency together in its tasks, help to 
garner public support, and provide a standard to evaluate the institution’s policy 
outcomes (Sanders 2006: 42).  
 
Furthermore, the latest Constructivist institutionalism grants a crucial place for ideas. 
They claim that institutions are built on ideational foundations which exert an 
independent path dependent effect on the subsequent development of institutions. 
A main task of constructivist institutionalists is to identify, detail, and interrogate the 
extent to which—through processes of normalization and institutional 
embedding—established ideas become codified, serving as cognitive filters through 
which actors come to interpret environmental signals and conceptualize and assess 
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their strategic conducts (Hay 2006:65). Along with constructivist institutionalism, 
Vivian Schmidt uses the term of ‘Discursive institutionalism’ to emphasize the role of 
ideas but also discourses. According to her definition, discourse encompasses not 
only the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which 
ideas are conveyed. (Schmidt 2008: 305) Discourse comes in two forms: the 
coordinative discourse among policy actors and the communicative discourse 
between political actors and the public. The discursive interaction either appear to go 
from top to bottom, in which political elites shape mass public opinion by 
establishing the terms of the discourse and by framing the issues in the mass media; 
or go from bottom to top in which we count on the advocacy networks of social 
activists. Therefore, “tracing discursive processes of coordination and communication 
is a way of showing why ideas may succeed or fail”. (Schmidt 2008: 311) 
 
To conclude, no shortage of literature that discuss the role of ideas in international 
relations, although so far no consensus about the way of ideational influence is 
reached. Metatheoretical disputes among different research traditions might be 
endless. As Kratochwil puts it, “The desire to win, to stand one’s ground, perhaps not 
surprisingly, is most of the time stronger than the genuine search for an acceptable 
solution to a problem.” (Kratochwil 2003: 125). At the same time, there is also 
growing efforts to promote a theoretical dialogue and synthesis between realism and 
constructivism (Sterling-Folker 2002, Barkin 2003, Jackson 2004). This dissertation 
argues that no individual theory is able to explain every aspect of international 
relations, while certain theories may offer convincing explanations to certain parts of 
the puzzle. For example, the emergences and the effects of certain ideas have 
different kinds of causality. By combining different theoretical approaches such as 
Constructivism and liberalism/Institutionalism in concrete conditions, the study in 
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this dissertation will more relevant to the complex foreign policy makings in the real 
world. In the following session, we will discuss the process of foreign policy makings 
in which the ideational factor is a necessary variable to evaluate.  
 
(II) Ideas and the foreign policy making  
There is a long-standing debate in the study of history and social science that 
whether and to what extent we can explain agent’s actions from their professed 
principle. Quentin Skinner (2002) gives a solution by emphasizing that even these 
principles are not genuine motives of agents and causes of their behaviour, but 
agents possess a strong motive for attempting to legitimate their (in particular 
questionable) behaviours. For example, they may utilize existing favourable terms 
established in their societies, or invent new norms to alter existing terms. In the end, 
“They will find themselves committed to behaving in such a way that their actions 
remain compatible with the claim that their professed principles genuinely motivated 
them”. Skinner’s argument is probably suitable for the actions and principles of 
international intervention. Because of the continuing controversy over the 
intervention, both the EU’s intervention policy and China’s non-intervention policy 
are questionable behaviour in the eyes of others, no matter what motives behind 
and whether their motives are ethical. Hence, both sides have the burden of proof, 
and use their favourable terms, either human rights or sovereignty established in 
international society, or promote emerging norms like R2P to legitimate their policies. 
Once they did that, their policy options will be restricted to a corresponding range of 
actions, even the actions are not always beneficial to them.  
 
There are various definitions and categorizations of ideas. Vivian Schmidt categorizes 
two types of ideas: cognitive ideas or called causal ideas elucidate “what is and what 
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to do”, and normative ideas indicate “what is good or bad about what is” in light of 
“what one ought to do” (Schmidt 2008: 306-309). Goldstein and Keohane (1993) 
classify ideas into world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs. The world view is 
the fundamental cognitive orientation of an individual or society encompassing the 
entirety of the individual or society's knowledge and point-of-view, which refers to 
the framework of ideas and beliefs through which an individual, group or culture 
interprets the world and interacts with it. Principled beliefs specify ethical criteria for 
distinguish right from wrong and just from unjust in international relations. For 
example, ‘Human rights takes precedence over Sovereignty’, and ‘Sovereignty ranks 
above Human rights’ are two sharply opposing principle beliefs. Causal beliefs serve 
as guides for agents on how to achieve their goals. For example, the efficacy of EU’s 
promotion of norms depends on the existence of a set of shared causal beliefs by 
other actors, who believe EU’s actions could benefit them, rather than threat them. 
In this dissertation, I mainly investigate the ideas taken the form of principle beliefs, 
or called normative ideas, which certainly related to broader world views.16  
 
What, then, is ‘foreign policy’ used in this dissertation? Let we separate out the term 
into its constituent parts. The term ‘policy’ has been defined as ‘A deliberate course 
of (in-)action selected among available alternatives to achieve a certain outcome’, 
which is ‘often initiated in response to high-profile incidents’ (Versluis, van Keulen & 
Stephenson 2011:11-12). And the term ‘foreign’ is generally used to describe such 
                                                             
16 For instance, Christianity and Confucianism are different world views. To understand their 
influence on European and Chinese foreign policy would require a broader comparative 
study of cultures, religions and civilizations. Nevertheless, some modern conceptions such as 
sovereignty and human rights have played the similar role as world views. They originate 
from the West, but gradually approved by societies across cultures in their particular ways. 
Therefore, it is possible to explicitly focus on variations of these ideas that have been 
affected by the intellectual and political movements occurred in European and Chinese 
modern histories. 
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action or inaction of the governments employed to their relations with other 
countries. This definition of foreign policy is very suitable for the topic of this 
dissertation: International Intervention, which is defined in Chapter 1. As regards the 
intervention, foreign policy is initiated in response to the high-profile domestic crisis 
of a foreign country, and can either refer to intervention (actively change the 
status-quo) or non-intervention (neutrally follow the status-quo). Comparing to other 
foreign policies, it is worth noting that the decisions on crisis intervention was usually 
pressured to make in a shorter time.  
 
Now, the question is how ideas can affect foreign policies. Goldstein and Keohane 
give initiative answers: by providing roadmaps, focal point and coalitional glue, and 
through the institutionalization of these ideas. (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:11-13) 
In the early stage of policy making, ideas serve as roadmaps because individuals need 
to determine their own preferences, and to understand the causal relationship 
between their goals and alternative actions by which to reach those goals. Thus 
selected ideas become important when actors believe in the causal links they identify 
or the normative principles that they reflect. Then in the formation of policies, 
shared ideas help participants to attain joint action by providing focal points that 
define cooperative solutions, and coalition glue to facilitate cohesion of particular 
groups. Alternatively, divergences of ideas may hamper their cooperation because 
the lack of coalition glue and the focal point. Finally, once embedded in institutions, 
ideas can affect the incentives of decision makers long even after the interests of 
international actors they represent have changed, because the creation of 
organizational and normative structures may limit the alternative policy choices.  
 
Yet if Goldstein and Keohane’s institutional approach has typically served as an initial 
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inspiration, it has increasingly become a point of departure. For one thing, while 
insisting the rationalist assumption that people behave in a self-interested and 
broadly rational way, in which their behaviours ‘depend on the substantive quality of 
available ideas’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:5), Goldstein and Keohane reject a 
far-reaching ‘reflectivist’ argument which claims ideas not only affect actors’ 
behaviours but also may constitute their identities and interests, since they think 
reflectivists lack of the articulation and testing of hypotheses in empirical analyses. 
Besides, they do not seek to explain the ‘source of ideas’, which they believe is the 
job of psychological approaches, whose work on foreign policy ‘has emphasized how 
collective myths that affect conceptions of self-interest can be created and then 
perpetuated through propaganda and socialization of children in schools’. (Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993:6) 
 
This dissertation departs from Goldstein and Keohane, since it does not only focus on 
the effect of ideas, but also attempts to briefly probe why the EU and China 
emphasize certain ideas while less respect others in Chapter 3 and 4. Goldstein and 
Keohane also realized the magnitude of the question. In regard to powerful 
institutionalized ideas, they proposed to “undertake an archaeology study of ideas in 
order to understand how one set of ideas rather than another came to be 
institutionalized” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:21). We will amplify the answer by 
understanding the ideas as socially embedded, and thus become norms, rather than 
only existed in individual brains. Such different ideas adopted by the EU and China 
are not simply determined by different cultures or historical experiences, but may 
result from different interpretations of norms in EU and China. A series of principles 
and norms become important and institutionalized in their polities as their particular 
identities, attributes, proprieties and commitments, to dominate the political reality, 
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sometimes even through the enforcement of their powerful advocates, either 
through top-down or bottom-up approach.17Therefore, it requires applying social 
constructivist tools to analyse the emergence of these influential social ideas as a 
process of both internal interaction within Europe and within China, as well as the 
external interaction between Europe and China.  
 
Grounded on an intergovernmental approach, member states still play a fundamental 
role in the formation of the EU’s foreign policy,18 thus it is necessary to investigate 
the interaction among member states within European institutions, where their 
national identities and domestic interests should be recognized. As a result, the 
Union appeared to be ‘disunited’ in some cases, when the governments of member 
states, European Commission bureaucracies and ruling parties conducting 
semiautonomous foreign policies in the service of disparate societal preferences. 
Nevertheless, preferences of member states are also distinctly defined and shaped 
through the process of internalization and socialization, namely the Europeanization. 
Decentralized European institutions (the Commission, European Council, European 
Parliament, Council of Ministers, etc.) could and would like to establish norms in 
foreign policy and require convergence via communicative processes. For example, 
the Commission activities in EC’s external relations and networks of representatives 
in CFSP (Smith 2004). These norms produced by the EU are founded upon the ideas 
                                                             
17 How can a constructivist approach be compatible with the analysis of power in politics? 
An answer is the post-structural and a critical understanding of power, which takes different 
forms rather only material form under different socio-political circumstances, is always 
present and implicated in any social formation, and that the (re)production of stable social 
relations is always a result of strategic (but not always rational) social action. (Jackson and 
Nexon 2004: 340) 
18 This is not only true for the intergovernmental CFSP level, and naturally for the member 
states’ foreign policies, but also for the Commission level, where the sharing of competences 
and member states’ supervision of the Commission do not rule out the application of 
intergovernmentalist approaches to study it (Balducci 2008:7). 
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which underpinned European integration: the abandonment of Westphalian norms 
and human rights beyond national borders. However, it does not equal to take these 
ideas enshrined in European treaties and documents for granted. Instead, the 
interaction among the EU’s ideas and those of member states need to be revealed. 
The Chapter 3 will further inquire the principles embedded in the European 
institutions, as well as its influence on the foreign policy making process.  
 
In contrast to a common view asserting China, as an authoritarian state, whose 
foreign policy making is out of the domestic restraints, in fact, domestic factor is 
crucial in shaping China’s foreign policy. Thus, it is valid to inquire China’s interests 
and motives in foreign policy through its identity, which is also the result of social 
construction principally produced by China’s domestic politics and social process. A 
series of national collective goals such as defending sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, stabilizing the domestic situation to avoid upheaval, modernizing China 
through economic prosperity, and finally realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation, are embedded in Chinese institutions. However, a single actor is not 
necessarily equal to a unitary actor. For example, China’s economic prosperity has 
powered nationalistic sentiments and demands; while Beijing’s status-quo foreign 
policy still frustrates Chinese nationalists (Wang 2005:19-20). Therefore, Foreign 
policy making in China could be increasingly a ‘two-level game’, with Chinese 
diplomats keeping one eye on domestic nationalists, even as they negotiate with 
their foreign counterparts (Gries 2005: 104). The Chapter 4 will further elaborate 
China’s principles in its foreign policy making process, in particular regarding the 
domestic crisis in another country.  
 
In addition to their independent domestic processes, the external interaction 
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between them could serve a catalyst to shape each other’s principles, preferences 
and policies. According to a social psychological perspective, this interaction is a way 
in which one’s self-identity emerges through an appreciation of the perception of 
others. In other words, interaction takes place in such a way that China is constantly 
interpreting the symbolic meaning of actions of Europe, and vice versa, as well as the 
global environment they live. For example, both China and the EU may tend to seek 
the role of ‘self’ through the interaction with the ‘otherness’, for instance, via the 
confrontation of ‘West versus East’, ‘Liberalism versus Communism’. Besides, China 
and the EU also have strategic motives to construct and strengthen their identities in 
their interaction, in order to regain social status in the global arena, re-establish the 
power relation between them, and restore their own collective self-esteems.  
 
(III) Conclusion: An Eclectic Theoretical Framework 
Figure 1  A possible Mechanism in which principles may transform into policies 
Now, we can generally perceive the foreign policy makings involved with principles as 
a three-stage process (Figure 1); each stage could be respectively better explained by 
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Constructivism, liberalism/Institutionalism and Realism. 19  In the first stage, as 
constructivism suggests, the EU and China have acquired specific principles according 
to their social identities, which are constructed through earlier social/political 
domestic and international interactions. In the second stage, as liberalism claims, 
their dominant ideas serve as a determinant of policy preference. They affect the 
goal setting in the form of roadmaps, focal points or coalition glue as institutionalism 
stresses. In the third stage, within a realist perspective, what states want to do is 
essentially constrained by their relative powers in the international system. This will 
require an assessment of the actor’s capabilities at its disposal to implement policy 
options, and an assessment of the consequences of each policy option.  
 
This is not a circular argument. It seems that principles is not only the explanans to 
foreign policy and but also the explanandum of social interactions at the same time. 
However, there is a linear timeline in the dissertation. The principles of the EU and 
China were constructed by their pre-existing social interactions, such as European 
integration, Chinese nation-building and early Sino-European relations. We can take 
them largely steady during the period the dissertation studies; Then the established 
principles, together with other factors such as security and economic concerns, 
determinate the policy preferences of the EU and China. Surely, their policy 
outcomes as a new round of interaction could maintain, enhance or modify their 
principles in the future. 
 
However, the principle is rarely the sole source of policy preferences. In the stage of 
goal setting, multiple concerns usually jointly shape the preferences of international 
actors through separate mechanisms (Figure 2). For instance, social ideas influence 
                                                             
19 This framework expands and refines the approach proposed by Moravcsik (1997), by 
adding the Constructivist analysis of emergences of certain principles. 
54 
 
Preferences 
Economic 
Interests 
Principles 
Social ideas 
Security 
Concerns 
Priority? 
policy makers through media and social movement, while economic concerns could 
convey through the lobby of big companies. Hence, questions endure concerning the 
priority for policy-makers in particular when their multiple goals conflicting with each 
other or their policy resources are too limited to accomplish all goals. For example, 
an assertive policy of defending principles and promoting values might affect the 
national pursuit of trade interests and even risk the life of soldiers. How should the 
decision makers assess the various goals and deal with such a policy dilemma? We 
need to adopt the institutionalist approach to analyse these complicated situations 
of policy-choice.  
 
Figure 2  Multiple Sources of Policy Preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the one hand, a main consideration in external intervention policy is the 
international and domestic legitimacy. Political actors need to hold accountable for 
the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 2009) established in their domestic 
institutions, as well in international institutions, in which certain principles can 
decide what range of policies constitutes as proper and legitimate behaviour. In other 
word, once the principles were institutionalized, they will have the power of legality. 
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On the other, decision-makers also need to consider the logic of consequence, which 
involves with the calculation of cost and benefits, the risk they can bear, and the 
capabilities and resources at their disposal. It is difficult to deny that usually two 
logics come into the mind of political actors together, thus either of them may 
provide the reason for action. 
 
If one was to accept that policy-makers need to consider both the logic of 
appropriateness and the logic of consequences, the next question would be how to 
distinguish them in different conditions. Inspired by March and Olsen, here we have 
three hypotheses regarding their relations. (1) Assume that two logics have different 
functions. The logic of appropriateness is used for the formation of general 
positions—whether they should intervene or not; the logic of consequence is for the 
choice of concrete policy tools—by what means they can intervene, or to what 
extent they can block an intervention; Or conversely, the logic of consequence first 
determines their positions, but then their specific behaviours will be limited to what 
can be justified by the logic of appropriateness. (2) The clearer logic will dominate 
the less clear one. For example, during the Cold War the confrontation between 
camps is more significant than the norms of human right thus states were inclined to 
support their allies during a crisis. However, after the cold war the conditions have 
been changed since the distinction between friend and foe become vague in many 
cases while the human rights idea has been rising. (3) The logic of appropriateness 
could be incorporated into the logic of consequences. For example, policy-makers 
decide to defend principles because they have calculated the reward of pleasing 
public opinion and the cost of breaking the promise. In the following chapter 3 and 4, 
we will analyse the structures and institutions of the European and Chinese foreign 
policy makings, and explore the possible linkages between the two logics.  
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Chapter 3: The European Common Foreign Policy on 
Interventions: Positions, Principles and Processes 
 
Is the European Foreign Policy (EFP) a valid research field today, as the American or 
Chinese Foreign Policy study? The answer, in my view, is clearly ‘yes’. In the internal 
aspect, the EU’s Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security & 
Defence Policy (CSDP)20 have become widely discussed policy areas within the EU. 
From the external perspective, major international actors generally recognize the 
EU’s meaningful role in global foreign and security affairs. Nonetheless, the 
‘European Foreign Policy’ remains an elusive concept, because it is difficult to 
conceptualize EFP accurately as a classic national foreign policy.  
 
The first difficulty regards the actorness. States have the foreign policy, while 
international organizations coordinate national foreign policies. As a growing 
accepted, but still problematic international actor, however, the EU “poses major 
challenges by virtue of its status as something more than an intergovernmental 
organization, but less than a fully-fledged European ‘state’” (Hill and Smith 2005:4). 
From the outset, an analysis of European Foreign policy (EFP) should better include 
‘the sum of what the EU and its member states do in international relations’ (Hill 
1998:18). According to Hill, only by taking an overview of all elements of what we call 
‘European’ that we can identify a general pattern of behaviour and assess the effects 
of different parts-namely the member states and the Union. Consequently, two 
pictures of European foreign policy come into view: the trend of policy convergence 
in a closer Union that makes more effective common foreign policies, together with 
the persistence of policy divergences due to heterogeneous national interests which 
                                                             
20 CSDP was formerly known as European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This 
dissertation uses the two terms interchangeably. 
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blocks a single European foreign policy.  
 
The Actorness cannot exist without the actual capability, which constitutes the 
second difficulty with analysing EFP. Supranational institutions in Brussels have 
external capacities in areas of trade, aid and energy, while national capitals still 
control the hard power in military and defence issues. That is why 30 years ago, 
Hedley Bull put a famous remark that “‘Europe is not an actor in international affairs, 
and does not seem likely to become one” (Bull 1982: 151), because there can be no 
power without military power. In the recent decade, the situation has been gradually 
changed since the launch of CFSP and later ESDP, which introduced the EU 
Battlegroups. As suggested by Mario Telò, the concept of the EU foreign policy should 
go beyond a traditional understanding of a political-military power, and “include the 
various external relations, both the ends and the means, economics, efficacy and 
democratic legitimization, direct accountability and multilateral commitment” (Telò 
2007: 227). It is doubtless that since 1999 the EU has gradually and purposefully 
developed a full range of capabilities to act in different dimensions: diplomatically, 
economically and militarily, which correspond to my categorization of intervention 
measures. 
 
The main purpose of the chapter is to elaborate the EU’s external policies of crisis 
intervention on three levels: general positions, committed principles and 
policymaking processes. The discussion is divided into four parts: The first part briefly 
discusses different conceptualizations of the European foreign policy, and raise the 
further question about to what extent the Union could coordinate the foreign 
policies of member states. Secondly, I review the EU and key member states’ 
interventionist positions on the domestic crisis of third countries, in particular after 
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the establishment of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993. In the third 
section, I outline the EU’s principles and norms in respect of the issue of intervention. 
The final section inquires the European foreign policy making process regarding 
different forms of crisis intervention, which could be influenced by committing 
principles, political values and public opinions.  
 
(I) Conceptualizing the EU’s external policies: Civilian/Normative/Ethical Power 
Europe?  
The unusual characteristics of the EU have inspired the academic debate on its 
external relations and global role. The experience of destructive World Wars in the 
20th century has helped to drive Europe away from the Realpolitik and militarism, at 
least within the continent. After 1945, the West Europe relied on the U.S troops and 
security guarantees to defend the peace, while most small and medium-sized 
European countries were unwilling to increase their defence budget. In a realist 
perspective, this leads to the fact that liberal-idealist views have shaped too much of 
the discourse of European foreign policy studies and IR since the end of the Cold War 
(Hyde-Price 2006: 217). From such a liberal-idealist perspective, military weakness 
and its consequent reliance on non-coercive means, is no longer the Achilles' heel of 
the EU, but become its unique advantage: great powers are usually ‘bad guys’, 
whereas the EU is ‘doing good’ in the international arena.  
 
The prevalence of the normative approach in analysing the EFP is mainly because it 
provides something outside the view of realists who usually claim the EU as an 
unqualified actor. This ‘liberal-idealist’ approach to European foreign policy can be 
traced back to the 1970s. François Duchêne claims that traditional military had given 
way to progressive civilian power as the means to exert influence on international 
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affairs while Europe can only represent a ‘civilian power’ which was long on 
economic power and relatively short on armed force. Furthermore, he is also 
interested in the normative power of the EC as an ‘idea force’ (Duchêne 1972). 30 
years later, Ian Manners conceptualizes the EU as a ‘normative power’ (Manners 
2002), which has raised the level of already booming debate about the EU’s external 
norms promotion (See Youngs 2001). Manners assumed that the specificity of the EU 
is based on post-Westphalian norms, which give the EU an ability to define what 
passes for ‘normal’ in world politics. He considers this preference for norms with 
respect to the principles on which the political integration of Europe has been based 
since 1950s: peace, freedom, defence of human rights, to which he adds, on a more 
minor note, social solidarity, the rejection of discrimination and sustainable 
development. According to Manners, the EU’s normative power has been weakened 
by its militarization since 2003, when the symbolic European Security Strategy (ESS) 
was launched, as well as the subsequent military missions (Manners 2006).  
 
Emanuel Adler adopts a civilizational perspective and assumes that the “normative 
power” Europe may be reinventing itself as a civilizational security community of 
practice, which is now attempting to alter the practice of international politics, not by 
force but through the magnetic attraction of its progressive and active practice (Adler 
2010). Taking Europe as a civilization is helpful to study Europe as a transnational 
polity, and could distinguish Europe’s community of practice from other civilizational 
communities of practice, for example, U.S and China. Therefore, there is a ‘clash of 
civilization’ between post-modern Europe and the modern international system, 
which is approved by other great powers. According to Adler, normative power is 
different from ‘soft power’ (Nye 1990), a concept favoured by U.S and China. Soft 
power serves as a cultural tool to fulfil national interests by persuasion instead of 
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force, whereas normative power is not only a way of conduct, but also the goal: the 
adoption of a set of norms, practices and institutions, even if they are not in their 
(material) interests.  
 
The question of whether the theory of Normative Power Europe could explain the 
EU’s foreign and external policies is regularly debated. First, realists tend to assume 
that the normative character of the EU’s external action is mainly the reflection of its 
military weakness, thus the norms are strategically utilized as the comparative 
leverages of the EU to counterbalance the disadvantage (Kagan 2003). Nevertheless, 
the EU is still a secondary power, since it has difficulty in projecting its normative 
power, which is built upon economic and military capabilities, on full-scale great 
powers such as China and Russia (Hyde-Price 2006: 223, on Russia see Haukkala 2008, 
on China see Balducci 2008). Secondly, regarding the EU’s motivation for advocating 
norms beyond its border, the norms-driven rationale of EU’s external actions is not 
uncontested. For example, several analysts pointed out that the EU’s norm 
promotion in the trade area is mainly for its self-interests, by minimizing trade 
disadvantages (Lightfoot & Burchell 2005, Langan 2012) or maximizing the EU’s 
wealth relative to other powers (Zimmermann 2007). In the field of crisis 
intervention (on which there is more below), the EU’s selected interventions in Africa 
and MENA region are sometimes regarded as the pursuit of material and prestige 
interests of the Union and powerful Member States, rather than normative 
objectives (on Africa see Gegout 2009, on MENA see Hollis 2012).  
 
To transcend the endless debate on whether the EU foreign policy is driven by norms 
or interests, Lisbeth Aggestam (2008) introduces the concept of ‘Ethical power’. In 
contrast to civilian and normative power, ‘Ethical power’ encompasses both civilian 
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and military power, as well as social and material power. Even though European 
normative goals are driven by an honest concern for the well-being of others in an 
altruistic sense, the EU also seeks to combine ethical considerations with strategic 
and instrumental interests. In a similar vein, Thomas Diez (2013) also adopts this 
approach of combining norms and interests in his reconceptualization of normative 
power as ‘hegemony’. For analytical purposes, it’s useful to examine the different 
ways in which ethics, power and interests are interconnected. For instance, we can 
analyse the interconnection of different contributing factors through the EU’s Grand 
Strategy (Vennesson 2007, Smith 2011). According to Vennesson’s definition, the 
grand strategy includes a justification of the polity’s approach to international affairs 
and the ways it is supposed to work. Foreign policy preferences are identified, 
formalized and revised through the formation of grand strategy.  
 
Therefore, the concept of ‘normative power’ or ‘ethical power’ is better being posed 
as a theoretical and empirical question to be explored than a political statement of 
reality. For example, ‘How does the EU deal with the ethical imperative to uphold a 
critical human rights dialogue, while at the same time trying to draw China into 
multilateral structures to ensure a more effective rule-based international order?’ 
(Aggestam 2008: 10). Giusepe Balducci (2008) gives a primary answer to this 
question. His analysis of the three levels of European foreign policy governance has 
shown that member states and the EU institutions had and still have diverse interests 
when it comes to the promotion of human rights in China. The interaction of such 
interests within the European foreign policy-making system did not lead to a 
normative convergence. This was largely due to the internal dynamics at play in each 
level of governance in the European foreign policy system, which influenced the 
selection of the most appropriate policies and instruments for the promotion of 
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human rights in China.  
 
Although scholars compete to devise new terms to conceptualize the EU’s foreign 
policy, we still face the risk of mistaking the EU’s rhetoric for reality. It is true that the 
EU is partly rooted on common norms and values and its foreign policies are usually 
framed in idealist terms. However, the key touchstone is: Whether member states 
have genuine internalized policy coordination through the EU institutions within 
which national foreign policies could evolve in a normative orientation because 
national actors’ identities/interests transformed? If so, what we should observe is 
more often the case that many member states have to generate and defend stances 
that even a decade ago they would not be expected to have held (Tonra 2006: 124). 
For certain, this question depends crucially on the specific policy-area. In certain 
policy-areas where vital national interests are not touched we can expect a higher 
level of the European common positions, while in the field of foreign intervention in 
particular regarding the use of force, the question becomes tricky.  
 
(II) The development of EU’s interventionist policies since the 1990s  
The attempt to incorporate the foreign and defence policy into the European 
integration could be traced back to the year of 1950. The French Pleven Plan 
proposed to establish the European Defence Community (EDC) included France, Italy, 
West Germany, and the Benelux countries. The treaty of the EDC was signed in 1952 
but never went into effect because French National Assembly refused to ratify it in 
1954. The Gaullists were afraid that French sovereignty and national interests would 
be undermined by the military integration of EDC. From that time the national 
worries about the supranational control of foreign and defence policies has long 
shaped the development of the European foreign policy. Even today the 
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intergovernmental nature is still predominant in the European foreign policy 
coordination.  
 
From 1970 to 1992, the European Union foreign policy coordination had been 
implemented under the loose framework European Political Cooperation (EPC). The 
EPC was not based on Treaties established the European Communities, but 
essentially an informal intergovernmental consultation mechanism where 12 
member states could achieve a single voice on international issues predicated on 
their overlapped interests. On one aspect, the Twelve endeavoured to secure 
common positions and voting in international fora such as the United Nations and 
CSCE framework (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe). On the other, 
through the EPC the Twelve achieved common stances and joint actions, as the 
civilian means to intervene in third countries. During the 1970s, the Twelve was 
actively involved in the resolution of the Middle-East conflicts through diplomatic 
means. In the 1980s, the Twelve adopted economic sanctions against South Africa for 
apartheid, Libya and Syria for terrorist indictments, and China for the Tiananmen 
crackdown. In spite of these achievements, however, the weakness of EPC totally 
exposed when the collective military action was required, for example, in handling of 
the Yugoslav Wars in the early 1990s.  
 
As the successor to the EPC, the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) was 
created in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty as the second pillar of the European Union. 
In addition to anchoring the unified Germany with West European partners, the CFSP 
was largely designed for enhancing member states’ collaboration and coordination in 
crisis management, including the short-term intervention and the conflict prevention 
in the medium-to-long term. The fiasco in the former Yugoslavia taught the EU a 
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lesson: without the military troops of U.S, Europeans was unable to handle their 
internal crisis, not to mention that beyond its own borders. Moreover, after the Cold 
war the EU and U.S have increasing divergent security interests and debates on the 
doctrines of the use of force such as the controversial unilateral preventive action 
(Thomas 2000, Kagan 2003). Therefore, European policy-makers realize that it is 
necessary to develop its own common foreign and security policy, which could be 
more capable of preventing and intervening similar humanitarian disasters on its 
doorstep. This pursuit of the common security project, as a traditional attribute of a 
state, is also important for the EU’s identity-forming or ‘nation-building’ by 
furthering the European integration process (Anderson & Seitz 2006).  
 
Since the groundbreaking Franco-British summit in Saint Malo in December 1998, the 
EU has accelerated on the way of becoming a more capable international actor 
beyond the ‘civilian power’. Under the framework of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) established in 1999, the EU created its own military force (EU 
Battlegroup) to implement the Petersburg Tasks including peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations. Meanwhile, the requirement of ESDP, as highlighted in the 
Headline Goals, serves as a catalyst to improve the member states’ military 
capabilities, particularly the capability of rapid deployment and operation outside of 
Europe. 
 
It seems that ESDP provides Europe an alternative to NATO in particular from a 
French or pro-European perspective, considering the institutional overlaps between 
them on membership, mandate and resources (Hoffman 2009). But there should a 
coordinated division of labour, usually emphasized by U.K and other 
pro-Atlantic/NATO countries. While the task of territorial defence and high-intensity 
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operation is considered the domain of NATO, the ESDP could focus on the small-scale 
military intervention involved with civilian aspects, which is largely omitted by the 
mandate of NATO. Not to mention in practice deploying U.S-led NATO forces as a 
peacemaker or peacekeeper is very controversial in many regions where existing 
overt Anti-Americanism. Besides, European states like Austria, Finland and Denmark 
find the ESDP provides them with a framework for security cooperation without 
requiring them to sign a mutual defence pact as NATO does. (Peterson and Lavenex 
2012:193) 
 
Parallel to the capability and institutional developments, the EU elaborated its 
strategic objectives, perceived threats (E.g. Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and 
failed states) and global ambitions in the European Security Strategy (ESS). Javier 
Solana, the EU’s first High Representative for CFSP, played a central role in this part. 
The EES highlighted that “Spreading good governance, supporting social and political 
reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and 
protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.” 
To fulfil the goal, the EU needs to ‘develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, 
and when necessary, robust intervention’ (Solana 2003: 10, 11). The EU’s concept of 
crisis intervention goes beyond the use of military forces, and mixes with civilian 
areas such as policing, the administration of justice; and civil protection (Menon 
2012: 589).  
 
Under the ESDP banner, the EU have completed 15 civilian and military missions 
across the world since the late 1990s, and is undertaking 16 ongoing missions by the 
April of 2014.21 Among them, several military peacekeeping missions deployed in 
                                                             
21 An updated list of missions, along with links to information about each one, is available via 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm 
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Macedonia in 2003, Bosnia since 2004, Eastern Congo in 2003/2006, Chad and 
Central African Republic in 2008, have demonstrated that the EU could 
autonomously deploy thousands of troops alongside the NATO or UN.22  It is 
noteworthy that the EU’ choice of military presence has usually been linked to the 
geopolitical considerations. ESDP sent considerable troops, mainly to areas of 
European concerns, such as the Western Balkan (within Europe), Middle East 
(immediate neighbourhood) and Africa (former colonies), while avoiding to trespass 
the interest spheres of Russia (Eastern Europe and Caucasus), U.S (the Western 
Hemisphere) or China (East Asia).  
 
Overall, the EU’s crisis intervention turned out a ‘mixed success’. On the one hand, 
ESDP missions generally had positive effects on the local situation, by helping to 
avert civil conflict and made a safer environment for civilians. On the other, the 
limited scale of missions in terms of personnel, budget, time and space were 
insufficient to solve the long-term problem on the ground (Menon 2009: 229-230). In 
contrast to the age of colonialism, nowadays European governments do not seek to 
stay longer in the target countries. Instead, the exit strategy and departure deadlines 
are central to the planning of intervention owing to the risk-averse (Dobbins 2008: 
84). Nevertheless, from a critical point of view, the launch of ESDP missions was 
mainly driven by the rationales of the EU and member states, the self-centred 
motivations, rather than the consideration of their consequence on the target states.  
 
                                                             
22 We have to acknowledge that in practice it is not always easy to distinguish NATO, UN and 
the EU-led missions, since most international intervention involve the participation of all 
three at some level. The EU mission could be followed or accompanied by missions led by 
other institutions. For instance, the first ESDP mission in western Balkan was taken over from 
NATO, and the first mission deployed outside Europe, the Operation Artemis in Congo, was 
closely cooperated with UN. 
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A decade has passed since the launch of ESS and that ESDP was declared fully 
operational, numerous papers have discussed the (in-)effectiveness of European 
foreign policy, in particular the EU’s capacity to produce collective decisions on cases 
of international interventions. Most notoriously when the EU failed to prevent, and 
later to stop a humanitarian crisis, the EU is depicted as repeating its timidity and 
weakness in the 1990s’ Balkan time and again. For example in Darfur, EU’s 
intervention was criticized as inadequate since it preferred to provide financial aid to 
support African Union peacekeeping force rather than dispatch European troops to 
Darfur, and insisted working through the UN institution to secure a multilateral 
mandate for stronger actions which was at best slow to act (Kubicek and Parke 2011). 
This policy outcome was caused by various reasons, not only including the long 
disturbing ‘Capabilities-Expectation Gap’: a gap between what the EU had been 
talked up to do and what it was able to deliver in terms of foreign policies (Hill 1993), 
but also the rising ‘Consensus-Expectation Gap’: a gap between what the EU 
member-states are expected to do in the world and what they are actually able to 
concur (Toje 2008a).  
 
In the case of Darfur, the Union, at least some senior officials once regarded it was a 
perfect opportunity to undertake ‘a low risk, but comparable high reward military 
intervention’ (quoted in Toje 2008a: 136). The proposal of a CSDP mission was 
discussed in 2004 but eventually rejected, due to the lack of political willingness and 
capabilities among member states in particular France, U.K and Germany, combining 
China and Russia’s opposition to forcible military intervention in UN Security Council. 
Instead, the EU adopted a soft kind of crisis management, such as declarations to 
concern, financial support to African Union Monitoring Mission (AMIS) and economic 
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sanctions against the Sudanese government.23 Among them the sanction policy is a 
common measure of international intervention and long existed in European foreign 
policy (Kreutz 2005). Although it is fair to criticize that the EU’s non-coercive 
intervention did not stop the deterioration of Darfur situation and thus was too little, 
the EU’s preference to intervene was quite clear. 
 
In response to the Libyan crisis in 2011, the EU showed its consistent position on 
intervention. On diplomacy, the High Representative for CFSP (HR) Catherine Ashton 
on behalf of the EU declared the extreme concern for the situation;24 then, the 
Council declared that Gaddafi had lost all legitimacy and recognized the Libyan rebel 
TNC in Benghazi as a legitimate interlocutor.25 On financial aid, the EU and its 
member states provided over €158 million for humanitarian aid and civil 
protection.26 On economic sanctions, as fighting went on in Libya, the EU imposed 
an arms embargo against the Libyan leadership.27 This sanction was first adopt by 
UN Security Council resolution 1973, but extended by the EU with a non-fly zone a de 
facto oil and gas embargo. Besides, an EU military operation in support of 
humanitarian assistance operations (EUFOR Libya) was launched, waiting for the 
request from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).28 
Although the EU adopted various measures for the intervention in Libya, the problem 
                                                             
23 European Commission, European Union response to the Darfur crisis, Factsheet ,Brussels, 
July 2006 
24 Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, 
on behalf of the European Union on events in Libya, Brussels, 20 February 2011, 6795/1/11 
PRESSE 
25 Council of the European Union, Declaration of the Extraordinary European Council, 
D/11/2, Brussels, 11 March, 2011 
26 European Commission, Libyan Crisis, Factsheet,11 January 2012 
27 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP of 28 February 2011 
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya, Brussels, 28 February 2011 
28 Council of the European Union: Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP, Brussels, 1 April,2011 
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of coherence existed because of unilateral actions or inactions of the member states 
(Koenig 2011). For instance, while France and UK were actively preparing for the 
military intervention in Libya, Germany abstained on resolution 1973 together with 
China, Russia, India and Brazil.  
 
Facing the crisis in Syria, the EU poses a consistent position and adopts similar 
measures of intervention like in Darfur and Libya. The EU’s measures include political 
condemnation, arms embargo, and economic sanctions on oil importing, suspending 
the cooperation and association agreements with Syria, and supporting the regional 
organization: League of Arab States (LAS) to intervene, and giving 228 million in 
humanitarian assistance. 29 In addition, following multilateral fashion, the EU 
attempted to push for Chinese and Russian cooperation in Syria. During the EU-China 
summit in Beijing in February 2012, Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, 
said the EU supported efforts of the Arab League to end violence in Syria and 
appealed to “all members of the UN Security Council”—a group that includes 
China—to “act responsibly.”30 The EU leaders also press Russia during a summit in St. 
Petersburg in June 2012, to put pressure on its ally to withdraw heavy weapons from 
cities and comply fully with UN envoy Kofi Annan's peace plan.31 
 
To conclude, the EU demonstrated that it is increasingly capable of independently 
intervening in a foreign crisis by various policy tools, and continues to adopt a 
general interventionist position in recent crises of third countries. Although the EU’s 
relative power is supposed to be further declined in the aftermath of the Euro crisis, 
                                                             
29 European Commission, European Union and Syria, Factsheet, Luxemburg, 15 October 
2012 
30 Joe McDonald, ‘EU leader pushes for Chinese help on Iran, Syria’, Associate Press, 14 
February 2012 
31 ‘Syria crisis tops EU-Russia summit agenda’, EurActiv, 4 June 2012 
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in recent years the EU has frequently imposed economic sanctions and does not 
reduce its ESDP missions. However, foreign policy outcomes are different from, and 
not only determined by foreign policy preferences. When we discuss the EU’s policy 
of intervention in this chapter, it is more like to demonstrate EU’s policy preference, 
the common stance, and the ‘expectation’ as the wishes that the Union and 
members themselves have raised. Rather, the outcome of the EU’s foreign policy 
which needs to take account of various extrinsic factors like geopolitical policy games 
with other international actors, which go beyond the scope of this chapter. In this 
light, even the CFSP diplomacy and CSDP operations obtaining the unanimous 
support of member states, they would not necessarily be successful and effective in 
the field, because the EU’s power resources might lag behind the goals it seeks to 
accomplish.  
 
(III) The norms of human rights and democracy in European foreign policy 
Notwithstanding its general interventionist position on foreign humanitarian crises, 
the EU usually declares its altruistic concerns of peace, human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law in that country. In practice, the EU interprets above universal values in 
a particular way, or emphasises the causal-link between different values, and 
attempts to promote its specific interpretation of the global operating principles. 
Accordingly, a growing literature on European Foreign Policy highlights the values, 
images and principles (VIPs) of the EU. They argue that the self-representation of the 
EU cannot be dismissed as simply ‘rhetorical’ or ‘symbolic’. Instead, the VIPs do not 
only constrain the policy options of the EU, but also constitute its international 
identity and defined-interests (Lucarelli & Manners, 2006).  
 
The EU’s commitment to human rights in international intervention is rooted in its 
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history and identity. The international order of post-war Europe has been largely 
shaped by human rights universal claims, which undermine the classical conception 
of state sovereignty. Several milestones marked this transformation in Europe. First, 
the historic Nuremberg trials confirmed the rule of law in international relations, by 
giving a precise and technical formulation to certain crimes such as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Then, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), together with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, limited the 
sovereignty of European states on their domestic affairs to the extent that it does not 
violate the international human rights law. Recently, the establishment of the 
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, which is largely 
European advocated, claims it has universal jurisdiction to punish the worst crimes 
committed by any government of the world. These international human rights laws 
and enforcement mechanisms, have constrained the absolute freedom of states to 
act on their citizens to various degrees, which we clearer seen in Europe. 
 
In addition to the norm of human rights, the EU actively embraces another key 
element of a political order, the democracy and democratization, for instance, 
throughout the membership of the EU. Through the democratization of member 
states, the EU has created a region of peace and prosperity. To some extent, now the 
EU is close to a Cosmopolitan legal order as anticipated in Kant’s perpetual peace: 
Democratic states which respecting civil, political and social rights, to be united in a 
federation of peace and to respect each other’s citizens either at home or abroad 
(Eleftheriadis, 2003:257). Hence, in the Post-Cold War Europe, there is increasing 
emphasis on the link between liberal-democracy, human rights, peace and security. 
For instance, without a democratic government, the human dignity and peace could 
not be sustainable. Consequently, regarding the civil conflict in the third countries, 
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the EU usually supports the side under the banner of democratic revolution. 
 
The internal transformation of human rights and democracy within Europe definitely 
has shaped the EU’s preference of its external relations, for instance, regarding its 
enlargement policy, the neighbourhood policy and wider humanitarian interventions 
in the world. In the European perspective, the protection of domestic human rights 
has become a matter of international community, and the states' actions at home 
should be exposed to the scrutiny of the international organizations. Hence, 
considering the unsettled debate on principles of intervention in international fora, 
which makes consensus on multilateral action in UN often unavailable, the EU clearly 
endorses the importance of individual human rights rather than the classic principle 
of state sovereignty. According to the human security principle enshrined in the 
European Security Strategy, “(the EU) need to continue mainstreaming human rights 
issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based 
approach coherent with the concept of human security. 32 Therefore, a 
re-conceptualization of sovereignty as the Responsibility to Protect, could justify, and 
even guide EU’s positions on international intervention, although not surprisingly the 
EU has difficulties to fully transform the doctrine into effective policies (Kirn 2011).  
 
In order to reconcile the sovereignty and human rights as two fundamental principles 
endorsed in international law and the UN Charter, the concept of Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) was invented by the Canadian-led International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, China is not in the commission) in 2001, 
and established in 2005 as a UN initiative. The norm of R2P consists of an emerging 
set of principles, on the basis of the idea that sovereignty is not an authority, but 
                                                             
32 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy ,11 December 2008 
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entails a responsibility.33 Hence, protecting its own people’s basic human rights 
becomes the precondition of respecting for a state’s sovereignty. As suggested in the 
UN Outcome Document, “If the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities 
and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the 
responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. 
Military intervention is considered the last resort.”34 Under such circumstances, the 
principle of non-interference has to yield to the responsibility to protect. Regarding 
the representative of the international community, the ICISS report (2001) confirmed 
the paramount status of the UN in interventions as “there is no better or more 
appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military 
intervention for human protection purposes”. Security Council also reaffirmed “the 
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity”.35 
  
While the doctrine of R2P was invented by Canada, it is closely related to the broader 
agenda of human security advocated by the EU. The human security idea can be 
traced back to the 1994 UN Development Program Report. Like the R2P, the idea of 
human security challenges the order of Westphalia by emphasizing that the 
individuals, rather than states, should be the proper referents of the security. The 
national security is generally essential, but not adequate to ensure the ‘freedom of 
fear’ and ‘freedom of want’ of the people. Under the human security agenda, the 
Ottawa treaty of landmine ban and the Rome Statue of the International Criminal 
                                                             
33 This interpretation of sovereignty can be traced back to 1990s (see Deng 1995, Barkin 
1998) 
34 United Nations General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’, Sixtieth session, items 
48 and 121 of the provisional agenda. A/60/L.1, 15 September, 2005 
35 UN Security Council S/RES/1674 , 28 April 2006 
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Court were established. The following norm of R2P is also the main contribution to 
the development of human security (Matlary 2008:136). The main sponsors of the 
agenda are ‘like-minded’ middle powers like Canada, Norway, Switzerland and 
several EU Member States (Gionet 2012). In 2004, the EU published the report of A 
Human Security Doctrine for Europe, well known as the ‘Barcelona Report’,36 which 
was proposed by the study group on Europe's security capabilities convened by 
Professor Mary Kaldor. The report attempted to provide a human rights basis, and 
the criteria of intervention for the implantation of the European Security Strategy 
(ESS). The human security doctrine achieved further development within the EU 
during the Finnish Presidency, as the study group was asked to publish the ‘Madrid 
Report’, A European Way of Security37 in 2006.  
 
At the conceptual level, the Human Security is a broad concept involved with other 
relevant concepts such as R2P and crisis intervention. The threats to Human Security 
include the serious crimes such as genocide identified by the R2P. But unlike the R2P 
focuses on the ‘man-made’ crises, the Human Security also tackles with a broader 
range of insecure situations like natural disasters. In the opposite of the human 
security, human insecurity unusually occurs in humanitarian crises with the violations 
of human rights, which might bring about the international intervention as the topic 
of the dissertation. Considering the richer content of the human security, some 
analysts suggested the EU should adopt the concept as its strategic narrative to 
integrate existing terms such as ‘crisis management’, ‘civil-military coordination’ and 
‘conflict prevention’ (Kaldor, Martin & Selchow 2007). However, its broad references 
                                                             
36 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/solana/040915CapBar.
pdf 
37 See the full text, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/humanSecurity/madridRep
ort.pdf  
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also lead to the ambiguity to some extent. As a candidate of the EU’s comprehensive 
ideational framework for intervention, Kaldor and her co-authors (2007: 281) 
admitted that the proposed paradigm shift from state security to human security was 
regarded by some policy-makers as too idealistic. In terms of military capacity and 
real-world politics, some suggestions in the Barcelona Report were also criticized as 
quite unrealistic for the EU, despite of the fact that all ESDP missions have concerned 
with the human security (Matlary 2008). 
 
Now turn back to the idea of R2P, which has largely marginalized the human security 
narrative in international fora included the UN (Martin & Owen 2010).38The EU also 
became one of the most enthusiastic supporters of R2P, and its support is enduring. 
During the 2005 UN Summit, EU member states worked closely with members of the 
African Union who pioneered the concept of R2P, and finally made the diplomacy 
success in the UN. After that, the EU has conveyed its endorsement of the R2P 
through various instruments such as ‘The European Consensus on Development’ 
(Article 37),39 ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’40 which clearly claims that 
“sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their 
actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, and quite vocally supportive 
European Parliament Resolutions reference R2P during the Libyan Crisis.41 
 
                                                             
38 There is a growing discursive distinction between the Human Security and R2P, 
formulating the former as the consensual and preventative development of capacities to 
protect vis-à-vis the latter is understood as coercive intervention to stop ongoing human 
rights violations. (Chandler 2012: 215) 
39 European Parliament Council Commission, ‘The European Consensus on Development’, 
Official Journal of the European Union, C46/1, 24 Feb 2006. 
40 Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy, ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, Brussels, S407/08, 11 December 2008.p.2 
41 European Parliament, Resolution on the Southern Neighbourhood, and Libya in particular, 
including humanitarian aspects, P7_TA-PROV(2011)0095, 10 March 2011 
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As suggested in European Commission’s answers to European Parliament’s questions, 
the EU could promote the norm of R2P in multilateral and bilateral ways: “While the 
Commission welcomes the development of this norm, it is for the UN member states 
to act upon it” (23 February 2007), and “Where it can the Commission will seek to 
raise the importance of the Responsibility to Protect in its bilateral relations” (6 
March 2007) (quoted in Evans 2007). Regarding the bilateral way, for instance, the EU 
funds the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to support the African 
Union’s to implement the Responsibility to Protect. This also followed the European 
Consensus on Development in 2006 which plans to “strengthened role for the 
regional and sub-regional organizations in the process of enhancing international 
peace and security”42 Regarding the multilateral way, the UN is viewed as the 
primary multilateral framework to promote R2P in practice. In rhetoric, EU member 
states, sometimes on behalf of the Union, made over 50 references to R2P in the UN 
Security Council or the General Assembly from 2005 to 2007.43 In action, the EU also 
worked closely with UN in military crisis management, for example, the EUFOR RD 
Congo in 2006 (Major 2006). However, limited consensus on the interpretation of 
R2P and subsequent multilateral intervention has been made in the UN. According to 
the 2005 Outcome Documents, collective action to protect should be only decided 
through the Security Council in accordance with the UN Chapter VI and VIII.44 
 
(IV) European foreign policy making process regarding crisis intervention 
Now, the central question is: to what extent the EU’s commitment to the above 
                                                             
42 ‘The European Consensus on Development’, p.7 
43 R2Pcs Project, ‘Excerpts of Government Statements on the Responsibility to Protect 
Europe 2005-2007’, Institute for Global Policy, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Government%20Statements%20on%20R2P%20
Europe%202005%20-2008.pdf 
44 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’, Paragraph 139. 
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principles and values can shape its foreign policy making? Whether the doctrines of 
R2P and human are just nice rhetoric in international fora? Answering such a 
question is complicated by at least two factors. First, competencies in European 
foreign policy-making are dispersed across a variety of actors, including the European 
Commission, the European External Action Service, the 6-months Council presidency 
and particularly the foreign and defence ministries of 28 member states (Dover 
2013:249). In short, after the Lisbon Treaty the CFSP and ESDP remain 
intergovernmental in character, while supranational institutions have gradually 
strengthened rules after the Lisbon Treaty. Secondly, the EU’ policy making processes 
varied across different interventionist policy areas: diplomatic, economic and military. 
Generally, the higher the level of coercion the intervention policy requires, the higher 
risks and costs it would entail (sometimes including life and death question), and the 
more reluctance of member states to pool their sovereignty to the EU when it comes 
to decisions. Notwithstanding the common declaratory commitment to the emerging 
norm of global human rights protection, the EU member states still hold significantly 
different positions concerning the use of force abroad.  
 
Figure 3  The brief Policy Stages of CFSP and CSDP 
 
Assessment 
Agenda-
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Formulation 
Decision Implementation 
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In the rest of this section, I use the policy-stage approach to analyse the 
policy-makings of CFSP and CSDP (Figure 3). The presented process mainly reflected 
the status in the period of 2003-2011, during which the cases of Darfur and Libya 
occurred. Through the analysis of policy-making process, I inquire the functions of 
different actors and the different factors affecting their decisions on civilian and 
military intervention. It should be noted that the process is not always linear that one 
stage follows on from another. For example, the assessment of crisis situation is not 
only existed before the agenda-setting, but also lasting after that, because the policy 
shaping requires further assessments of the international situation as well as 
resources available.  
 
Assessment of the International situation 
The responsibility of The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit is monitoring the 
international situation and analysing the emerging crisis. The Unit provides 
information and assessment to member states who can formulate a common foreign 
policy. However, sometimes member states pulled their resources back internally, 
especially when faced high crisis like the 2008 Georgia War. Along with the 
agenda-setting and the planning process, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
could require more information from other actors, ranging from the Commission, the 
member states, and the Council Secretariat, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU 
INTCEN) and the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC).  
 
Agenda-setting and formulation 
The agenda-setting is crucial for the policy making, because it determines what 
issues will be put into the decision-making process and discussed by the 
policy-makers. For example, not all of the domestic conflicts/crisis in the world would 
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be put on the agenda of the CFSP. Due to the security concern, the EU is naturally 
priorities the crisis occurred in its neighbourhood. Besides, the issues in the EU’s 
agenda of external intervention usually had received a great deal of attention in the 
media, and influenced by relevant public opinions such as the special responsibility 
for the former colonies. Therefore, the media reports also play an important role in 
the agenda-setting of intervention, not only decide whether to put the crisis on the 
front pages of the newspaper, but also could frame a same crisis in different 
perspectives. For example, the conflicts framed as the shocking humanitarian crisis or 
the fight for democracy has more opportunities to become the policy agenda of the 
EU. Meanwhile, the EU also picks up some trivial issues relatively low on the 
international agenda, as a number of low-profile ESDP missions deployed in 
inconsequential countries illustrates. This is because different member states in 
particular the Big 3 and rotating Presidency sometimes have varying agendas and 
different priorities in the world (Toje 2008b: 207), and the EU is also cautious and 
avoid conflicting with the missions of NATO or the UN. 
 
After all, the key actors of foreign intervention are governments thus this agenda 
needs to be finally set by politicians from above. The supranational institutions have 
a formal role in the EU’s foreign policy agenda-setting. Different from other 
community policies like single market, the Commission does not hold the exclusive 
right of the initiates in CFSP from the outset. Instead, it shared right of initiative with 
member states from Maastricht to Nice, but had rarely used it in a formal way. At 
present, the Lisbon Treaty excludes the Commission’s individual right of initiative, 
and transfers the right to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and 
Security Policies. The HR is also the Vice-president of the Commission, could submit 
proposals individually or with the Commission’s support. However, in most cases a 
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formal initiative from HR is not a perquisite procedure for the Council to adopt a 
decision (Wessel 2012: 500).  
 
The right to convene an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours is another 
tool for the rapid agenda-setting in crisis response. Before the Lisbon Treaty the right 
was in the hands of the rotating Presidency, while the Commission and member 
states could request the Presidency to convene an extra meeting. Now the right was 
also transferred from the Presidency to the new-established High Representative, 
who can convene an extra Council meeting of his motion, or at the request of a 
member state. This signifies that the Union has a stronger role in the agenda-setting 
of the EU’s foreign policy particularly regarding crisis intervention.  
 
With regards to the deployment of CSDP missions, the initiatives within EU usually 
come from the member states, the High Representative (E.g. Javier Solana) and the 
Council Secretariat, which has an increasing feeling of ownership and can channel its 
ideas through the Council Presidency or another member state (Breuer 2010: 8). 
Sometimes, initiatives originated from the third party like the UN and NATO 
(Björkdahl & Strömvik 2008:1). If the circulating proposed operation is generally 
recognized by member states and the Commission as politically feasible, strategically 
desirable and also possible in terms of capabilities, it will survive in the agenda and 
go head to the stage of planning. The PSC is in charge of the planning of operation, 
with the assistances of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EU Military Committee 
(EUMC), or the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) if 
civilian aspects involved. 
 
Formal decision-making  
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First, we need to know what kind of decisions the EU could make through the CFSP 
and the subordinate CSDP framework. The Maastricht Treaty provided CFSP with the 
key instruments of Common Position and Joint Action. The Common Position 
included the restrictive measures such as travel ban, asset freezing and embargo. 
Once the Council established a Common Position on particular issues, member states 
must adopt their national policy to in line with the stated EU position. The Joint 
Action was the formal legal basis of CSDP missions, providing the latter with the 
objectives, the mandate and etc. Later, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced Common 
Strategies, which defined the policy objectives, duration and means targeting on 
certain countries or areas such as Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean. Currently, 
The Lisbon Treaty incorporates the previous three distinct legal instruments of 
common strategies, common positions and joint actions into the General Guidelines 
and Union Decisions which ‘defining actions to be taken and positions to be done’.  
 
It should be noted that the decisions in CFSP are not the strict ‘legal acts’ of the EU 
like in other Union policy areas, in which the Commission, the Parliament and the 
Court of Justice have respective formal roles in the legislative procedure. Instead, the 
CFSP decisions are exclusively made by member states in the Council (i.e. The Foreign 
Affairs Council) and not legally binding. For instance, the Council frequently only 
issues soft declarations to set up the general political lines in foreign affairs. If 
member states do not comply with the declaration, the Commission and the Court of 
Justice cannot resort to the infringement procedure.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
The decision rule of CFSP has been evolving from Maastricht to Lisbon. At the 
beginning of the CFSP, the decisions were made in the Council only by unanimity, 
which retains the essence of the ‘intergovernmentalism’ in the age of EPC. Naturally, 
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the strict adherence to the rule of unanimity would lead to the ineffectiveness, since 
one single reluctant member could block the whole decision-making process. To 
improve the situation, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 introduced the concept of 
abstentions, which shall not prevent the adoption of Union decisions. The abstaining 
member could be exempt from the obligation of such decisions, but still refrain from 
any actions likely to conflict with or impede the Union action. Considering that it is 
difficult to implement a CFSP decision without the support of the vast majority, the 
Lisbon Treaty adds that if the number of member states declaring abstention 
represents more than one third of member states comprising at least one third of the 
population of the Union, the decisions would be prevented.  
 
In addition to the constructive abstention, the possibility of majority voting on CFSP 
has been discussed within the EU since 1990. Amsterdam Treaty first provided that 
the common position and joint action can be achieved through a Qualified Majority 
Vote (QMV), under which a member state can only veto in the case that it claims that 
the measure adopted is against its core national interests (Art. 23.2). Still, the 
unanimity is the default voting rule of CFSP in the post-Lisbon period, while the 
application of QMV is seen as the exceptions in certain (albeit increasing) areas of 
CFSP (Wessel 2012: 500), or in the situation that the Council has unanimously agreed 
to use the QMV. Besides, the QMV is explicitly excluded at all times from decisions 
having military of defence implications, such as the CSDP missions which require 
considerable personnel and financial resources.  
 
Besides the high risk of military intervention, another salient issue over decisions on 
military intervention is the financing. According to the formal financial arrangement 
(Athena Mechanism) established in 2004, participating member states in a given 
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military operation would afford the major expenditure related to the deployment of 
their personnel and equipment. Meanwhile, all member states with the exception of 
Denmark, should contribute to a supplementary ‘common cost’ related to the 
headquarters, infrastructure and logging according to their GNI scale. Under this 
mechanism, even certain strong interventionist member states (E.g. France) are 
willing to contribute troops, the proposal of military intervention within the EU could 
be blocked by the major providers of the ‘common cost’ (E.g. Germany). This 
situation already occurred in several ESDP missions deployed in Africa, in which 
Germany had few incentives to sponsor the France-led military operation in its 
former colonies like Congo and Chad.45The financial concern becomes more serious 
in the context of Euro Crisis and subsequent austerity measures, as member states 
seek to further cut their already depleted defence budget. It should be noted that 
although the financing of the CSDP mission is always a political issue raised by 
member states, it is not a real financial problem for the deployment of the CSDP, 
because most of the missions are small-scaled that member states could easily afford 
their shares of ‘common cost’.46  
 
Generally, it is easier for member states to achieve the ‘lowest common denominator’ 
style of cooperation on the civilian interventions in the form of diplomacy, assistance 
and sanction, the common positions and declarations. Member states could achieve 
consensus because they generally share some common objectives such as defending 
human rights, promoting democracy when a crisis emerged in third countries. In 
addition, through a single voice of Europe, the larger member states could exert their 
leadership and expand their influences. This process is not necessarily ‘zero sum’ 
game in which smaller member states have to lose their autonomy on foreign policy 
                                                             
45 Author’s interview with a German analyst on ESDP, Brussels, April 2013 
46 Author’s interview with a EU official in ESDP, Brussels, June 2014 
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to some degree. Instead, smaller members may have the opportunity to play a role in 
world politics that they could not play individually.  
 
Implementation by civilian and military means 
Besides, the EU’s diplomatic or economic measures do not require member states to 
provide additional funding or capabilities, because there are pre-existing agreements 
within the EU to provide the significant resources. For example, the implementation 
of EU economic actions involves the classic ‘Community method’ because the 
relevant policy tools of external trade, aid and finance are laid in the hands of the 
Commission. For this reason, the Commission usually participated in the CFSP 
making-process as the ‘twenty-eighth’ (now the twenty-ninth) member states. 
However, the question of to what extent the EU, the largest single market in the 
world, could use its economic leverage in pursuit of its foreign policy goals is difficult 
to answer. For example, the EU’s trade policy is decided by the Commissioner for 
trade, rather than the High Representative, on a case-by-case basis.  
 
By contrast, the deployment of European troops in crisis management is largely 
under the control of key member states in terms of military power. Even after the 
establishment of ESDP in 1999, member states could choose to send troops abroad 
through NATO (E.g. Afghanistan) or the UN framework (E.g. Lebanon). Not to 
mention France and U.K have the records of individual military intervention in Sierra 
Leone (2000), Côte D’Ivoire (2004) and Mali (2013) in this century, in conjunction 
with consents of host countries and/or authorization by the UN. Therefore, the 
voluntary participation in ESDP operations is subject to the member states’ own 
deliberations, and the launch of the larger scale of ESDP overwhelmingly depends on 
the political willingness of the larger member states.  
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Meanwhile, the EU has been attempting to Europeanized the security policies of 
member states by establishing several Brussels-based permanent institutions, which 
have pronounced executive powers to realize the decided policies. For example, the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) established by the Nice Treaty in 2001, is 
central to the ESDP response to any crisis. According to the Article 38 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the main task of the PSC is to ‘monitor the implementation of agreed policies’ 
and exercise ‘the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management 
operations.’ It should be noted that the PSC, like its predecessor the former Political 
Committee, is dominated by national representatives. Nevertheless, in practice the 
negotiation in PSC is better understood as a problem-solving process with strong 
wills to forge consensus and frequent references to common EU values, rather than 
the hard bargaining in pursuit of fixed national interests (Juncos and Reynolds 2007: 
141). This argument is confirmed by my interviewees in Brussels. Most of them said 
that for historical reasons the commitment to common value plays a quite important 
role in PSC negations, and unlike a hard bargain bigger members rarely bully smaller 
ones. Or at least, “both the problem-solving and bargain existed within the PSC.47 
Therefore, the PSC could be regarded as one of the channels in which the 
Europeanization of national foreign policies took place.  
 
In addition to the PSC, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was created in 2004 to 
“support the member states and the Council in their effort to improve European 
defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP”, in 
terms of identifying operational requirements and then suggesting programs to fill 
the gap. Similarly, the EDA is hardly an autonomous supranational institution, since 
                                                             
47 Author’s interview with several EU officials in EEAS, Brussels, June 2014 
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its steering board is made up of the defence ministers of participating member 
states.  
 
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty provided the EU with the full-scale diplomatic corps: The 
European External Action Service (EEAS), under the authority of the High 
Representative. With the establishment of the EEAS in 2010, all these above agencies 
have been transformed into EEAS’s branches, while their intergovernmental functions 
will continue in the foreseen future. However, the function of EEAS is currently 
constrained by member states. For example, some member states are reluctant to 
further fund EEAS and commit their own diplomats to the autonomous body (Allen 
2012: 647). From the perspective of member states, since the rotating presidency is 
replaced by HR Ashton (except trade area) and now there is less transparency after 
the Lisbon.48 For HR Ashton, she was expected to bridge the gap between the 
Commission and the Council, but she failed in the Commission.49 Anyway, it remains 
to be seen to what extent the new established EEAS and HR could promote a more 
capable and coherent EU’s foreign policy.  
                                                                                                                              
Conclusion 
In general, the EU is at the forefront of the multilateral intervention in humanitarian 
crises. To do that, the EU goes beyond its traditional image of civilian power, and has 
developed its diplomatic, economic and (still weak) military tools at its disposal since 
the late 1990s. With regard to the principles governing the multilateral intervention 
in the UN framework, the EU clearly promotes the norms of human rights and 
democracy, and supports the emerging concept of R2P. These ideas derived from the 
post-war history of Europe, and permeated the fundamental treaties and key 
                                                             
48 Author’s interview with a EU official in ESDP, Brussels, June 2014 
49 Author’s interview with a EU official in EEAS, Brussels, June 2014 
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documents of the EU. Obviously, these norms or principles never entirely determine 
the EU’s policy outcomes of intervention, but could predispose the EU to act in 
certain ways and refrain it from some other actions.  
 
Turning to the question of policy-making process, Intergovernmentalists could safely 
argue that the intergovernmentalism still prevails in EU’s crisis intervention policy. 
National governments interact intensively during the decision-making process and 
final decisions are made by European Council or Council of the ministers rested on 
member states unanimity. There are two basic reasons for this. First, member states 
need to react to international crises under tight time pressure. That is why member 
states held the right of policy initiation while the High Representative with the 
support of the Commission has an equal right to initiate but is not expected to do 
formal agenda-setting. Secondly, in crisis management member states are focusing 
on policy coordination rather than legislation-making. There is little room for a strong 
institution to play the role of monitoring, sanctioning and executing (Wagner 2003). 
Therefore, member states have much less incentives to delegate their foreign and 
security policy to the EU institutions, which cannot help to decrease the transaction 
costs like in trade policy. Consequently, the lack of its own coherence and capabilities 
usually makes the EU’s intervention often less effective. 
Nevertheless, the institutionalization at the Union level has been shaping the pure 
intergovernmental cooperation on foreign and security policies, through the 
increasingly important Brussels-based institutions such as the Political and Security 
Committee. The logic of appropriateness, like the common ideas serve as the 
coalition glue, is clearly visible in the past negotiations in the PSC. The path 
dependency can be observed in the choices of Petersburg tasks, which shaped 
subsequent policies (Peterson and Lavenex 2012:200). Constructivists even go further, 
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by claiming that the intensive foreign policy interaction within the EU for decades has 
been influencing the preference formation of the member states and developing the 
new European identities and interests in the external relations. For instance, the 
common goals of preventing, managing and resolving crises are genuinely shared 
among member states regarding the policy-making of intervention.   
 
Neither the Intergovernmental/Realist approach nor Institutionalist-Constructivist 
approach can individually capture the full dynamics of the sui generis European 
Foreign Policy making process. In fact, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, 
and the European intervention policy is better understood as a combination of 
national interests and normative considerations. European policymakers usually 
admitted that they were making the balance between the national interests and 
common norms which were intertwined in some occasions.50Therefore, it is better to 
understand European Foreign policy as primarily intergovernmental constructed, in 
which division of interests certainly existed among national capitals, but increasingly 
influenced by the institutions based in Brussels, where the socialization, persuasion 
and learning processes have been shaping the positions of member states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
50 Consensus view of several European diplomats, personal communication, Brussels and 
Rome, 2012-2014. 
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Chapter 4: Chinese foreign policies on interventions:  
Positions, Principles, and Processes 
 
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China’s approach to the UN 
multilateral interventions has experienced three stages. (1) Before recovering its 
membership in the UN in 1971, China was largely isolated from the international 
community. Meanwhile, Beijing was even boldly against the UN intervention by force 
such as in the Korean War. (2) During the 1970s and the 1980s, China was still 
reluctant to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations, but unilaterally 
intervened in the Vietnam and Cambodia. (3) Since the end of the Cold War, China 
has gradually become an active participant of multilateral intervention under the UN 
framework, while Beijing is averse to the conception of non-consensual 
‘humanitarian intervention’ and wary of the emerging norm of ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’.  
 
Several literatures have reviewed China’s intervention and non-intervention policies 
from the 1950s to the 2010s, to demonstrate how Beijing’s principle of 
non-interference involved in the past 60 years and explain why China’s positions on 
UN peacekeeping varied in different periods (He 2007, Stähle 2008). However, there 
has so far been little attention given to the issue of Chinese foreign policy making 
process concerning crisis intervention, which is essential to understand the effect of 
ideas and principles on the policy outcomes. Therefore, my research on this topic will 
combine the analysis of policy making process, attempting to explore the 
mechanisms in which ideational factors could exert a long-lasting influence on 
policy-making. 
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The chapter is divided into four parts. The first section explains why China acquired 
the principle of non-interference in the 1950s, emphasizing Beijing’s security 
concerns and ideological motivations. Besides, I will explain China’s practices of 
unilateral intervention and reluctant attitude to the UN multilateral intervention 
during the Cold War. The following section focuses on the evolution of China’s 
position on multilateral intervention since the 1990s, accounting for Beijing’s 
rationales to participate the UN peacekeeping. In the third section, I point out that 
China does not completely cast off the principle of non-interference. Beijing still 
emphasizes the respect to target state’s sovereignty and the neutrality of 
intervention in recent cases. The final section turns to the third question of Chinese 
foreign and security policy making process, and attempts to demonstrate how the 
principles and values could shape China’s policy-making on crisis intervention.  
 
(I) The emergence of China’s non-interference principle and the Chinese 
practice of external intervention 
China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference can be traced back to the 
1954, when ‘the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ were enshrined as the 
cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy.51 The Five Principles, including: (1) Mutual 
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) Mutual 
non-aggression, (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) 
Equality and mutual benefit, and (5) Peaceful co-existence. Their first formal 
codification in treaty form was signed in 1954, in a China-India agreement on trade 
and intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. Then the five principles 
were subsequently incorporated in modified form in a statement issued in April 1955 
                                                             
51 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed China’s continuing allegiance to The Five 
Principle after the change of Chinese leadership. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's 
Regular Press Conference on November 15, 2012 
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at the historic Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Later The Five 
Principles had been adopted in Colombo and elsewhere formed the basis of 
the Non-Aligned Movement.  
 
Security concern was one reason for China’s adoption of the non-intervention 
principle in the 1950s. The new born PRC was facing an insecure domestic and 
international environment. Domestically, the Chinese Civil War was not completely 
ended, with the continuing military collision between the PRC in mainland China and 
ROC in Taiwan Island, as well as the danger of rebellion movement in Tibet. 
Internationally, the U.S and other major western countries refused to recognize the 
communist regime in China and adopted a joint export embargo against the PRC. 
Besides, due to the strong U.S military presence in China’s neighbourhood and the 
U.S military intervention in the Korean War, Beijing deeply perceived the risk of being 
intervened and toppled by the U.S. The international situation further deteriorated 
for China as a result of the Sino-Soviet Split since 1960, in which Moscow also 
threatened to punish Beijing. Therefore, as a potential target of foreign intervention, 
China naturally preferred to the defensive principle of non-interference. 
 
China’s embrace of the non-interference principle was not only aiming to preserve 
the Communist regime and China’s independence from foreign interventions. One of 
the most notable features of its development is that it had been driven significantly 
by domestic and international anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism movement. 
Therefore, ideology is another reason for Beijing to enshrine this principle. China 
shared the doctrine of non-interference in domestic affairs with the global South, or 
called ‘The Third World’ in Mao Zedong’s term. During that period Western powers 
regularly interfered in the internal affairs of their former colonies through regime 
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change, economic agreement with strings, and even the deployment of military force. 
To fight against the Western interference and change the world order, China 
supported the national self-determination movement with large-scale aid and quickly 
established diplomatic relations with the newborn African countries. In return, 
African countries played an essential role in Beijing’s campaign to secure a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. After being isolated from the Western 
world and deteriorated the relations with the Soviet bloc, China perceived the 
developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America (represented by the Group of 
77) as its friends in the world. As the world’s largest developing country as it labelled 
itself, China attempted to unify their voices on the global issues.  
 
Echoed by the Five Principles and in particular the principle of non-interference, the  
increasing number of post-colonial states contributed to make considerable 
law-making declarations and resolutions in the UN even before the PRC regained 
China’s UN membership in 1971. For instance, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility 
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
Independence and Sovereignty in 1965, 52 and the Declaration of Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in 1970.53 Therefore, at that time 
China insisted classic Westphalian norms of non-intervention in international fora: on 
the basis of a ‘thick’ notion of sovereignty, Beijing refuses to support international 
interventions even with the UN Security Council authorization and the invitation of 
the host state.  
 
Throughout the first decade in the UN, China’s attitude to the UN peacekeeping was 
                                                             
52 UN General Assembly A/RES/20/2131, 21 December 1965 
53 UN General Assembly A/RES/25/2625, 24 October 1970 
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an outright rejection. During this period, the UN peacekeeping missions focused on 
the Middle-East to calm the Arab-Israeli Conflict, in Suez (UNEF II) in 1973 and in the 
Golan Heights (UNDOF) in 1974 concluding the Yom Kippur War, and Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
in 1978 following the 1978 South Lebanon conflict. Since its return to the UN Security 
Council, China generally opposed the creation and continuation of all UN 
peacekeeping operations, and refused to share the annual budget of peacekeeping 
operations or contribute personnel operations (He 2007: 16-17). In Beijing’s view, the 
UN peacekeeping operation was under the ultimate control of the two hegemonic 
superpowers, as an interventionist instrument to serve their own interests. 
Consequently, as the pioneer of the anti-hegemony, China should not cooperate with 
them in the UN Security Council. Remembering the brutal war in Korea against the 
UN forces in the early 1950s, Beijing was naturally suspicious of the peacekeeping 
operation under the UN flag. 
 
It is noteworthy that Beijing did not veto any proposal of UN peacekeeping 
operations in this period, because a veto could be regarded in line with the position 
of either U.S or Soviet Union, and annoyed the host country which might genuinely 
need the UN peacekeeping. Instead, Beijing often presented during the UNSC voting 
process, but kept silent and did not participate in the voting, in order to express its 
non-cooperation and neutrality. For example, as regards setting up United Nations 
Emergency Forces to supervise the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel at the end 
of Yom Kippur War, China did not vote or formally abstain on the UNSC Resolution 
340.54 The Chinese representatives called the behaviour as ‘the fifth kind of voting’ 
(Zhu 2005), which was different from the four traditional kinds of voting behaviour in 
UN: voting in favour, vote against (veto), abstention and absence from the meeting 
                                                             
54 UN Security Council: Resolution 340, October 25, 1973 
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and voting. It reflected that Chinese diplomats still needed time to learn the complex 
structures and procedures of the UN, after the restoration of Beijing’s seat in the 
organization in 1971. The dearth of experience in multilateral organizations was 
another practical reason to refrain China from participating in UN peacekeeping 
during the 1970s. 
 
Ironically, Beijing’s commitment to the principle of non-interference was not wholly 
consistent during the Cold War. In support of the communist revolution and 
self-determination movement, Mao’s China obviously breached the principle of 
non-interference several times from the 1950s to the 1970s, notably the unilateral 
military intervention in the neighbouring Korean Peninsula and Indo-China Peninsula. 
During the Korean War (1950-1953), China fought against the UN multinational force 
led by the U.S, in order to save the defeated communist regime in North Korea. In 
1979, China invaded the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as a response to 
Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia in 1978 which ended the rule of the 
Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge.  
 
China justified its military interventions in two ways, although they are probably not 
well reflected China’s genuine motivations. First, Beijing legitimated its military 
interventions as against the pre-existing interventions made by the U.S in Korea and 
Vietnam in Cambodia. According to Beijing’s narratives, U.S represented the Western 
imperialism, which attempted to occupy the Eastern countries like Korea, while 
Vietnam sought to establish its regional hegemony in Indo-China by occupying 
Cambodia. Therefore, China’s interventions were invited by the host country (North 
Korea and Cambodia) to combat the invaders. Secondly, at home Beijing used the 
reason of self-defence to justify its military operations. Based on this claim, China 
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was involved in the Korean War because U.S was bombing the Chinese towns on the 
China-Korea border and would pose a bigger threat to China if it occupies the whole 
Korea. Beijing also accused Vietnam of provoking border conflicts which finally 
exceeded China’s tolerance.   
 
Besides the two striking cases of military interventions, China also exerted political 
interventions by supporting the communist (Maoist) anti-government forces in other 
countries, in particular in South-East Asia and Africa. This practice was particularly 
prevailed during the China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), and stood contrast to 
the current Chinese foreign policy proclaims as respecting the political system of 
other countries. However, it should be noted that China’s radical interventionist 
policy in this decade was mainly the result of domestic political chaos and reflecting 
Mao’s personal will, rather than a routine national foreign policy. For example, the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry was largely paralysed by the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and 
excluded from the decision-making of the exporting revolution.  
 
China’s interventionist policy based on the revolutionary ideology was ended in the 
1980s. In the era of Deng Xiaoping, the aim of Chinese foreign policy began to 
transform from confronting the two superpowers to creating a peaceful international 
environment for the domestic economic development. For example, to improve the 
relationship with its Southeast Asian neighbours, China re-emphasized the principle 
of non-interference, replacing the support to the communist rebels and the fight 
against the hegemony in this region. In this light, China could re-establish the 
diplomatic relations with Indonesia in 1990 and ended the conflict with Vietnam at 
the same time. In the 1980s, the embrace of the principle of non-interference was 
necessary for Beijing’s strategy of development. By reducing the possibility of conflict 
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with superpowers and neighbours and the material burden of exporting revolution, 
China could focus its limited resources on economic development. 
 
Meanwhile, the domestic ‘Reform and Opening up’ also request China to engage in 
international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy. Since the 1980s, Beijing 
adjusted its UN policy and began to take a more cooperative stance on the UN 
multilateral intervention. For the first time in 1981, China voted in favour of the 
Security Council resolution that extended the mandate of the UN peacekeeping 
operation in Cyprus. The next session will explain China’s position changes regarding 
the UN peacekeeping operations.  
 
(II) The evolving China’s positions on intervention since the 1990s 
The end of the Cold War has profoundly changed the international environment. 
After getting rid of the global geopolitical game between U.S and USSR, the focus of 
the international community, including the developing world has largely shifted to 
the new agendas such as civilian protection, crisis management and peace-building. 
The UN Security Council, which was largely paralysed by the West-East confrontation 
during the Cold War, has become more active in playing a decisive role in dealing 
with crises since major powers have a higher political willingness to cooperate. A 
clear indicator of this is the fact that the UN undertook only 13 peacekeeping 
operations From 1948 to 1988, all of them are traditional monitoring mission after 
the conflict; while from 1988 to 2012, the UN deployed more than 50 UN 
peacekeeping missions, some of them were including broader mandates. 
 
China’s non-interference policy, as a reaction to the bi-polar world, has been adapted 
to the changing international system accordingly. As a posture of integrating the 
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international community, China actively participated in multilateral intervention 
operations through the UN framework in the past 25 years. Since it first dispatched 
20 election monitors to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in 
Namibia in 1989, China has become the largest peacekeeping contributor among the 
UNSC permanent members and ranked 15th overall among all UN contributors. At 
the beginning, China’s participation was limited to the traditional non-military tasks 
such as sending observers to the Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission in 1991 and deploying 
engineering units to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. The slight shift 
occurred in 1993, when Beijing voted in favour of the resolutions authorizing the use 
of limited force to protect civilians in Somalia and Bosnia. Since the 2000s, China’s 
peacekeeping engagement ranged from traditional peacekeeping operations to 
multidimensional peacekeeping and enforcement. In East Timor, Liberia and Congo, 
considerable Chinese troops and police were deployed in large part to protect 
civilians. 
 
There are two preconditions that China could choose to participate in the UN 
peacekeeping operations. First, as a well-recognized tool of multilateral intervention 
in conflicts, the UN peacekeeping operation is a comparable safe form of 
engagement to maintain the peace and security. Hence Chinese soldiers wearing the 
blue helmets would not cause the major controversy at home or fuel the ‘China 
Threat’ theory abroad. Besides, as the permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, China could use its veto power and influence to shape the proposed UN 
intervention in accordance with its interests and preferences. For instance, by 
strengthening the authority of the UN, China could counter the radical form of 
unilateral military operation led by the West.  
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Furthermore, two kinds of pressures have been driving China to involve with the 
international crisis management. On the domestic level, in recent years there is 
growing demand for Beijing to secure China’s expanding interests abroad, even by 
military presence if necessary. For example, around 75% Chinese peacekeepers have 
been deployed in Africa, where China has major interests on energy and trade, but 
also increasingly exposed to the local fragile security environment. On the 
international level, both the Western countries and developing partners urged China 
to shoulder more responsibility in assisting the host state to overcome its security 
challenges. For instance, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has 
explicitly incorporated the Chinese cooperation with Africa on peace and security 
(Aldin and Large 2013: 19-20). 
 
In an optimistic view, the divergence between Chinese and Western positions on 
interventions is under the way of lessening (Carlson 2006:224). Like other great 
powers involved in peacekeeping operations, Beijing’s motivation behind includes 
bolstering China’s status as a benevolent power, capitalizing on chances to exercise 
PLA force and maintaining a military presence in some concerning areas. A Chinese 
analyst (Pang, 2009) also points that China’s adherence to the principle of 
non-interference is experiencing remarkable change, because (1) A growing domestic 
demand for China to protect its overseas interests; (2) Western pressures on China 
to shoulder more international responsibility; (3) and some developing countries 
adopt a flexible interpretation on non-intervention, notably the African Union.  
 
However, the Crisis in Darfur completely exposed the divergences between China and 
the West on international intervention, which was highlighted before 2008 Beijing 
Olympics with the mass campaigns against the Chinese government in Europe and 
99 
 
North America. A quantitative discourse analysis shows that China’s position on 
Darfur was quite different from that of U.S: In their respective 20 official speeches 
and documents on Darfur, U.S mentioned sanctions 74 times and approves it 
explicitly 61 times, whereas China mentioned sanctions 49 times and opposes it 22 
times (Gu and Dong 2010: 28). Beijing was blamed as an irresponsible power in the 
management of Darfur conflicts, watering down and obstructing decisions in UN 
Security Council on a robust UN multilateral intervention to halt the slaughter in 
Darfur. And even worse, rumours abounded about Beijing’s military assistance to 
Khartoum, according to reports from Amnesty International (2007) and some 
Western media.55  China, of course, categorically denied this accusation.56  The 
conventional wisdom attributes China’s position to its close oil ties to the Sudanese 
regime. However, this prevailing explanation in terms of economic-motivation may 
ignore the importance of ideational factor in China’s foreign policy, thus fail to seize 
the general and consistent Chinese position on intervention, in particular does not 
provide a satisfactory account of some cases in which China’s economic motivation 
was inadequate. 
 
When Libya Civil War broke out, More than 30,000 Chinese nationals worked in Libya. 
China mounted a big operation to fly out Chinese citizens on chartered flights and 
military aircraft, which demonstrates China’s growing ability and willing in operations 
abroad. At the same time China voted in favour of UN Security Council resolution 
1970 which condemned the use of lethal force by the regime of Gaddafi against 
                                                             
55 Hilary Andersson, “China 'is fuelling war in Darfur’, BBC News, 13 July 2008; Amnesty 
International, ‘Sudan: Arms Continuing to Fuel Serious Human Rights Violations in Darfur’, 8 
May 2007. 
56 Zhang Juan, ‘Zhai Juan: The Weapons in Darfur is not from China’, CRI online, 17 April, 
2007. 张娟：《翟隽：达尔富尔地区武器来源帽子扣不到中国头上》，国际在线。 
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protesters, and imposed a series of international sanctions in response.57 This could 
be read as a sign that China began to adopt a more permissive approach to 
intervention. However, on March China retreated somewhat to its traditional 
position by abstaining in the vote on the UN Security Council resolution 1973 that 
authorized a non-fly zone and ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians in Libya. 
58What the outcome was: the France, the UK and US-led military intervention 
sidetracked from the aim of protecting civilians but aiding the rebels for hastening 
Qaddafi's downfall. During the course of the events, China repeatedly accused NATO 
of overstepping its mandate several times.  
 
The consequence of regime change in Libya has strengthened China’s resistant 
position on international intervention on humanitarian ground. Considering the later 
crisis and coercive multilateral interventions in Syria, China vetoed a Western-drafted 
resolution along with Russia at the UN Security Council on 4 October, 2011 that 
would have threatened Assad's regime with targeted sanctions if it continued its 
campaign against the protesters. On 4 February 2012, a similar resolution was vetoed 
by China and Russia again. On 4 August, China and Russia vetoed UN Security Council 
resolutions which could have led to sanctions against Syria a third time. China’s 
expressed its stance explicitly early in May 2011 as follows:59 
 
“China believes that when it comes to properly handling the current Syrian situation, 
it is the correct direction and major approach to resolve the internal differences 
through political dialogue and maintain its national stability as well as the overall 
stability and security of the Middle East. The future of Syria should be independently 
                                                             
57 S/RES/1970 (2011) ,26 February 2011 
58 UN Security Council SC/10200, 17 March 2011 
59 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on May 24, 2011’, 25 May, 2011. 
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decided by the Syrian people themselves free from external interference. We hope the 
international community continues to play a constructive role in this regard.” 
 
China’s position on multilateral intervention is clear and basically consistent in above 
cases: unwilling to intervene, at least by coercive measures. In contrast to a popular 
argument that China supported Al-Bashir and Gaddafi regimes in the pursuit of its oil 
interests in Sudan and Libya, in the case of Libya China’s non-intervention policy had 
made Chinese assets and investments in risk during and after the regime change. The 
economic-motivation explanation of China’s position is even less convincing in the 
case of Syria where Chinese assets are quite limited. The next section explores the 
role of China principles, which could be a reason to explain why China’s positions on 
intervention are not always directly reflecting their powers and interests.  
 
(III) China’s current principles regarding the multilateral intervention  
Although China has become less adhered to the classical form of non-interference 
principle since the 1990s, Beijing’s positions in recent cases of Sudan, Libya and Syria 
remind us to reconsider the limit of China’s shift from its non-intervention position. 
Still, China exclusively sticks to the traditional peacekeeping operations which must 
have clear UN Security Council authorization as well as the local consent. The UN 
defines the peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) as Non-combatant military operations 
undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties and 
designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce agreement 
in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement.60 Therefore, China’s 
participation in UN peacekeeping has been guided by these defining principles: (1) 
deployment of the force following a ceasefire agreement; (2) the requirement of 
                                                             
60 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Glossary of UN Peacekeeping 
Terms”,  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/glossary/p.htm 
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consent of the host country or belligerent parties; (3) the non-use of force, except in 
cases of self-defence, and (4) impartiality of the force and its commander (Contessi 
2010: 329). China’ commitment to above principles can be found in China’s white 
papers China’s National Defence in recent years and China’s discourse in the UN 
Security Council debates on peacekeeping.  
 
According to the former Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s speech in UN Security 
Council in 2000,61 China’s strict restrictions on humanitarian intervention is a critical 
lesson drew from the NATO unilateral military intervention in Kosovo. Tang Jiaxuan, 
who was then the Chinese Foreign Minister, spoke at the UN that “A country’s 
sovereignty is the prerequisite for and the basis of the human rights that the people 
of that country can enjoy. When the sovereignty of a country is put in jeopardy, its 
human rights can hardly be protected effectively.”62The case of Kosovo alerted China 
to the danger of coercive intervention against the wills of host state. Moreover, 
China’s wariness on the US-led intervention is rooted in the soured Sino-American 
relations after the Cold War and the Tiananmen accident. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, as the remaining largest communist regime in the world, Beijing 
perceived the challenge from the liberal democracies through the so-called ‘Peaceful 
Evolution’. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the Chinese version of multilateral 
intervention, emphasis is placed on the importance of respecting the target’s 
sovereignty and the leadership of UN instead of a West-orchestrated intervention. 
  
What arose in cases of Darfur, Libya and Syria is the emerging norm of Responsibility 
to Protect. Although China accepted the R2P with reluctance in the UN,63 the idea 
                                                             
61 Jiang Zemin, The speech in the summit meeting of UN Security Council, 7 September 2000, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel2/17/20000908/223916.html 
62 General Assembly, A/54/PV.8, p.16, 22 September 1999 
63 China, Russia and Algeria had initially opposed the notion of collective responsibility 
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has little attraction for Beijing. According to the speech of Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, 
the Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN in 2009, China emphasizes 
that R2P remains a concept and does not constitute a norm of international law. Liu 
reiterated the implementation of ‘R2P’ should not contravene the principle of state 
sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, and strictly 
limited to four mass atrocity crimes, namely, “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity”.64 The subsequent controversial application of R2P 
implementation has raised more objections from the Chinese government. As Beijing 
needs to balance its well established principle of non-interference with the global 
emerging norm of R2P, after the intervention of Libya which brought about a regime 
change, China’s balance inclines to the orthodox principle of non-interference again. 
A Chinese diplomat and IR expert, argued that R2P is highly vulnerable to the abuse 
of regime change, which is not authorized by the UN Charter, thus China vetoed on 
Syria in the defence of the UN Charter (Qu 2012).  
 
In addition, In China’s view the application of R2P may be too narrow since its 
conception of human rights gives priority to civil and political rights over 
socioeconomic rights, which encompass issues such as the food and resources crisis. 
Instead, Beijing believes that the key of the final solutions to the problems of China 
and other developing countries’ is their own economic and social developments. For 
example, China mentioned words relevant to ‘development’ 83 times in its 20 
documents concerning Darfur from 2004-2008 (Gu and Dong 2010: 28). Liu Guijin, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(paragraph 139), however Algeria's two-year term as a non-permanent member of the 
Security Council came to end on December 31, 2005 and British diplomats persuaded China 
and later Russia to pass Resolution 1674. See ‘Update Report No. 1, Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict’, Security Council Report, March 8, 2006; E. Lederer, ‘UN Affirms Duty to 
Defend Civilians’, The Washington Post, April 28, 2006. 
64 UN General Assembly, A/63/PV.98, 24 July 2009 
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the Chinese envoy on Darfur, offered an alternative interpretation of the Darfur 
situation by arguing that the essence of Darfur issue is not genocide, but 
‘development’, which caused the conflicts over resources between ethnic groups. 
65This argument of development was echoed by the Sudanese ambassador to China 
Mirghani Mohamed Salih, who attributed the Darfur crisis to ‘insufficient 
development’ in an interview with a Chinese media.66  
 
Beijing’s emphasis on economic development and the stability of the state reflected 
its strong political preference since the Deng Xiaoping era. It is originated from the 
Chinese Communist Party’s ideology of governance at home, that long-term 
development is more important than liberal-democracy. This also has shaped China’s 
modalities on the conflict-prevention and conflict intervention in other continents. 
As a confident newcomer in the global stage, China is more willing to provide its 
alternative norms rather than passively follow the existing norms made by the West.  
 
In practice, China’s stances of non-interference are usually appreciated by the 
developing countries who can take the advantage of it. The non-interference 
principle is helpful for Beijing to comfort its African partners that China would not 
attempt to dominate them by utilizing its material leverages (Li 2007). For example, 
while engaged with the implementation of African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA), China has proffered its non-interference policy – according to which China 
focused on providing financial and technological support and the African Union 
remains the owner and leader of its security program (Kambudzi 2013: 32).  
                                                             
65 Bai Jie and Xu Song, ‘Liu Guijin: The essence of Darfur issue is issue of development’, 
Xinhua Agency, 29 May 2007. 白洁，徐松：《刘贵今：达尔富尔问题实质是“发展的问题”》，
新华社 
66 Interview by Ruan Cishan, ‘The truth in Darfur which was distorted by U.S’, Phoenix TV, 18 
October 2007. 阮次山：《被美国歪曲的达尔富尔问题真相》，凤凰卫视 
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(IV) Ideas and the Chinese Foreign Policy Makings  
After the cold war, China has framed various ideas, including ‘lie low, bide our time’, 
‘peaceful rise’, ‘peaceful development’, ‘multi-polar world’, and ‘harmonious world’, 
as the strategic guideline of Chinese foreign policy. These ideas well reflected China’s 
perceptions of the international environment and its self-identity. Using the theory of 
categorization and social identity, Yong Deng points out the international social 
situation China faces: After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the leading advanced 
western democracies seek to establish their in-group superior qualities by promoting 
a set of values as the basis of social comparison and categorization in international 
society (Deng 2008). That is why U.S and the EU would like to use the word 
‘engagement policy’ toward China, whom needs be engaged with their leading 
existing customs, in order to be entitled to the full membership of the international 
club.  
 
As Yong Deng claims, to overcome the disadvantage and raise its status in 
international society, China’s strategy follows two directions: on the one hand, as a 
continuing status quo power, China actively participate in the existing international 
order such as UN and WTO, in which China has an advantage; on the other hand, 
China attempt to alter the dominance of western ideas in international society, for 
example, by advocating the idea of ‘harmonious world’: where western superiority of 
democracies is no longer valid, but every sovereign state can embrace their own 
political systems, economic models and social arrangements. However, nowadays 
China’s strategy of two-directions may encounter a dilemma regarding the issues of 
international intervention. Although Beijing is willing to play a significant role in 
maintaining the international peace and security, in particular through the UN 
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framework, the norms leading the intervention such as R2P are championed by the 
West, which make China hesitated to follow.  
 
The question the dissertation tackles is to what extent these ideas and principles 
professed by Beijing could shape China’s foreign policy making on external crisis 
intervention? Like the study of the European foreign policy in Chapter 3, the answer 
to the Chinese question is also related to its policy-making process. Compared to the 
EU, however, Chinese foreign policy making process is less transparent and 
sometimes appears to be mysterious, largely due to the lack of foreign policy 
decision-making legislation. In theory, the competencies of Chinese foreign policy 
making dispersed across several government departments, including National 
People’s Congress, the President, State Council, and the Central Military Commission. 
In reality, however, the small and opaque Standing Committee of the Politburo of 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has the ultimate authority in China. The collective 
leadership of Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) could make supreme foreign 
policy decisions outside the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Defence Ministry, especially 
on the major issues. Therefore, it is difficult to anticipate Beijing’s foreign policy from 
its formal decision-making procedures. But this does not imply that China’s foreign 
policy making is random and could elude the academic scrutiny. In fact, the CCP 
regime is even easier to achieve the continuity of foreign policy than the polities of 
multi-party system. The consistency and coherence of the Western foreign policies 
are affected by the rotation of ruling parties and the separation of powers between 
the legislative and executive branches.  
 
Meanwhile, analysts also find it is difficult to view Beijing’s foreign policy making as 
purely centralized and mainly reflected the personal wills of top leaders. As a growing 
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world power under the domestic social transition, today China faced the most 
complicated foreign policy challenges of any other time in the history of the PRC. To 
adjust to the transforming international and domestic environment, Beijing’s foreign 
policy mechanism has grown more sophisticated and diverse, in which a broader 
spectrum of actors and factors need to be taken into account (Jacobson and Knox 
2010). In respect of the multiple actors, for instance, Chinese official think tanks and 
even elite experts from universities are believed to have informed and influenced the 
Chinese senior decision makers since the Jiang Zemin’s Presidency (1989-2002) 
(Shambaugh 2002, Morrison 2012). Regarding the emerging factors, for example, 
Chinese public opinion is no longer regarded as irrelevant in the analysis of Chinese 
foreign policy. 
 
The two characteristics—the lack of transparent procedures as well as the 
proliferation of inputs—make the study of Chinese foreign policy makings especially 
challenging. The chapter will adopt a complex approach, rather than only a linear 
stage approach to analyse it. First, I will discuss the key people and agencies involved 
in the Chinese decision-making process; Secondly, I will identify the domestic 
intervening variables in particular ideational ones, which could have influences on 
these people and agencies. It should be noted that my investigation bellow mainly 
reflects the period of Hu Jintao’s Presidency (2002-2012), during which the 
interventions in crises of Darfur and Libya occurred. The new China’s National 
Security Commission of CCP established by President Xi Jinping in 2013, which 
further centralizes the Chinese foreign and security policy making and increases the 
authority of the president over the deep bureaucratic traditions and rivalries, is 
beyond the content of the chapter. 
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Chinese decision makers and agencies involved in external crisis interventions  
The collective leadership under the principle of ‘democratic centralism’ is the key for 
understanding the China’s foreign policy decision making. Usually, the more 
important issue would involve broader scope of discussion among CCP top leaders 
and even other high officials in relevant departments. Any decision on strategic 
important issues such as introducing a new strategic policy toward a critical country 
should be based on the consensus among 7 or 9 top leaders in the Politburo Standing 
Committee. They are based in Beijing and meet regularly every week or the 
emergency requires. Considering the varied backgrounds and charged fields of PBSC 
members, sometimes they have different priorities and preferences during the 
negotiation. In case the consensus is impossible to reach and the decision has to be 
made, it is believed the final decision will be voted upon (that is why the number of 
Politburo Standing Committee member is always odd). It is noteworthy that in most 
cases the Politburo Standing Committee would take longer time to achieve unanimity, 
rather vote for the decision.  
 
Like most of his counterparts in the world, the Chinese President, as the general 
secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of Central Military Commission, is the 
supreme policy-maker on foreign policy. Although needs to seek consensus, Hu Jintao 
commands unparalleled authority and privilege in determining routine and daily 
foreign policies, and have greater weight than his colleagues to decide strategic 
issues. According to the division of labour among members of Politburo Standing 
Committee, the president is in charge of the diplomatic and defence affairs.67 He 
                                                             
67 Other PBSC members also shoulder some responsibility on external relations. For example, 
Wu Bangguo, as the chairman of the National People’s Congress, was in charge of the 
parliament diplomacy. Jia Qinglin, who chaired the People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
played a significant role in dealing with Taiwan, overseas Chinese, and relations with 
developing countries. (Cabestan, 2009: 68) 
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heads the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the Communist Party of China 
(FALSG), which is an ad-hoc inter-agency committee consisting of a dozen senior CCP 
leaders and relevant ministers. In Hu’s era, the Leading Small Groups (LSGs) in 
different areas played essential coordinating roles in the governance of China. The 
FALSG shares the same executive staff and slightly different group members with the 
NSLSG (National Security Leading Small Group) which was established in 2000. As a 
subset of CPC Politburo, the FALSG is the highest decision-making body on China’s 
external relations.  
 
The FALSG is largely designed for responding to the international crisis, which 
(potentially) involving China, rather than dealing with regular foreign affairs at the 
working level. In the ad-hoc FALSG meeting, all the relevant agencies have one or 
two seats at the table by invitation. During the process of policy making, there might 
be various opinions and competing policy options presented by different branches, 
such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the CCP 
international department, the Ministry of State Security and the Military (PLA).68 
Generally, the discussion in FALSG is understood as problem-solving and 
consensus-building among different agencies. The diffused decision-making authority 
could lead to a slower decision making process regarding the critical and emergent 
issues, but also help to avoid making arbitrary and disastrous decisions made by an 
individual or a minority of people. The establishment of FALSG marks the end of 
strongman in China. Compare with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the subsequent 
Chinese Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao do not have the absolute authority 
                                                             
68 It is believed that the PLA has the greater weight than any other line ministries on issues 
have a clear security dimension such as border disputes and Sino-US relations. But the role 
of PLA in general Chinese foreign policy making is debated. On the one hand, along with the 
professionalization of the PLA, the Military’s influence on Chinese politics has largely 
declined since the Deng Xiaoping era. On the other, in recent years several PLA generals 
frequently made public comments on international affairs and engaged in television debates. 
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over the critical foreign policy decision making. As a Chinese analyst pointed out, the 
broader consensus building serves to legitimate the final decision within CCP, instead 
of risking the personal career and reputation of individual leaders (Sun 2011:6).  
 
As the primary (but informal) advisor of Chinese President on foreign affairs, the 
State Councillor plays a central coordinating role among different participating 
agencies. In Hu’s era, State Councillor Dai Bingguo manages the office of FALSG, 
which is also known as the Foreign Affairs Office of CCP Central Committee (FAO). As 
a conveyor belt between top leaders and bottom bureaucracies, The FAO is an 
essential agency in assessing the international situation and agenda setting. On the 
one hand, the FAO is responsible for collecting and filtering the policy reports from 
relevant government departments and (semi) official think tanks.69All the agencies 
have their own research institutes and Intelligence sources, and their reports usually 
reflect their specific concerns. On the other, the FAO summarizes the key findings for 
the State Councillor to present policy briefings to the President, who will determine 
whether it is necessary to convene a FALSG meeting and who will be invited to the 
meeting. In other word, the FALSG agenda is largely shaped by the State Councillor 
(Jacobson and Knox 2010:6). Moreover, the FAO has some derived power from the 
President to make decisions on daily operational and procedural issues. Like the EEAS 
of the EU, the FALSG and FAO are criticized for the deficiency of coordination and 
integration among different agencies, which usually centres on their own work, 
provide partial reports and sometimes lead to budgetary war.  
 
This bureaucratic tension is particularly true between the MFA and PLA at the 
                                                             
69 The General Office of CCP is responsible for collecting and submitting different agency 
reports for senior leaders via their secretaries. But the function of General office is mainly 
procedural and not only concerned with foreign affairs. 
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implementation level. On the one hand, the PLA usually emphasizes its operational 
autonomy thus is reluctant to coordinate their perceived daily activities, which could 
have foreign policy consequences, with the civilian agency. Two notable cases are the 
PLA’s anti-satellite test in 2007 and the J-20 fighter display in 2011. The MFA was not 
informed in advance and felt awkward in dealing with the strategic Sino-US relations. 
Another example is the naval patrols in the South China Sea. The PLA feels its routine 
operation is constrained by the MFA which cares the bilateral relations with the 
neighbouring countries.70 On the other hand, sometimes the Chinese government 
makes foreign policy decisions with military dimension, but without the previous 
consolation with PLA. For example, in 2006 China decided to send a one thousand 
peacekeeping troop to South Lebanon, while eventually only 350 transportation and 
medical-service PLA troops were dispatched. It is reported that the PLA was not 
consulted in advance about the number or readiness level of available (particularly 
English-speaking) officers and soldiers (Cabestan 2009: 90).     
 
In sum, we can understand the Chinese foreign policy making process as a diffused 
hierarchic system. First, all relevant line departments and official think tanks could 
contribute to the assessment of situations and provide policy options, while the right 
of agenda-setting is believed to be dominated by the CCP top leaders. A large 
number of government agencies produce and submit regular or commissioned 
reports, including situation assessment and policy recommendation. These reports 
would be normally filtered by Foreign Affairs Office, General Office or secretaries of 
top leaders. Unless authorized by CCP top leaders, these reports would not get 
circulated outside the agency or put into the agenda. Second, the final decision 
making of Chinese foreign policy is diffused to some extent (Figure 4). The State 
                                                             
70 Personal communication with a PLA Naval officer in South Sea fleet, 2012 December. 
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Councillor and his FAO could make daily procedural decisions for the Head of State, in 
particular on the affairs involved the inter-agency coordination. The affairs that State 
Councillor feels uncertain would be moved to the table of the Chinese President. The 
strategic affairs and critical crises, which go beyond the President’s individual 
responsibility, will be negotiated at the PBSC, the broader PB or the FALSG level. It is 
worth indicating that the FALSG is not a formal decision making body but a 
convenient place to coordinate and prepare the policy. Any critical policy proposal 
made in the FALSG should be formally approved by the PBSC.   
 
 Figure 4  China’s Foreign Policy Making: Who Decides What?  
 
The domestic intervening variables 
After briefly demonstrating the mechanism of Chinese foreign policy making, we can 
further investigate how the domestic factors could influence it. Generally, the 
mechanism is complex but well organized, in which multiple line agencies should 
provide accurate information to the op decision-makers and implement their final 
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decisions with good coordination. However, the reality is even more complex 
because a number of intervening variables have effects on the established 
mechanism. As I mentioned above, the implementation of China’s external relations 
sometimes appears uncoordinated due to the tension among different government 
agencies. This section focuses on the assessment of situations, agenda settings and 
final policy decisions of the Chinese foreign policy, in which the institutionalized ideas, 
system cultures and public opinions could play significant roles.  
 
First, the assessment of international situation could be influenced by the culture of 
institutions and thus not ideally objective. In China, the long-existing mainstream 
principle within the institution could constrain the analysts in from re-evaluating the 
situation according to the change on the ground. Instead, they prefer to follow and 
maintain the prevailed ideas rather than challenge them, in order to avoid personal 
career risks as being marginalized in the institution. This is particular true when 
analysing the Western intervention in the third world. The mainstream view in China 
is that the Western interventions always serve their national interests at the cost of 
target countries and likely challenge Beijing’s interests in that country or even targets 
at China’s national security. Whenever a military intervention led by the West take 
place, a dominating tone of the official analysts is refuting the Western public 
justification and exposing their ‘real’ motivation behind.71This approach of analysis is 
not totally false, but only partly true. The information and evidence which conflicts 
with the mainstream argument, such as the rising of humanitarian concerns in 
international society, are largely ignored. This, in turn, further reinforces the 
orthodox doctrine of Anti-Western Intervention in China. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                             
71 Author’s interview of several analysts from Chinese Institute for International Studies (CIIS) 
and Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), August 2014, Beijing 
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Nevertheless, it is possible for Chinese mid-level officials and think tank analysts to 
bring out new foreign policy ideas. A prominent example is the ‘peaceful rise’ theory, 
which was firstly elaborated by Zheng Bijian in 2003. During the 2003 and 2004, the 
idea of ‘peaceful rise’ was endorsed by a number of top officials including President 
Hu, Premier Minister Wen Jiabao and Defence Minster Cao Gangchuan. The initial 
success of ‘peaceful rise’ theory was not only because it directly addresses the need 
of Chinese foreign policy to re-define China’s grand strategy in the new era, but also 
due to its inventor and promoter Zheng Bijian. Zheng has been a famous political 
theorist within the CCP since the Deng Xiaoping’s era, and used to be the 
vice-president of the Central Party School of CCP while Hu Jintao was the president of 
the school. Although Zheng was no longer a government official at that time, his 
credibility in the Party and the close personal relationship with the top leader is the 
key for him to input the new idea to the Chinese government system. Moreover, he 
was 70 years old and less concerned that his career could be affected by his 
breakthrough. However, later the ‘peaceful rise’ theory was challenged by other elite 
scholars and several officials in the MFA and PLA, and finally was modified into the 
less controversial concept of ‘Peaceful Development’ (Glaser and Medeiros 2007).  
 
Secondly, personal authority, rather than certain agencies, is the key in the 
agenda-setting of the Chinese foreign policy. The key line ministry like the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is not active like their Western counterparts. The MFA is a relatively 
weak ministry in China, due to its limited power and jurisdiction.72 As a government 
agency subordinated to the State Council and FALSG, the main function of the MFA is 
to manage the routine bilateral relations with foreign countries and multilateral 
                                                             
72 Generally, the power of Chinese politicians depends on his/her rank in CCP, while the 
Chinese Foreign Minister is not even one of the 25 members of CCP Politburo. Regarding the 
jurisdiction on foreign policy, the MFA has to share China’s foreign policy tools with other line 
ministries. For example, China’s foreign aid is at the hands of the Ministry of Commerce. 
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relations in international organizations, by protecting China’s core interests and 
maintaining China’s international images. Meanwhile, the MFA has little incentive 
and power to push Chinese foreign policy in a particular direction. In reality, the MFA 
pays considerable effort to pre-emptively settle the question that could embarrass 
the Chinese government and top leaders, rather initiate new question into the 
agenda of top leaders. Anyway, as elaborated above, the destiny of policy reports 
and recommendations submitted from the bottom only depends on whether it could 
be sponsored by the authoritative individuals above. Only if a policy proposal gets a 
powerful sponsor at the higher level, it will be taken seriously by the lower-level 
officials in the Chinese bureaucratic system.   
 
Public opinion and media usually influence the agenda-setting of crisis intervention 
in the West. In China, however, there is no formal channel like elected parliament, 
through which public opinion could exert pressure on the government, or the 
independent media immune from the censorship of the government. Nevertheless, 
in China there are growing pluralistic public expresses and media attentions to the 
international affairs, which are not totally ignored by the Chinese foreign and 
security policy makers. Chinese public opinion on external relations is largely 
dominated by active internet users (netizens) and young students, who usually 
believe in nationalism and prefer raison d’état to universal values. For instance, in a 
case of foreign humanitarian crisis, they usually urge Beijing to defend their 
perceived Chinese national interests rather than save strangers.  
 
The increasing public opinion expresses in China is a double-edged sword for 
Beijing’s foreign policy makings. On the one hand, Beijing attempts to shape the 
public opinion via the state-controlled media and other propaganda resources, and 
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sometimes utilizes the public nationalist sentiments to legitimate its foreign policy 
against certain foreign governments like Japan and U.S. On the other, when the 
nationalism dominates the public opinion, it could constrain China’s policy options. 
When a breaking international issue directly touching Chinese interest or sentiment, 
the public could express their views in the less controlled internet media and even 
pressure the government to take stronger actions by the ‘anti-something 
demonstration’.73 Hence, Chinese top leaders would try to avoid being perceived by 
public as failing to protect Chinese interests, which is more difficult to be concealed 
from the public today. For instance, in a foreign crisis that Chinese companies and 
personals are involved, we can expect that China will have stronger incentives to 
intervene in. 
 
Finally, risk-averse prevails in the decisions-makings in the top. Like most 
decision-makers in the world, Chinese leaders tend to reduce the risk of a foreign and 
security policy. With regard to an intervention policy targeted on the domestic crisis 
of another country, the potential material benefits for the intervener are usually rare 
or uncertain. Thus the policy-makers feel no need to gamble and prefer to choose the 
policy option requiring the lowest material and personal costs, such as the diplomatic 
and economic measures, rather than military intervention unless security threats 
clearly exists. For China, besides, their perceived risks include that China being 
isolated from the majority group or becoming the leader in the international affairs 
(Paltiel 2010:13). For example, China’s voting behaviour in the UN Security Council is 
usually standing with the majority and never veto alone. China’s fear of isolation also 
exists in several cases of international intervention, in which China was deeply 
                                                             
73 They are frequently the anti-Japan, anti-U.S and anti-Imperialism demonstrations. These 
demonstrations have some legitimacy in Chinese politics, and in many cases are not directly 
suppressed by the government 
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concerned with the dominate opinion of the international community and seek to 
build consensus with relevant regional organizations like the African Union and Arab 
League. Meanwhile, in spite of being suspicious of the interventionist camp, Beijing is 
unwilling to project itself as the vanguard of the anti-interventionist group.  
 
As elaborated in the previous section, the characteristic of risk-averse is partly due to 
the collective decision-making mechanism in the top, which reduces the possibility of 
personal adventure of individual leaders. Instead, Chinese decision makers would be 
more inclined to follow the pre-existing practices and in line with the institutionalized 
ideas. For example, Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy ideas in 1980s such as “hide one’s 
capacities and bide one’s time” and “Keep the low profile and never take the lead” 
were largely complied during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s presidency (1989-2012). 
This is also true concerning the earlier principle of non-interference in domestic 
affairs. Despite the growing domestic debate over the principle, no one in the 
Chinese policy circles overtly challenges the applicability of the principle yet. On the 
contrary, Chinese government reaffirms the principle of non-interference in different 
occasions. In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized these principles are still 
relevant and important today. He promised (largely to the developing countries) that 
China will insist the principle of non-interference and never impose its wills on other 
countries.74 
 
Conclusion 
The principle of non-interferences has survived 60 years in China’s external relations, 
while Beijing’s implement of the principle varied at different periods. Standing in 
                                                             
74 Chinese Government, “Xi Jinping’s speech at the conference marking the 60th anniversary 
of ‘the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’”, June 29, 2014, 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-06/29/content_2709613_2.htm 
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contrast to its isolation from the UN intervention and violent unilateral interventions 
in the early years, today China has become an active peace mediator and an 
important contributor to the UN peacekeeping force. In the course of its participation 
to UN multilateral intervention in crisis, China sticks to the traditional principles of 
peacekeeping operations, which emphasize the sovereignty of the host state and 
non-use of force. To explain China’s approach to intervention and its commitment to 
the principle of non-interference, we need to take the Chinese foreign policy making 
process into consideration.  
 
The consensus-driven nature of China’s foreign policy making process gives multiple 
actors, inside or outside of the Chinese government system, an opportunity to 
convey their preferences and input their agendas. Once they successfully influence 
one of the top decision-makers, the foreign policy making deliberations would be 
affected. Hence, in the study of China’s policy on international crisis intervention, we 
should investigate a number of Chinese actors involved in the issue. First and 
foremost, the MFA manages the bilateral relations with the target country and 
presents in the UN Security Council. Therefore, the MFA needs to consider the 
coordination with relevant parties and major powers, the consistency of Chinese 
position as well as the broad international agenda. Secondly, if the crisis and 
intervention occurred in an oil-producing country where China has a stake, or a 
county where China’s bilateral relationship is dominated by the trade ties, we need to 
take large Chinese state-owned companies in energy, minerals, constructions or 
defence,75 as well as the Ministry of Commerce into account. The business sector 
usually defines a narrower commercial interest. Thirdly, when the foreign crisis and 
                                                             
75 Among the Chinese state owned companies the Big-3 Oil Companies, CNPC, Sinopec and 
CNOOC have more opportunities to influence the Chinese foreign policy. For example, Zhou 
Yongkang, a PBSC member in Hu’s era and working in Chinese oil industry for 30 years, was 
believed that represented the interest of Chinese oil companies in the PBSC. 
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international intervention included the military and security dimension, the opinion 
of PLA becomes crucial. Compare with the West, however, Chinese media and NGOs 
usually have less impact on Beijing’s (non-)intervention policy, for instance, in Africa 
or Middle East where Chinese national sentiment is not directly involved.   
 
If divergences exist among different official foreign policy actors, Chinese 
policymakers tend to postpone making decisions until consensus was achieved. 
Consequently, it is extremely difficult for Beijing to make a quick decision on a robust 
intervention, especially required by the human rights demands of foreigners. Besides, 
people in the Chinese policy-circle usually avoid challenging established mainstream 
view. Therefore, this leads to a lot of continuity in China’s foreign policy making. For 
example, although China’s material power has grown significantly in the past two 
decades and Chinese national economic and strategic interests extend to remote 
areas such as Africa and Middle East, China generally continues to adopt a status quo 
non-intervention policy or only non-coercive diplomatic engagement toward a 
conflict beyond its border even the conflict may endanger its commercial interests.  
 
For sure that China’s pragmatic policies in specific cases could be nuanced and 
flexible. For instance, Beijing could send a UN peacekeeping force, as a kind of 
military presence, to the target country where China’s national interests at stake. 
Nevertheless, in a realist perspective, there exists a looming tension between China’s 
growing power and its defensive foreign and security strategy which may be less 
applicable to protect China’s expanding interests all over the world. It is unusual for a 
powerful state in the world, which has the growing capabilities to intervene, to 
perform considerably conservative on international intervention. Interestingly, in a 
liberal perspective, there also exists a dilemma between China’s increasing 
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integration with international society, to play a role in multilateral organizations and 
multilateral intervention, and its continuing preference of standing aloof with the 
emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference. In the following cases of Darfur and 
Libya, we might observe these policy dilemmas Beijing faced.  
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Chapter 5: The Case of Darfur Crisis (2003-2009) 
 
The purpose of the chapter is not describing the whole sequences of the crisis again, 
which was well documented in books written by journalists, activists, and officials 
who experienced the event. Instead, my work mainly examines responses from the 
international community, in particular the EU and China, and explains why the two 
international actors adopted significantly different approaches in dealing with the 
Darfur Crisis from 2003 to 2009. Two main interpretations can be identified that in 
different ways to account for the EU-China divergences in Darfur. The first is the 
realist and materialist explanation: the question of international intervention in 
Darfur is a notable case mainly reflecting the significant Chinese material interests in 
Sudan and the rising Sino-West (Europe) economic/geopolitical competition in Africa, 
while their rhetoric was actually irrelevant. We will encounter these accounts in the 
following. The second explanation seems more normative, emphasizing this case 
demonstrated the emerging norm of Responsibility to Protect in the international 
society, while its value as a precedent and opinio juris was limited due to the 
unwillingness among the UN membership to challenge the traditional sovereignty of 
Sudan (See Matthews 2008). 
 
Both explanations provide insights for us to understand the international 
intervention in Darfur. However, neither the hard-core materialists nor naive idealists 
see the whole picture. The former only focuses on the easily-defined part of national 
interests such as oil and alliance, and conspicuously underestimates the importance 
of values, principles and images to an international actor. The latter, on the contrary, 
emphasizing the diffusion and competition of norms, but usually fails to validate 
their causal effects in policy-making, mainly due to the lack of comprehensive 
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analyses of foreign policies. Therefore, my case study of intervention in Darfur 
attempts to bridge the gap by taking both the material factors and ideational factors 
into account. The findings are based on two sources. On the one hand, the chapter 
depends on diverse first and second sources, including official documents and media 
reports, to reconstruct the scenarios the Chinese and European decision-makers 
faced with the Darfur Crisis, and thus we can inquire what factors they were 
considering. On the other, by interviewing a dozen of relevant officials and analysts 
who experienced the case, my explanation could be further confirmed or corrected.  
 
The Chapter opens with a short introduction of the crisis and the initial regional 
intervention from the African Union, whose incompetence produced the subsequent 
international interventions. Three specific fields of multilateral intervention that 
China and the EU (including Member States) involved will be analysed. First, I 
examine the sanctions and proposals of sanctions against Sudan, by providing 
EU/China’s self-interests considerations and proclaimed principles regarding 
economic intervention. Next, I investigate the EU/China’s attitudes to the judicial 
intervention of the International Crimes Court. This reflected their understandings 
about the essence of the crisis and the question of legal responsibility. Finally, the 
military interventions of the United Nations and European Union peacekeeping 
forces are discussed. Here, I consider whether the deployment of an international 
peacekeeping force was in accord with China and the EU’s interests, and why debates 
happened within the UN and the EU. The division of fields is based on my 
categorization of intervention devised in the Chapter 3.  
 
The following sub-questions structure the avenue of enquires during the case tracing. 
(a) whether the international/public concerns of the Darfur Crisis in fact occurs, how 
123 
 
widespread it was in Europe and China, and what was the difference between 
European concerns and Chinese concerns (b) whether the element of their concerns 
add up to a consideration for policy-makers by linking their (non-)intervention 
policies with their images and commitment to certain principles; (c) to what extent, 
this ideational factor, as a independent variable in the case study, has a causal effect 
on policy making vis-à-vis the rival explanations concentrating on economic interests 
or security concerns.  
 
(I) Background: the Crisis in Darfur and the African Union on the ground 
(2004-2007) 
Darfur, literally means the land of the Fur and the home to 80 ethnical groups, is a 
backward region in western Sudan, suffered from the desertification and drought. 
The tension between the sedentary Fur and the semi-nomadic Arabic tribes over the 
strained resources of land and water has long existed, but seemed invisible to 
international society which was more attracted by the Sudanese Civil war in the 
south. The Arabic-dominated Sudanese government has been long concentrated its 
resources on the Nile Valley and failed to develop the economy of Darfur, particularly 
since Khartoum began to gain the growing oil revenues in 1990s. Not surprisingly, as 
a political and economic marginalized region, plus the politically exaggerated ethnic 
difference and structural inequity between the Arabic Muslim and the ‘Less Arabized’ 
African Muslim, the deprived Darfur was prone to become a breeding ground of 
rebellion movements.  
 
The long-accumulated problems in Darfur finally became a crisis when the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) carried 
out an unprecedented raid against the government in 2003. The incompetent 
124 
 
Sudanese government troop was unable to suppress the rebels who using guerrilla 
tactics in the desert, thus unleashed and armed the Arabic militia Janjaweed. These 
gunmen on the horse were notorious for the massacre of Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa and 
other so called ‘African’ tribes who supported the rebels, with the connivance of the 
Sudan government.  
 
The increasing number of civilian victims and internal displaced people during 2003 
to 2004 finally caught the attention of the international society, through the 
mounting media reports and activist movements from 2004 onwards. Although the 
contents of media reports differed from country to country, it was generally agreed 
that what occurred in Darfur was not an ordinary African civil conflict, but a severe 
humanitarian crisis demanding prompt solutions rather than only modest 
humanitarian assistance. Hence, the intervention in Darfur gradually became high on 
the agenda of the international community since 2004. For example, due to the 
relevant advocacy and public concerns, the Darfur issue became a campaign issue 
during the 2004/2008 American Presidential Elections and the 2007 French 
Presidential Election. It was also clear that some Western leaders were 
uncomfortable with the slaughters in Darfur as a violation of their cherished human 
rights values.  
 
The first effort of intervention was made by the regional actor - African Union, which 
established on 9 July 2002 to replace its predecessor - Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). While OAU bore the mark of decolonization and thus narrowly focused on 
securing the sovereignty of its member states even governed by dictators, the AU has 
a brand new Charter which notably incorporated the principle of human rights 
protection. For example, remembering the tragedy of Rwanda and the inaction of the 
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international society, the fundamental Constitutive Act of the African Union granted 
the AU a right to intervene in respect of certain ‘grave circumstances’. Therefore, the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur was the first crucial test for the newborn African Union. 
However, in dealing with the case of Darfur the AU council did not activate the article 
of humanitarian intervention, but followed a traditional approach of peacekeeping 
with the consent of Khartoum. 
 
Under the mediation led by the African Union and the neighbouring Chad (which was 
facing an exodus of refugees from Darfur), the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire 
Agreement between the Sudanese government and the two rebel groups was 
achieved in 2004. The AU formed a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor 
observance of the April ceasefire.76 Soon after, AU initiated the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in July 2004, originally sent 150 Rwandan soldiers and soon 
added another 150 Nigerian soldiers with the consent of Sudan. As the sole external 
peacekeeping force on the ground, the AMIS was appreciated by Darfur people at 
least in the initial stage. The leading role of the African Union was also endorsed by 
UN Resolution 1556 and 1564.  
 
However, AMIS soon faced strong challenges due to its own weakness. First, the 
ceasefire agreement was a hasty action with fatal shortcomings such as lacking maps 
and existing two versions (Flint and de Waal 2008:174-175), which undoubtedly 
increased the difficulties with the AU peacekeeping. Secondly, obviously 300 
peacekeepers were radically insufficient, and they lacked adequate material 
resources, transport and logistics and clear administrative mandate to protect 
civilians. According to Jon Pronk’s subsequent monthly reports to the UN after the 
                                                             
76 African Union, Press Release 51/2004, Addis Abeba, 28 May 2004 
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Resolution 1564, in Darfur the situation had continuously deteriorated, despite there 
had undoubtedly been progress on the political negotiation and humanitarian 
assistance.77 In response, the AU decided to increase the scale of AMIS to 3,320 
personnel with the endorsement of the UN in Resolution 1574 in Nairobi78 and 
logistic support from UN member states. Eventually the number of AMIS personnel 
reached its peak in April of 2005 at 7,000.  
 
The limit capacity of the AU exposed in Darfur called for urgent assistances from the 
International community. Both China and the EU had backed the AU’s endeavour in 
Darfur. In June 2005, under the influence of France, the European states chose the 
EU rather than NATO as the coordinated institution to support AMIS (Reichard 
2006:272). The EU took a joint action to provide a consolidated package of civilian 
and military measures to support AMIS from July 2005 to December 
2007.79Considering the AU’s scarcity of peacekeeping budget, the EU provided over 
EUR 300 million to AMIS through the instrument of African Peace Facility. In respect 
of the logistic support, the EU Member States airlifted for over 2000 AMIS personnel. 
Besides, The EU deployed several dozen of military and police advisors to assist AMIS 
in training and coordination.80 China also encouraged the ‘African solutions to 
African problems’. Beijing commended the pioneering role of the AU in solving the 
Darfur Crisis in different diplomatic occasion, and donated 1.8 million dollars to the 
AU.  
 
(II)  Division on sanctions against Sudan within the UN 
                                                             
77 See S/2004/763, S/2004/787, S/2004/881. 
78 UN Security Council, S/RES/1574 (2004), 19 November 2004 
79 EU Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP, 20 July 2005. 
80 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, “EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – 
AMIS”, 1 January 2008 
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Compared to the African Union, the United Nations potentially has much stronger 
ability to intervene. The Security Council began to concern the situation in Darfur in 
2004. The first official involvement was made by the presidential statement which 
expressed its deep concern at the continuing reports of large-scale violations of 
human rights in Darfur.81 The Report of the Secretary-General highlighted the 
continuing fighting and catastrophic situation in Darfur and other areas was regard as 
an obstacle to implement the comprehensive peace agreement between the 
government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the 
region of South Sudan. Kofi Annan reported that “A meaningful agreement on Darfur 
will be fundamental to the success of a future United Nations role in the Sudan”.82  
 
Regarding whether the situation in Darfur should be put on the agenda of the UN, 
reluctances already existed in the Security Council. UK made a draft resolution, which 
endorsed the conclusions of the Secretary-General with regard to the situation in 
Darfur and urges the parties to the April 8 Ceasefire Agreement to conclude a 
political agreement without delay. According to Sir Emyr Jones Parry, UK ambassador 
to the United Nations, “about a third of the council thought the resolution should 
just concentrate on the peace process, while the remaining two-thirds thought it 
should cover the peace process and the situation in Darfur.” An anonymous source 
told that China, Algeria and Pakistan were lobbied by Sudan, and unwilling to discuss 
Darfur at the beginning. “But we got a letter from the secretary-general last week 
saying we cannot ignore the western part, and so we reached an agreement to 
include it.” Abdallah Baali, the Algerian ambassador to the United Nations admitted 
(Wald 2004). The draft was eventually adopted unanimously on 11 June 2004 as the 
Resolution 1547. This resolution mainly welcomed the achieved peace agreement in 
                                                             
81 UN Security Council, S/PRST/2004/18, 12 May 2004. 
82 See paragraph 20 and 22. UN Security Council, S/2004/453, 3 June 2004. 
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southern Sudan, and mentioned Darfur with a brief reference urged both parties to 
bring an end to the violence in the Darfur region, the Upper Nile and other areas.83 
 
Unfortunately, this hope proved overly optimistic as both the government of Sudan 
and rebels had not altogether complied with the ceasefire agreement, even after the 
joint communiqué between the government of Sudan and the UN Secretary-General 
on 3 July. The violence continued and the UN needed to respond. In addition to 
supporting African Union at ground level, another non-military tool of intervention 
the UN could adopt was imposing sanctions. However, Security Council divided over 
the use of coercive measures against Sudan. In the following four UN Security Council 
resolutions involving sanctions, European states and U.S energetically pushed 
forward international sanctions against Khartoum, while China was highly reluctant 
to use its extensive leverage over the Sudanese government.  
 
Resolution 1556  
The first UNSC resolution focusing on the conflict in Darfur, drafted by U.S and U.K, 
was including some mandatory measures to pressure the Sudanese government.84 
China frowned upon this practice by arguing that “such (mandatory) measures 
cannot be helpful in resolving the situation in Darfur and may even further 
complicate it”. Instead, China believed that Khartoum will actively honour its 
commitment of disarming Janjaweed and other illegal armed groups, while the 
immediate concern of international society should be providing further humanitarian 
assistance to relieve the suffering of Darfur.85The amendment added the concern of 
humanitarian assistance, while the U.S, all four European states (U.K, France, 
                                                             
83 UN Security Council, S/RES/1547(2004), 11 June 2004. 
84 UN Security Council, S/2004/611, 28 July 2004 
85 UN Security Council, S/PV.5015, 30 July 2004 
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Germany and Romania) and Chile insisted to submit a draft resolution included arms 
embargo acting under the Chapter VII and other potential coercive measures (except 
the use of armed force) if Sudan still fail its commitment.86 The Resolution 1556 was 
approved by 13 Council members, with Brazil’s claim of no need to trigger the 
Chapter VII. China and Pakistan abstained to express their disapproval on coercive 
measures. Sudan, without voting right, was vociferously against the resolution. 
 
The Resolution 1564 
According to the report of Jan Pronk, the Sudanese government has made some 
progress since Resolution 1556, but had not met its commitments of protecting 
civilians from militia attacks and punishing perpetrators.87Security Council members 
divided on two aspects: (1) whether the limited progress Sudan had achieved was 
acceptable at the moment; (2) whether a further sanction or threat of sanctions can 
facilitate Sudan to cooperate. The U.S and European states were quite unsatisfied, in 
particular with recent helicopter attacks by the government. They believed the 
Sudanese government only act under the international pressures, thus further 
pressures could yield further progress. Germany, Romania, Spain, U.K and U.S drafted 
a new resolution which shall consider expanding the sanctions to petroleum sector in 
order to obtain a full compliance of Sudan. On the contrary, China emphasized the 
sincerity and improvement of Khartoum to resolve the problem. Together with Russia, 
Algeria and Pakistan, China abstained with the doubt of the effect of the sanction 
threat. Wang Guangya, Chinese ambassador to the UN, reiterated “the fact that 
China’s position against sanctions remains unchanged.”88 Due to China’s resistance, 
the UN did not implement sanctions on the Sudanese petroleum sector in practice.  
                                                             
86 S/RES/1556(2004), 30 July 2004 
87 UN Security Council, S/2004/703, 30 August 2004 
88 UN Security Council, S/PV.5040, 18 September 2004 
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Resolution 1591 and 1672  
When international sanctions such as the asset freeze and travel ban were included 
in the U. S-drafted Resolution 1591, China, Russia and Algeria abstained to convey 
their disagreement about sanctions.89 The reason China gave was the same: we 
should be very cautious about adopting the sanctions because probably a rash 
sanction is unhelpful for resolving the Darfur issue. Ambassador Wang Guangya 
affirmed that it was China’s consistent view of Darfur.90 Resolution 1672 was the first 
time the UN imposing travel and financial sanctions on individuals: two high ranking 
officials of the Sudanese government and two rebel leaders.91China, Russia and Qatar 
abstained to convey their reservations about the application of sanction against 
individuals and successfully limited the list to four persons. Again, China emphasized 
that sanctions usually cannot reach expected results, but jeopardizes civilian 
populations. Besides, China claimed the sanctions lacked of convincing evidence and 
may disturb the parties in the Abuja Peace Talks.92  
 
Accounting for China’s reluctant position on sanctions 
Economic sanction is presupposed to modify the behaviour of target state by 
imposing its economic costs. As the largest trade partner of Sudan since 2002, China 
was expected to use its huge leverage to divert Khartoum’s tough approach in Darfur. 
However, far from imposing trade sanctions against its ‘all weather friend’ Sudan, 
China’s foreign aid to Sudan was not even halted during the crisis. In the 2006 
Sino-Africa Summit, Chinese president Hu Jintao declared that China would double 
                                                             
89 UN Security Council, S/RES/1590(2005), 29 March 2005 
90 UN Security Council, S/PV.5122, 29 March 2005 
91 UN Security Council, S/RES/1672(2006), 25 April 2006 
92 UN Security Council, S/PV.5423, 25 April 2006 
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the assistances to Africa by 2009.93In the February of 2007, Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce announced to forgive 33 least developed African countries’ debts to China 
before the end of 2007.94Sudan was one of the beneficiaries, released from a 
Chinese debt of 80 million dollars and received an assistance of 13 million dollars for 
the construction of infrastructure. Although Hu allocated 40 million Yuan for the 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur, some Western observers regarded China’s 
approach of ‘business as usual’ in Sudan as being not serious in seeking to pressure 
Khartoum when the international community was appealing for sanctions against the 
Sudanese government (Keith 2007: 158). 
 
Implementing an economic sanction is a double-edge sword could also cost the 
civilian people and trade partners of the target state. Although Beijing’s justification 
used in the UN was placed on the counterproductive consequence of sanction on the 
Sudanese people, it was generally believed that China’s closer economic relation with 
Sudan, particularly in petroleum sector had led to Beijing’s deep reluctance to 
economic sanctions against Khartoum. China’s oil empire in Africa began with Sudan, 
which had an abundant supply of oil. Since Sudan had been sanctioned by U.S since 
1997, China’s trade volume with Sudan rocketed mainly due to China’s increasing oil 
import. Besides the oil trade and oil infrastructure investment implemented by 
state-owned oil companies, China also had several large-scale projects of 
infrastructure construction in Sudan, and a considerable amount of arms trades with 
Khartoum since 1990s. Therefore, China indeed afraid that the UN sanctions against 
Sudan, in particular on petroleum sector as threatened in the Resolution 1564, would 
be paid at the expense of China’s substantial economic interests.  
                                                             
93 “Hu Jintao said that China will expand its aids to Africa”, Xinhua Agency, 4 November 2006 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2006-11/04/content_5288695.htm 
94 “China plans to forgive 33 African countries’ debts before the end of 2007”Xinhua Agency, 
29 Jan 2007 http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-01/29/content_5669614.htm 
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This made Chinese public opinion more suspicious of the Western intentions of 
sanctions, as a competitive strategy against China (Wang 2004). Another Chinese 
analyst suggested that China’s abstentions on above resolutions were inadequate to 
protect China’s oil interests in Sudan (Wang 2005:38). The domestic concerns 
impelled the Chinese government to account to Chinese media for its voting in the 
Security Council. Ambassador Wang Guangya explicitly promised to protect the 
overseas interests of Chinese companies, which would be untouched by the 
Resolution 1564. For, the resolution was significantly revised under China and other 
countries’ pressures, by deleting the suggestion of sanction Sudan automatically. 
Instead, any sanction should be further discussed and approved by the Security 
Council before its implementation. 95 This is smoking gun proof that economic 
concerns had motivated China to impede a substantive sanction against Sudan. 
 
It should be noted that the economic interdependence between China and Sudan 
was asymmetric and their cooperation was not without problems. China was the 
most vital partner of Sudan that consumed the half of Sudan’ oil production, while 
Sudan was far from being a critical partner of China in a relative term (Shichor 2007). 
Although the stable oil import from Sudan was important for China to reduce its 
reliance on Middle East oil, Sudan never ranked in the top 3 largest oil supplier to 
China (Table 2). Besides, the share of China’s oil import from Sudan will be inevitably 
further reduced because of the interdependence of the oil-rich South Sudan in 
2011.96 The prospect of South Sudan’s independence was clearly foreseeable since 
                                                             
95 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ambassador Wang Guangya talked about the new UN 
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http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjdt_611265/zwbd_611281/t158100.shtml 
96 However, the oil export of landlocked South Sudan would continue to rely on the 
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2005 Naivasha Agreement set up a referendum in 2011. Meanwhile, Chinese oil 
companies also faced some challenges in Sudan at that time. Afraid of the monopoly 
of Chinese companies, especially the China National Petroleum Corporation, by far 
the largest investor in Sudan since 1996, Khartoum intentionally introduced rival oil 
companies including the Sinopec. Consequently, CNPC lost several bids of Sudanese 
oil fields when the Darfur Crisis broke out (Ren & Wang, 2004). As we will see below, 
China’s positions on Darfur Crisis were not always pleasing its oil allay Khartoum.  
 
Table 2  Sudan’s share of China’s crude oil imports (2000-2010)      % 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share 4.7 8.3 9.3 6.9 4.7 5.2 3.3 6.3 5.9 6.0 5.3 
Rank 6 4 4 6 6 7 8 6 6 5 6 
Source: Tian (2001-2011) 
 
The non-substantive sanction against Sudan was largely due to the Chinese oil 
business there, but a long-standing principle of China appeared to have a 
constraining effect of excluding the economic sanctions as a normal policy in Africa. 
Comparing other global economic actors like the EU and U.S, China’s trade and aid 
policies toward Africa countries were characterized by its so called 
‘non-conditionality in political terms’ (Zhang 2009). It should be pointed out that 
Beijing still attaches one diplomatic condition: the ‘One China’ principle to 
marginalize Taipei, which is not about the domestic affairs of African countries. The 
principle of ‘non-conditionality but one’ in Chinese foreign aid policy could be traced 
back to 1964, when China aimed to ally with African newborn nations to confront the 
Soviet Union and United States. Since the 1990s, China’s policy focus in Africa has 
largely transferred from the ideological/geopolitical game to the economic reciprocal, 
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driven by the desire to obtain oil and other raw materials for China’s continuing 
economic growth and open up new export markets (Taylor 2006). Nevertheless, the 
principle of non-conditionality but one is continued to be used today.97 For, on the 
one hand, condition-free trades, loans and aids are appreciated by the African 
governments and beneficial to the China-Africa economic deals; on the other, 
attaching political strings to economic agreement was traditionally regarded as a 
western-style interference in domestic affairs, which was long criticized by China’s 
official discourses and many African leaders as ‘new imperialism’.  
 
Table 3  China’s calculations on the economic intervention in Sudan 
Supporting (oil) sanction Obstruction and abstention 
Benefits: 
The possible international reputation of 
rescuing Darfur 
 
Benefits: 
Safeguarding China’s oil interests; 
Pacifying the domestic criticism; 
Maintaining the consistency of China’s 
principles and policies in Africa 
Costs: 
Direct economic losses in oil sector; 
Domestic criticism for the economic loss; 
Adverse effects on the Sino-African 
cooperation based on the principle of 
non-conditionality. 
Costs: 
Drawing criticism from the West 
 
 
Hence, wielding the economic leverage over Sudan to achieve political or 
humanitarian goals would not only directly damage the strong China-Sudan 
                                                             
97 State Council of China, “Chinese Foreign Aid”, April 2011, 
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economic tie in a short-term. This may also break China’s accountability in 
‘non-interference’ and its image of the leader of the developing world (‘the biggest 
one’ as Beijing claimed), thus jeopardize China’s traditional close relations with Africa 
and other developing countries. In fact, many of them were not interested in 
sanctioning Khartoum. The timing was also a key to understand China’s calculations. 
In 2006, ‘the year of Africa’ for China’s diplomacy, Beijing prominently strengthened 
its close bond with Africa by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s 
separate visits to Africa, hosting the China-Africa Summit in Beijing, and publishing 
China’s Official Policy Document on Africa. This document echoed the Sino-African 
historical tie based on “equal treatment, respect for sovereignty and common 
development.”98 To avoid the risk of damaging Beijing’s long-term relations with 
Africa, China’s trade and aid policy toward Sudan during the Darfur Crisis had 
followed the established practice of non-conditionality.   
 
Explain EU’s approach of sanctions 
All of the EU Member States in UN Security Council voted in favour of the four 
resolutions, which included the content of sanctions against the government of 
Sudan as the measures to pressure Khartoum to comply with the peace process. In 
fact, European states were often the co-drafters of these resolutions. Within the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), The EU supported the 
UN targeted sanctions against Sudan by Common Position99and rapidly implemented 
them through a series of Council Regulations. Here the EU’s sanctions are an 
intervention instrument of an economic nature which seeks to bring about a change 
in the Khartoum’s wrong policies and activities in Darfur. As an instrument of the 
                                                             
98 The full text in Chinese 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2006-01/12/content_4042333.htm 
99 Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2004/31/CFSP, 9 January 2004 
and 2005/411/CFSP, 30 May 2005. 
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CFSP, the adoption of a new Common Position requires unanimity from EU Member 
States in Council, while action by Community was needed in order to implement 
financial measures.  
 
To guide its sanctions policies, the EU announced its basic principles of sanctions in 
2004.100The EU refereed its sanction as ‘restrictive measures’, which was “an 
important way to maintain and restore international peace and security in 
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and of our common foreign and 
security policy”. On the one hand, the EU promised to fully implement the UN 
authorized sanction; on the other, if necessary the EU could impose autonomous EU 
sanctions, in pursuit of countering terrorism and WMD proliferation, upholding 
respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance.  
 
This normative goal of sanction was echoed by the EU’s white paper ‘Strategy for 
Africa’ in 2005,101 released shortly before China published its white paper toward 
Africa. The EU’s normative ambition stands in sharp contrast to China’s concentration 
on economic cooperation. While the Chinese vision of Africa emphasized the 
economic mutual benefits, the EU’s strategy highlighted the political agendas such as 
improving good governance and human rights. Regarding the principles in dealing 
with their relationship with Africa, while China confirms its promise of 
non-interference in domestic affairs, in the European perspective, the Europe-Africa 
partnership should be based on the international law and human rights.  
 
It was clear that Khartoum’s behaviours in Darfur had violated human rights and 
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101 European Union, EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s 
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international humanitarian law, which could justify the EU’s sanction on the 
Sudanese government during the Darfur Crisis according to the above principles 
inscribed in EU documents. It is well known that the EU sanctions never cover all 
countries which threatened the peace or violated the human rights and democracy 
(Brummer 2009), so the selection of target states is inevitable and sometimes 
criticized as double standards. But Sudan was first caught by the UN without much 
controversy, since the atrocity in Darfur was too severe to be ignored by the mass 
media and international community, thus the inaction of EU sanction would be 
blamed as repudiating its adopted principles as well as the UN resolutions. 
 
Compare to the US comprehensive sanction against Sudan,102 however, the EU 
sanction was limited to embargoes on arms and related materials, travel ban and 
assets frozen on several medium-ranking Sudanese officials. In despite of the call for 
the EU to increase its sanctions on Sudan (Beatty 2007, Rettman 2007), the European 
sanction was refrained from expanding into the EU-Sudan trade or oil export 
throughout the crisis. In the light of the EU basic principles of sanctions, such a 
limited ‘targeted sanction’ could reduce the side-effects on innocent people and 
neighbouring countries of the target state. Meanwhile, the scope and intensity of 
sanction the EU could adopt also need to take into account the potential detrimental 
economic and political consequence for the EU and its Member States.  
 
Although the EU’s share in Sudanese exportation had been significantly decreased 
from 28% in 1999 to 2% in 2007, due to the boom of the Sudanese oil exportation (in 
particular to China) since the late 1990s, the total values of Sudanese exports to the 
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EU, as well as the importation from the EU still had increased during the period. 
Therefore, a full scale trade embargo from the EU could harm the Sudanese economy 
on the one hand, by reducing the Sudan’s GDP by 2.3%, according to a simulation, on 
the other hand, the economic cost of the EU was losing an important trade partner in 
Africa and the embargoed Sudan-EU trade probably would further shift to China and 
other East-Asian countries (Siddig 2011). For this reason, a comprehensive economic 
sanction on Sudan was hard to achieve the unanimity among the EU Member States. 
There is one clear proof. As the Franco-Belgian oil group Total owned the largest 
undeveloped oil concession in Sudan, in 2004 France objected the extended 
sanctions on Sudan suggested by U.S in UN Security Council.103 Besides, Swedish Oil 
Company Lundin and OMV of Austria also had profited in Sudanese oil fields until 
2003, under the shield of the EU’s ‘constructive engagement’ policy with Sudan 
(Patey 2007:1007).  
 
Table 4  The EU’s calculations on the economic intervention in Sudan 
Policy options Benefits Costs 
The inaction in sanction Not clear Drawing criticism at home 
and abroad 
The targeted sanction Upholding its principles  
and pressuring Khartoum 
Probably less effective in 
pressuring Khartoum 
The broader sanction Putting more substantial 
pressures on Khartoum 
Resulting in unduly high 
economic and humanitarian 
costs 
 
 
                                                             
103 “France opposes UN Sudan sanctions”, BBC, 8 July 2004, 
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(III)  Genocide or not? ICID report and the judicial intervention from ICC 
The choice of label regarding the essence of the Darfur Crisis was commonly 
regarded important, as many people believed that it could establish the legitimate 
boundaries of possible action from the international community. The 1948 Genocide 
Convention, as well as the lesson from the well-know genocide in Rwanda, would 
demand a more robust intervention to suppress an ongoing genocide. The word of 
‘Genocide’ in Darfur had haunted in world media since 2004. The UN co-coordinator 
for Sudan Mukesh Kapila first sounded the alarm about the danger of genocide in 
Darfur, claiming the only difference between Darfur and Rwanda was the scale 
(Kapila 2004). Then, investigation teams or commissions from U.S State Department, 
the AU and even Sudanese government published their own reports, which were 
profoundly different especially concerning whether genocide was taking place in 
Darfur. The U.S declared it was genocide while the AU did not use the G-word, not 
mention the partial conclusion of ‘tribal squabbles’ from the Sudanese government. 
The EU had not declared the Darfur conflict as an act of genocide and China explicitly 
refused to declare that. According to the Resolution 1564, an international 
commission inquiry was established to investigate the violations of international 
humanitarian law, and ascertain whether the genocide has occurred.104  
 
The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID), led by Italian jurist 
Antonio Cassese, submitted its report to the Secretary-General in January 2005.105 
The ICID report concluded that “the government of Sudan and the Janjawiid are 
responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 
amounting to crimes under international law”. The use of military force by Sudanese 
                                                             
104 See Paragraph 12, S/RES/1564(2004), 18 September 2004 
105 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, Geneva, 25 January, 2005 
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government was disproportionate to any threat posed by the rebels, but deliberately 
and indiscriminately directed against civilians in most cases. While considering 
genocide, the report said “the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be 
missing; at least as far as the central government authorities are concerned”. The 
ICID identified a list of 51 suspected individual perpetrators and recommend hand 
over the list to a competent prosecutor. The ICID strongly called on the Security 
Council immediately refer the situation of Darfur to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). Nevertheless, the ICID report was criticized by some activists for refusing to 
character the crimes in Darfur as genocide and thus downplay the catastrophe, in 
order to avoid invoking the Genocide Convention (Udombana 2006).  
 
The UN Security Council decided to refer Darfur to the ICC in Resolution 1593,106 
which was drafted by U.K and supported by other European states in the Security 
Council. It was the first time the Security Council referred a situation to the ICC, even 
though Sudan was not a party of Rome Statue and strongly against the Security 
Council referral. The legal ground of the resolution is that ICC may exercise its 
jurisdiction if “A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations”, according to the Article 13 (b) of Rome 
Statue states.107 However, the UN member states divided again within Council and 4 
abstentions were noticed. United States continued to “fundamentally object to the 
view that the ICC should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals, including 
government officials, of States not party to the Rome Statute.” China, as a 
non-contracting party of the Rome Statute, shared some views of ICC with U.S. 
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Besides, China emphasized the respect for Sudanese national juridical sovereignty, 
and warned the unintended consequence of the resolution.108 
  
The ICC formally opened an investigation on 6 June 2005, and eventually issued an 
arrest warrant for the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir and some senior officials 
on 4 March 2009. The ICC indictment further deepened the international disarray 
over the Darfur Crisis. The proponents of indictment argued that the involvement of 
the ICC was necessary because it would bring justice to Darfur by ending impunity for 
the perpetrators. Besides, it was believed the activity of ICC, together with economic 
sanctions, could positively pressure the Sudanese government to halt its criminal 
policy in Darfur such as supporting Janjaweed (Kastner 2007). On the contrary, the 
sceptics disagreed with the expected consequence of ICC involvement. The 
inopportune ICC indictment did upset Sudanese top officials as well as rebel leaders, 
thus may bother rather than facilitate the ongoing peace negotiation between 
Khartoum and rebels, because generally the amnesty deal is necessary in a peace 
negotiation. Besides, the court’s intervention provoked a broad backlash from 
African governments, because all of ICC investigations had only targeted at Africa 
since the court established in 2002 (Bosco 2013).  
 
The EU is a staunch supporter of the ICC in the case of Darfur. The EU Member States 
played an active role in UN to refer the case to the ICC and the Council of the EU 
adopted the same position. When ICC attempted to arrest al-Bashir the EU reiterated 
its full support and called for Sudan’s cooperation with ICC (EU 2010: 24). Since the 
principles and objectives of ICC are completely in line with that of the EU, the EU has 
inscribed its commitment to ICC in a series of documents. For example, the Council 
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Common Position on the ICC promised the support from the Union and Member 
States,109 the Action Plan specified the steps and sections the EU can contribute to 
the ICC.110 As regards the EU’s external relation with African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries, the Cotonou Agreement includes an ICC-related clause and serves as a 
binding legal instrument. Sudan was a party of the Cotonou Agreement in 2005, but 
when the amendment proposed introducing the Rome Statute and related 
instruments to all parties, Sudan withdrew from the agreement in June 2009 when 
ICC issued an arrested warrant for al-Bashir on March.111For the EU, supporting ICC in 
Darfur was a policy for implementing principles and thus beneficial to the EU’s 
prestige without clear material costs.   
  
Table 5  The EU and China’s calculations on the judicial intervention of ICC 
 The EU China 
Benefits of supporting ICC 
Costs of supporting ICC 
Upholding its principles Not clear 
Drawing criticism in Africa Breaking its principles and 
betraying Khartoum; 
Drawing criticism in Africa 
Benefits of abstaining ICC 
Costs of abstaining ICC 
Not clear Upholding its principles 
Drawing criticism at home Annoying Khartoum 
Benefits of obstructing ICC 
Costs of obstructing ICC 
Not clear Pleasing Khartoum 
Breaking its principles and 
drawing stronger criticism 
Drawing stronger 
international criticism 
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Concerning the role of the ICC in Darfur, China was belonged to the camp of 
scepticism. China is not a party of Rome Statue and generally disagrees with several 
principles guided ICC such as the universal jurisdiction, so that Beijing was never a 
supporter of ICC investigations even before the Darfur. In the case of Darfur, not only 
principles but also the consideration of consequences made China hostile to the ICC 
intervention. One consequence China claimed in the UN was that the ICC’s arrest 
warrant for the Sudanese president had an adverse effect on the situation in Darfur 
by disturbing the peace process. This argument was shared by the African Union, the 
Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and members of 
Nonaligned Movement. Therefore, another consequence China must be aware was 
that the ICC indictment was unwelcome in the third world where China always stands 
with, not mention Beijing’s oil ally Khartoum. As a result, China claimed to support 
the efforts in UN Security Council to suspend the ICC indictment of al-Bashir from 
2008 to 2009, according to the Article 16 of the Rome Statute.112However, in practice, 
China did not invoke the Article 16 in the Security Council. It is notable that 
Khartoum expected Beijing’s veto against the ICC referral and felt quite dissatisfied 
with Beijing’s abstention.113It reflected that China’s stance regarding Darfur Crisis was 
not altogether based on the coordination with Khartoum. Beijing had to balance the 
international pressure from the other side, which criticized China’s inaction in solving 
the Darfur Crisis. The next part will demonstrate how the growing international 
pressures had modified China’s calculations.  
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(IV)  The transition from AU to UN (2006-2009): peacekeeping operations in 
Darfur and neighbouring countries 
In the beginning of 2005, Security Council, with no dissent, adopted Resolutions 1585, 
1588 and 1590 about Darfur Crisis. The three resolutions were not including the 
threat of sanctions, but mainly extending the mandate of the United Nations 
Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS),114 and transferring its responsibilities to the 
new established United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),115 which was requested 
to be co-operated with AMIS. In 2006, the looming failure of the AMIS pressured the 
UN to deploy its own blue helmet peacekeepers to take over the African Union’s 
green berets, who was suffering from the attacks from militias and rebel groups since 
2005. Therefore, Resolution 1679 in May mentioned a follow-on United Nations 
operation in Darfur.116 The resolution was approved without dissent, but with 
China’s statement of “a basic principle and precondition for deployment of all UN 
peacekeeping operations”: Must obtain the agreement and cooperation of the 
Sudanese Government.117 
 
In August, the following Resolution 1706 expanded the mandate and the force of 
UNMIS, up to 17300 military personnel and 3300 civilian police, to enforce the Darfur 
Peace Agreement signed on May 5th. Considering the cross-border conflict, the 
resolution also broadened the mandate of UNMIS to the neighbouring Chad and 
Central Africa Republic. It was the first UN Security Council resolution explicitly 
reaffirmed the Responsibility to Protect.118 However, the resolution was adamantly 
rejected by the Sudanese government, asserting the Western ‘colonial’ ambition 
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behind. Khartoum’s genuine concerns include: the multinational force presence 
could not only restrict Sudan’s military campaign in Darfur, but also assist the ICC to 
investigate and even arrest the indicated Sudanese officials. China abstained with 
Russia and Qatar due to the non-consent of Khartoum, and used the threat of a veto 
to insist inserting the requirement of Khartoum’s consent. Chinese Ambassador 
Wang Guangya emphasized that requiring the consent of the host country is a ‘fixed 
and standardized phrase’ when deploying UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, China’s 
abstention was ‘principled reservations’. 119Although Resolution 1706 was passed, 
UN peacekeepers could not be deployed in practice in the absence of consent of 
Sudan. 
  
The compromise was the Annan Plan of three-stage operations, made in November 
2006. The first stage of UN sending material assistance and 200 advisors to AMIS was 
smoothly completed. However, the Sudanese government was not cooperating on 
the second stage of increasing UN troop proportion in the peacekeeping operation, 
or the third stage of deploying a large scale UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force under 
the command of the UN. In response, U.S threatened to impose further sanctions 
labelled as ‘Plan B’ (Kessler 2007) while UK threatened a non-fly zone against Sudan, 
if Khartoum still refused the deployment of UN peacekeepers (Borger 2007). 
Meanwhile, the UN, the AU and China had undertaken various coordinating and 
mediating efforts to facilitate the Annan Plan. Finally, Sudan agreed to implement the 
second stage in April and the third stage in June 2007, with the following conditions: 
(1) the commander of the hybrid-force should be African; (2) Most of the 
peacekeeping soldiers should come from Africa, then Asia and Latin America.  
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With Sudan’s consent, The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) was unanimously authorized by Resolution 1769. The mandate is for a 
force of up to 19,555 military personnel and 3,772 police, which “should, as far as 
possible, be sourced from African countries”.120 Despite the unanimity, U.S warned 
that Sudan’s failure to cooperate would lead U.S “move for the swift adoption of 
unilateral and multilateral measures”; while China emphasized that the goal of 
resolution was not pressuring or sanctioning Sudan, but launching a hybrid 
operation.121 As the first UNAMID force in Darfur, a 140 personnel Chinese engineer 
troop was deployed in November 2007. Due to varied technical obstacles, however, 
the hybrid peacekeeping force was not fully recruited and deployed until the 
beginning of 2009.122 
 
Beijing’s involvement in implementing the UN military intervention in Darfur 
China’s persistent position of non-interference in Darfur was broadly criticized as 
encouraging Sudan’s intransigence, thus hindering a swift and robust multilateral 
intervention in the UN framework. For instance, China had used its veto threat to 
thwart a more coercive version of Resolution 1706. According to the materialist 
explanation, China’s obstructionism was exclusively motivated by its very rapidly 
increasing need of oil resources in Sudan (Reeves 2006). For this reason, global 
advocacy groups including Hollywood celebrities, which failed to push U.S and the EU 
to take a decisive intervention in last 3 years, began to lay the blame for the enduring 
Darfur conflict on Beijing. The 2008 Beijing Olympics provided them a window of 
opportunity to pressure the Chinese government. China had paid much attention to 
shape its international image of a benign power, thus would be less indifferent to 
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international opinion than Sudan. 
 
It was popular to interpret China’s non-interference justifications as window dressing 
to disguise selfish reasons like defending its oil ally from foreign intervention. For 
sure, China needed to maintain the good relations with Khartoum. However, what is 
missing from the account is that China had been lobbying Sudan to accept the UN 
peacekeeping two weeks after its abstention to Resolution 1706 in 2006, even before 
the ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign linked China’s role in Sudan to the 2008 Beijing 
games. According to the testimony from Ambassador Wang Guangya to Reuters, 
China informed Sudan that China approved of the idea of the transition to the UN 
peacekeeping operation, but it would be up to Sudan. “From the beginning, it is 
always our position,” Ambassador denied China shifted its standpoint, "We said it is a 
good idea to have the UN taking over. But in the meanwhile, I think it is a general 
practice that when the UN sends troops, you have to have the consent of the 
government, so now we need the second part.”123 It proved that what China 
disagreed was not the outcome of Resolution 1706, the UN peacekeeping operation 
per se, but the way to initiate a forcible peacekeeping by imposing a resolution on 
the target state, which presented a serious infringement of Sudan’s sovereignty. 
China’s concern was reasonable in practice, as a forcible military intervention against 
the will of target state would probably result in unduly casualties and chaos.  
 
In fact, China had been a key player in persuading Khartoum to accept the UN 
peacekeepers since 2006. Beijing’s efforts received acclaim in the international 
society. Andrew Natsios, The U.S’ envoy to Sudan, praised China began to play an 
important behind-the-scenes role to go along with its more visible peacemaking 
                                                             
123 “China Pushes Sudan to Let UN Troops into Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, September 15 , 2006 
http://www.sudantribune.com/China-pushes-Sudan-to-let-UN,17596 
148 
 
efforts after the international appeals for China’s action in Darfur (Sullivan 2007). At 
the beginning of Beijing’s soft engagement to convince Khartoum particularly 
President al-Bashir, the latter was reluctant to the UN peacekeeping and refused to 
implement several aspects of Annan’s Plan. Later in different occasions, China 
straightforwardly sent ‘strong messages’ to the Sudanese government that China 
fully supported the UN mission (Holslag 2008: 78-79). Instead of threatened with 
economic sanctions in case of Sudan’s non-compliance, Beijing clarified the different 
options to Khartoum in a way of concerning Sudan’s interests: either accept the 
neutral UN peacekeeping operation which including African and Chinese forces, or 
further deteriorate the situation that might trigger coercive unilateral intervention 
from Western states as they always threatened. Obviously, the first option was 
certainly better for Khartoum to pacify the Darfur Crisis as soon as possible, 
especially considering the renewed conflict in the south. Therefore, “the Sudanese 
government was relatively more willing to listen to China’s suggestions”.124 
 
Two main reasons explain China’s growing efforts of intervention in 2007. First, the 
rising international pressures on China had added to problems of the Chinese 
government. In West, a number of politicians and human rights campaigners planned 
to boycott the Beijing Olympics. The Chinese government was sensitive to the 
Olympics event and China’s international image. For instance, Ambassador Liu Guijin, 
the full-time Chinese special envoy to Darfur appointed in 2007, met the directors of 
the Save Darfur Coalition, which explicitly expressed their purpose of urging China to 
pressure Sudan.125 In Africa, China’s traditional partners in AU were eager for the UN 
peacekeeping force to replace the exhausted AU force in Darfur. The neighbouring 
                                                             
124 Author’s interview Interview with a Chinese diplomat, Beijing, July 2014 
125 Saving Darfur Coalition, “Save Darfur Coalition Urges Continued Chinese Engagement on 
Darfur Crisis”, 7 September 2007  
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Chad, which just transferred its diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing in 2006, was 
also expecting China to help in Darfur. Secondly, China’s oil interests in Sudan were at 
stake. The Darfur rebel JEM attacked Chinese-run oil facilities in the neighbouring 
Kordofan region for warning Chinese to leave in 2007 (Osman 2007). It reflected that 
the Sudanese government was unable to stabilize the situation and protect China’s 
investment alone. As a trade partner China sincerely welcomed the deployment of 
UN peacekeeping force to bring a quick restoration of peace and stabilization in the 
western Sudan. In short, these events significantly modified China’s calculations by 
increasing China’s visible cost of non-intervention as both its reputation and 
investment were at risk. Therefore, the rational choice for Beijing was to push 
forward to the UN peacekeeping force in Sudan, and demonstrating its contributions 
in solving the Darfur Crisis. 
  
But to what extent China’s pro-active engagement in Khartoum had blurred the 
boundaries of non-interference? Beijing still avoided endorsing a precedent of 
international intervention without the consent of the target state, which would 
deviate too far from China’s orthodox principle of non-interference. With the 
constraint, the only approach of engagement Beijing can choose was persuading 
rather than compelling Khartoum. Hu Jintao’s visit to Sudan in February 2007 
exemplified the self-restraint. On the one hand, Hu duly attempted to change 
Sudan’s rejective position toward the UN peacekeeping in Darfur, admonishing 
Bashair ‘you have to resolve the problem’ (McDoom 2007). On the other, Hu 
strengthened the bilateral economic relations and declared four principles in dealing 
with the Darfur issue: (1) Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan; (2) 
insist a peaceful solution through dialogues; (3) confirm the constructive role of the 
AU and UN; (4) stabilize the Darfur region by a comprehensive ceasefire and improve 
150 
 
the living conditions of local people.126In short, China cautiously shifted its attitude to 
Khartoum while continued defending its policy as being in conformity with its 
principles.  
 
Table 6  China’s calculations on the UN military intervention in Darfur 
Policy options Benefits Costs 
Obstructing the UN 
peacekeeping 
Pleasing the Sudanese 
government 
Deteriorating the situation; 
Drawing international 
criticism before the Beijing 
Olympics; 
Annoying regional actors. 
Persuading Sudan to 
accept the peacekeeping 
Deflecting international 
criticism, safeguarding its 
oil interests, maintaining 
its influences in Africa 
while upholding its 
principles 
Annoying the Sudanese 
government to a less extent 
Compelling Sudan to 
accept the peacekeeping 
Pacifying the international 
criticism 
Breaking its principles and 
Betraying Sudan 
 
The European Union’s military intervention led by France 
When China was busy with addressing the international pressure and persuading 
Sudan to accept UN peacekeeping force UNAMIND in Darfur, the EU contributed 
troops to tackle with the Darfur Crisis in neighbouring Chad and Central Africa 
Republic (CAR), which were involved with the fights crossing the border from Darfur 
                                                             
126 “Hu Jintao talked with Sudanese president al-Bashir”, Xinhua Agency, 2 February 2007 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-02/02/content_5688877.htm 
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since mid-2006. The EU regarded the mission as a part of its regional approach to 
Darfur Crisis, by assisting to maintain order in the refugee camps close to the border 
with Darfur. The initiative of deploying a peacekeeping force in Chad could be traced 
back to Resolution 1706 in 2006 and the Security Council proposed 10,900 troops in 
early 2007.127 However, the Chadian president Idriss Déby rejected the UN military 
force, 128and labelled it as an illegitimate interference in Chad’s domestic affairs (Lanz 
2008:40). For, these refugee camps were used by Chad as important recruitment 
bases for the Chadian army and Chad-supported Darfur rebel groups, and the 
proposal of the UN mission including a political mandate (Seibert 2010: 8). As 
Khartoum blocked the UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, a parallel peacekeeping 
in eastern Chad was also unlikely without the consent of N'Djamena.  
 
The position of Chadian leadership changed under the influence of France, which 
initiated all EU missions in Africa before. The new-elected French president Nicola 
Sarkozy became active in solving the Darfur Crisis because of his commitment made 
in the 2007 France presidential election campaign. Chad had a longstanding military 
cooperation with France, which has an ongoing military presence in Chad under the 
Opération Épervier since 1986. Based on the ongoing security agreement, France 
provided logistical and intelligence support to Chad to tackle with the rebel 
movements backed by Sudan. Yet France might face the criticisms that it was too 
implicated in the actions of the Déby regime to play the role of a rescuer in Darfur, 
especially if Paris chooses to intervene unilaterally. Therefore, an EU operation under 
the French leadership was a more acceptable option for Chad as well as the 
international society.  
                                                             
127 UN Security Council, S/2007/97, 23 February 2007 
128 “Chad rejects a UN military force”, BBC, 28 February 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6405543.stm 
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In order to launch the EU military operation through the CSDP framework, France 
needed to convince other Member States. Most of them were sceptical on France’s 
motivation: whether it aimed to protect civilians and humanitarian workers as Elysée 
Palace claimed or defend its ally Déby from the offensives of the rebel groups (Tull 
2008, Helly 2009: 346). Although later France managed to gain enough political 
supports within the EU for establishing the operation, there was less material 
support of the Member States for such a venture. Only Ireland, Poland, Austria and 
Sweden contributed more than 100 troops. The other big 2, U.K and Germany, did 
not contribute any troop or airlift capability to the EU operation.  
 
With the authorization from the France-drafted UN Resolution 1778,129 and the 
consent of host countries after several concessions, the EU conducted a 16-months 
military bridging operation (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) in Chad and CAR during the 2008 to 
2009. France contributed 2100 troops in the 3700-personnel EU force, and paid more 
than half of the budget. The mission was successful in regard with fulfilling its limited 
mandates. In 15 March 2009, a UN force took over under the mandate of United 
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), while a 
number of Member States and third countries remained on the ground and 
relocated their troops to the UN (Ireland, Austria, Finland, Poland, France, Albania, 
Croatia and Russia).130However, the hand-over from the EU to the UN was not 
smooth in practice. When Member States were ready to exit according to the plan, 
the UN was not sufficiently prepared to replace the EU’s mission (Seibert 2010: 35).  
 
                                                             
129 UN Security Council, S/RES/1778(2007), 25 September 2007 
130 European Union, “EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central 
African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)”, March 2009 
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Table 7   France’s calculations on leading the EU military intervention  
Policy options Benefits Costs 
The inaction in military 
intervention 
Avoiding any material 
expense and casualty risk 
Breaking elections promise; 
Possible adverse effects on 
French prestige in Africa 
Leading the EU military 
intervention 
Increasing the prestige of 
leaders and France; 
Maintaining French 
influences in Chad/Africa; 
Sharing some expenses 
and risks with the EU 
Shouldering major material 
expenses and casualty risk; 
Spending time and political 
capitals to coordinate EU 
Member States 
Unilateral military  
intervention 
Increasing the prestige of 
leaders and France; 
Confirming French 
influences in Africa; 
A more rapid intervention 
Shouldering all material 
expenses and casualty risk; 
Drawing potential criticism 
of unilateralism 
 
 
An excellent analysis attributed France’s rationale to the French domestic politics 
(Marchal 2009). The president Sarkozy had a strong influence on the French 
presidential government in particular in foreign affairs, and his Foreign Minister 
Bernard Kouchner was an enthusiastic advocate of humanitarian intervention. 
Pushing for a France-led European intervention in the Darfur Crisis could help 
themselves and the new government to gain more credits at domestic, European and 
international levels. Since in 2007 Sudan had already accepted the deployment of 
UNAMID in Darfur where no western troop was allowed, France needed to find an 
alternative option to demonstrate its efforts of intervention. Kouchner’s first plan 
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was to establish a ‘humanitarian corridors’ to facilitate the humanitarian aid to 
Darfur. However, the plan was rejected by both UN and humanitarian organizations 
as unnecessary. Hence, the neighbouring and affected Chad, and to a less extent, 
Central Africa Republic were selected by Paris, despite the fact that the European 
military operation there had minimal influence to mitigate the conflict in Darfur. 
 
There was little doubt that the EUFOR Tchad/RCA was characterized by French 
cost-benefit calculations. But it is hard to conclude that the primary motivation of 
France was to pursue its geostrategic interests in its former colonies, since Chad and 
CAR were only selected as a plan B. Even the non-humanitarian motives was existed, 
it does not preclude the role of principles behind the EU military mission. The 
ideational factors had enabled the European intervention by influencing the 
cost-benefit calculations of policy-makers. For France, without the rooted human 
rights idea in French society, Sarkozy and Kouchner would unlikely regard a 
humanitarian intervention initiative as a popular policy pleasing electorate, news 
organizations and relevant NGOs such as the coalition ‘Urgence Darfour’. A 
counterexample was the Chinese leadership, who did not have this incentive to 
intervene in a humanitarian crisis because saving strangers would not be recognized 
by the Chinese society as a significant achievement of the government yet.  
 
The same reason probably also suitable for Brussels and other European capitals. 
Xavier Solana, the High Representative of the EU, also demanded a public visibility of 
the EU in the Darfur Crisis to fulfil the EU’s commitment in the regional crisis 
management (Hainzl and Feichtinger 2011:8). Being aware of the Paris’ hidden 
agendas and thus reluctant to contribute, other Member States still accepted the 
French proposal within EU on 15 October 2007. This compromise was not only for 
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avoiding a direct tension with France, which promised the impartiality and neutrality 
of the mission and provided the most resources, but also considered the merit of 
confirming the image of the EU as an ethical power in relation to Darfur with only a 
one-year mission (Olsen 2009: 256). Conversely, the political liability of blocking an 
initiative of humanitarian intervention was clear. “Nobody wanted to appear as not 
doing much to help Darfur” (Marchal 2011: 26). A fresh lesson could be drawn from 
China, who was under huge international pressures because Beijing baffled a robust 
intervention proposal on Darfur within the UN Security Council in 2006.  
 
Table 8  Member States calculations on the EU military intervention  
Policy options Benefits Costs 
Obstructing the 
France-led EU military 
intervention 
Avoiding any material 
expense and casualty risk; 
Stopping French hidden 
agenda in Africa (for big MS) 
Drawing domestic and 
international criticism; 
Damaging the relations 
with France and 
cohesion of the EU 
Authorizing the France-led 
EU intervention without 
contribution (UK, 
Germany, etc.) 
Upholding their principles; 
Maintaining the prestige and 
cohesion of the EU 
Avoiding any casualty risk 
Shouldering a few 
common costs; 
Increasing French 
influences (for big MS) 
Supporting the France-led 
EU intervention with 
contribution (Poland, 
Ireland, etc.) 
Upholding the principles and 
increasing their own prestige; 
Maintaining the prestige and 
cohesion of the EU 
Shouldering some 
material expenses and 
casualty risks; 
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(V) Conclusion  
In dealing with the Darfur Crisis, both China and the EU supported the leading role of 
the African Union, and the fundamental role of the United Nations. For example, 
they made parallel efforts to deploy multinational military forces on the ground of 
Sudan and Neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, there also existed significant policy 
differences between the EU and China in two of the three fields the chapter 
examined. The EU supported to sanction Khartoum and halted its aid to Sudan, 
whereas China opposed the proposal of the sanctions and continue its close 
economic tie with Sudan. The EU endorsed the judicial intervention of the ICC, which 
never gain the support from Beijing.  
 
How to explain their policy outcomes? My answer starts with their cost-benefit 
calculations. Protecting and promoting the national interests, or more specifically the 
government-defined interests, are always the primary concerns of foreign policy 
decision makers. In a realistic perspective, the first-order interest of a state is the 
national security. Without clear perceived security threat, the given preference of 
policy-makers is not to intervene. For example, the great powers’ responses to 
humanitarian crises were similarly pale during the Cold War (Wheeler 2000). In this 
case, since Sudan is far away from the EU and China’s borders, the turmoil in Darfur 
and the subsequent military intervention were not presenting a direct security threat 
for China or European States. Certainly, we can find indirect security concerns: For 
the EU, although the number of Darfur refugees flowed into Europe was minimal, a 
long-term turmoil in an Islamic region may spawn terrorism. For China, the chaos in 
its oil partner was also a challenge to its ‘energy security’. Therefore, China and the 
EU actually had similar security concerns, which became the cause of their policy 
convergences such as supporting peacekeeping operations, rather than their policy 
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divergences. Instead, what led to their divergences were mainly their different 
economic interests in Sudan, and the different sources of the government prestige. 
 
Economic self-interests had influenced China and the EU’s policy-decisions notably 
regarding the sanctions and military operations. It is hard to imagine that China or 
the EU took the disaster of Darfur as an opportunity to expand their economic 
benefits, but they needed to calculate the potential material costs of the crisis and 
their policy options. China had a strong oil tie with Sudan before the crisis, so China 
was cautious about its established economic advantages in this country, and made 
very efforts at the UN to restrain the multilateral economic sanctions from expanding 
to oil trades. Finally the UN resolutions only implemented the arms embargo and 
freezing assets of individuals, and China’s core oil interests in Sudan was protected. 
To a less extent, several EU Member States such as France also had noticeable 
economic interests or potentials in Sudan. Therefore, the EU was unable to reach an 
agreement to pose an American-style full sanction against Sudan, which is costly at 
least for some Member States. Another material factor the EU considered was the 
cost of EUFOR peacekeeping mission in Chad and CAR. The French initiative was 
accepted on the conditions of relatively risk-free, low-cost and short term: It was 
only a one year mission in a non-combat environment and did not require other 
Member States, in particular Germany and UK, to contribute large troops.    
 
The rising public concerns on Darfur Crisis, as well as the policy-making processes 
involved the consideration of the governments’ prestige and image had occurred in 
China and Europe from 2004 onwards. Therefore, upholding the adopted principles, 
fulfilling the established commitments would increase their prestige both at the 
domestic and international level. The domestic prestige is even crucial for the 
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legitimacy of government. On the contrary, breaking a promise in public was 
detrimental to their prestige. However, regarding the international intervention, 
China and the EU adopted different principles and made different promises, which 
shaped how they defined their interests of prestige. Principles such as Human 
Security and the Responsibility to Protect, plus the intensive media reports and 
influential humanitarian social movements within European societies, had enabled 
the European intervention in Darfur by ensuring the domestic legitimacy and 
boosting the international prestige of the EU and Member States. On the contrary, 
European leaders realized that the inaction or even thwarting an action in Darfur 
would be unacceptable in the eyes of public opinion. In this respect, imposing 
targeted sanctions, supporting the ICC indictment, and deploying troops in 
neighbouring areas served as to protect and promote the prestige of the EU and 
certain Member States, such as Sarkozy’s France.  
 
Yet, the Chinese government and society had not embedded such a strong universal 
human rights principle like Europeans. Besides, the emerging ‘mobilizing-conscience’ 
role of western news organizations in agenda-setting on foreign affairs (McDevitt 
2010) did not exist in China, as state-run news organizations like Xinhua Agency 
retains authority in foreign news reporting. Therefore, the same internal excitation 
mechanism for humanitarian intervention did not work in Beijing. By contrast, China 
had established some other principles the EU did not emphasize. For example, the 
non-intervention of domestic affairs without the consent of host state has been 
championed by Beijing for decades. Largely for demonstrating its principle of 
non-interference in domestic affairs and non-conditionality in trade relations as a 
long-term commitment made in Sudan and other African countries, China abstained 
for all UN resolutions involving economic or legal sanction against Sudan, and the UN 
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military intervention proposal without the consent of Khartoum.  
 
Why China was reluctant to use the veto, but paid more efforts to lobby Sudan after 
2007? The audience of Beijing’s foreign policy was beyond Chinese people and a 
number of developing countries which shared China’s principle, since China rose as 
an emerging global power and further integrated into the international community 
after the Cold War. As the idea of human rights protection became an emerging 
global norm in recent two decades, China no longer expresses an entire opposition to 
it. Therefore, vetoing a humanitarian intervention proposal in the UN would go too 
far and also damage China’s prestige as a responsible power, which shoulders the 
responsibility to make contribution to the world peace. Besides, the major 
demonstrations against the Beijing Olympic staged in the West, as well as the 
political pressures from the U.S and European governments, elevated the ‘prestige 
cost’ for Beijing’s continuing inaction. In fact, Chinese diplomats already began to 
persuade Sudan in 2006, but Beijing needed time and the involvement of top leaders 
to coordinate different governmental agencies and state-owned companies in oil and 
military industry, to create a consistent policy toward Khartoum.  
  
The role of ideational factors in Chinese and European foreign policy-makings on 
Darfur was discernible. First, their policy options were restricted to the range that 
can be justified by their adopted principle. Secondly, different social ideas provided 
different roadmaps for China and Europe in their pursuits of prestige, as their 
prestige was largely defined by the prevailing domestic public opinion. Besides, the 
European states needed to coordinate their policy at the EU level, during which the 
EU institutionalized principle could serve as the cohesion glue, whereas China’s 
principle of non-interference functioned as a long-lasting bond with the developing 
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world. In the case of Darfur, the rise of global norm of human rights protection in the 
UN since 1990s had influenced both the EU and China, by shifting their dilemma of 
choices from whether to intervene to how to intervene a humanitarian crisis.  
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            Chapter 6: The Case of 2011 Libya Crisis 
 
As a part of the democratic revolution wave in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), the Libyan Civil War began in February 2011. The anti-government protest in 
Benghazi rapidly escalated into an armed conflict between the rebels seeking to 
overthrow the Colonel Gaddafi and the government force loyal to him. It should be 
pointed out that the Libyan Civil War was not only a fight between democracy and 
tyranny, but also characterized by the tribal problem accumulated over the years. 
The anti-government force was mainly from the eastern part of the Libya like 
Benghazi (Cyrenaica region), which faced a growing economic hardship since the 
Gaddafi’s regime had obviously favoured the Western part surrounding Tripoli 
(Tripolitania region) where Gaddafi’s belonged tribe Qaddadfa lives in. During the 
period of King Idris I of Libya, however, Cyrenaica was once the privileged region until 
Gaddafi seized the power in 1969.  
 
The sequence of events in the Libyan civil war was well known as the fall of Libya’s 
strongman Gaddafi. After dominating the country and cruelly suppressing the 
opposition for four decades, Muammar Gaddafi’s dictatorship were disintegrating 
and crumbling, in particular when the rebels formed the government of the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) and began to gain the international support. On the one 
hand, a number of states and international organization condemned Gaddafi's 
regime over its attacks on civilians during the conflict, cutting of their diplomatic 
relations with Gaddafi government. On the other, with the de facto help of the 
foreign military intervention, the rebel forces gradually seized the initiative on the 
ground, and finally captured the capital city of Tripoli in August. Gaddafi was 
defeated and killed in the end. His regime Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
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was formally replaced by the National Transitional Council in the UN.  
 
The chapter examines the international responses to the Libya Crisis in 2011, in 
particular China, the EU and its key Member States’ motivations and justifications for 
their policies. The chapter categorizes their interventions or non-interventions in 
Libya into two groups: political/economic and military. Regarding each category, the 
EU (including Member States) and China’s nuanced foreign policies will be explained 
according to their economic interests, security concerns and institutionalized 
principles. Different from the previous literatures concentrating on a single factor, 
this chapter bears the emphasis that these three alternative explanations are not 
necessarily contradictory, since policy-makers usually need to consider a variety of 
factors. Even though considerations of security and economic interests were evident 
in the intervention in Libya, they did not preclude the role of principles and norms.  
 
Here, three key arguments are advanced: First, though their material interests in 
Libya and bilateral relations with the Gaddafi regime varied, the EU and Member 
States eventually adopted a critical position against Gaddafi and support the rebels. 
To achieve such a common policy, their commitment to certain principles was 
necessary. Secondly, even the Gaddafi regime was not China’s friend, Beijing refused 
to endorse the military intervention in Libya. China’s principle and values were 
necessary to cause this policy outcome. And, thirdly, the principle of 
pro-intervention alone was not sufficient to mobilize the EU to intervene by military 
measures, whereas only the principle of non-intervention was unable to motivate 
China to prevent a military intervention. 
 
The following sub-questions structure the avenue of enquires during the case tracing. 
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(a) Whether certain principles and norms actually occurred, not only in the rhetoric 
of the EU and China, but also in their policy-making process. (b) Whether the 
occurrence of norms and principles (democracy, human rights…) was a cause of the 
EU’s interventionist policies of supporting rebels in the case of Libya Crisis. (c) 
Whether the principle of non-interference and the value of pro-stability was a cause 
of China’s neutral policy outcome in the Libya Crisis. (d) Why the EU and China’s 
attachments to relevant principles were inadequate to motivate them to conduct or 
impede military intervention.  
 
(I) International Interventions through diplomatic and economic measures  
In February 2011, the escalating Libyan civil conflict soon became a grave concern for 
the international society, after the government force retaliated in a criminally 
disproportionate manner and bombed civilian targets. The response of the UN to the 
Libya Crisis came quickly. The Security Council issued a statement on Libya situation, 
condemning the violence against civilians and calling on the Libyan government to 
meet its responsibility to protect its population.131On the same day, the League of 
Arab States announced a similar statement of condemning the crime of Gaddafi’s 
regime and suspended Libya from all sessions. The African Union also adopted a 
strong stand by condemning the indiscriminate and excessive use of violence and 
pressuring the government of Libya to protect its citizens from serious crimes.132 
 
However, the Gaddafi regime manifestly did not respond to the mounting calls of the 
international society and continued its bloody suppression. Consequently, the regime 
further lost its domestic and international legitimacy. The Libyan diplomats in UN 
decided to serve as representatives of the Libyan people rather than the regime. The 
                                                             
131 UN Security Council, SC/10180, 22 February 2011 
132 AU Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI), 22 February 2011 
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UN Human Rights Council recommended the General Assembly to suspend the 
membership of Libya in the Council due to the gross and systematic violations of 
human rights, and decided to dispatch a commission of inquiry to investigate the 
alleged violations of international human rights law in the country.133 The UN human 
rights chief commissioner Navi Pillay referred to the principle of R2P, suggesting that 
the international community has the responsibility to intervene when the 
government of Libya failed to protect its population.  
 
Within the above context, Resolution 1970 including the R2P language, coercive 
measures and the ICC referral was passed unanimously.134 Comparing to the intense 
debates on Darfur Crisis in the Security Council, two factual circumstances facilitated 
the pass of Resolution 1970. First, regional organizations like Africa Union and the 
Arab League played a key role in forming the consensus in the Security Council, which 
was not happening during the Darfur Crisis. Secondly, no one, including Libya’s 
representative at the UN, was defending Libya’s sovereignty from international 
intervention in the Security Council. This situation stood in stark contrast to Sudan’s 
vociferous self-defence regarding Darfur in the Security Council. Instead, the Libyan 
ambassador to the U.N overtly condemned Gaddafi and urgently required the 
intervention of the UN.135 China, which is usually unwilling to impose sanctions in 
crisis intervention, explicitly attributed its consent to the above ‘exceptional 
situations’. In addition, the impact of the comprehensive sanction in the resolution 
was targeted and should not worsen the condition of Libyan citizens, which 
dismissed the worries of developing countries about the unintended consequence of 
sanction. Yet reservations still existed in the Security Council. Russia emphasized the 
                                                             
133 UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/S-15/2, 25 February 2011 
134 UN Security Council, RES/1970(2011), 26 February 2011 
135 UN Security Council, S/PV.6490, 25 February 2011 
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restrictive measures did not indicate future military intervention. India insisted the 
exemption from the jurisdiction of nationals as not parties to the Rome Statute.136 
 
China’s response: Deeply concerned, but refrained from rebuking Gaddafi 
China was restrained from taking sides. In spite of voting in favour of Resolution 1970 
against the Gaddafi regime, Beijing was not joining the international community in 
condemning the Gaddafi’s use of force to crush the protest. Considering that the 
Gaddafi regime was not close to China, Beijing’s caution mainly reflected its 
traditional reluctance to criticize authoritarian governments of the developing 
countries, which would present interference in domestic affairs. Instead, Beijing 
followed the standard procedure according to the doctrine of non-interference, 
taking a neutral position in the Libyan uprising and only calling for the restoration of 
peace. And interestingly, Gaddafi even delivered a speech and justified its violence by 
drawing parallels with the Chinese authorities’ use of military force to quell the 1989 
Tiananmen Square protest, “National unity being worth more than a small number of 
protesters”. 137  Obviously, Beijing disliked Gaddafi’s analogy and blacked out 
Gaddafi's reference in Chinese news reports. 
 
No matter whether Beijing truly sympathize Gaddafi, it was clear that China did not 
welcome the Libyan rebels and the Arab Spring aiming at bottoms-up regime change. 
The Libyan uprising was inconsistent with Beijing’s political philosophy—stability is of 
‘overriding importance’ at home, and implicitly challenging the ‘Chinese Model’ of 
authoritarian politics coupled with state-guide capitalism. Hence, the Arab 
revolutions were seen by Beijing as the politics of instability that follows a failed state. 
                                                             
136 UN Security Council, S/PV.6491, 26 February 2011 
137 BBC: “Libya protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit”, 22 February 2011, 
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The evidence could be found in the coverage from the Chinese state-run media. Their 
general attitude to the Arab revolution was sceptical and even against, in particular 
when a rumour called for a Chinese ‘Jasmine revolution’ spreading on the internet in 
2011 (Parello-Plesner & Pantucci 2011). For example, an article in People’s Daily 
emphasized the cost of the Arab Spring was too high for the Arabic people and the 
outcome of it had not significantly bettered their lives (Tian 2012).  
 
The initial response from Beijing was mainly concerned its assets and people in Libya. 
China was an important trade partner for Libya, ranking the third largest Libyan oil 
buyer behind Italy and France and ranking the second largest supplier of the Libyan 
imports after Italy. Besides, about 75 Chinese companies, 13 of them are 
state-owned key enterprises, had around $ 20 billion contracts in Libya. They 
employed 36,000 Chinese working on about 50 projects, including railway, road and 
building construction before the Libyan civil war (Wang 2012). In the wave of unrest 
sweeping Libya, Chinese oil facilities had been attacked by raiders in chaos. The CNPC, 
China’s largest state-owned cooperation, was the first oil majors confirmed the attack, 
after European oil groups such as BASF of Germany, Eni of Italy and Repsol YPF of 
Spain closed their Libyan operations earlier (Blas 2011). Therefore, Chinese 
government required the Gaddafi regime to restore social stability and guarantee the 
safety of Chinese personnel and property in Libya.138  
 
Obviously, at the moment the Gaddafi regime had no time to ensure the safety of life 
and properties of Chinese citizens in Libya. According to the directives from President 
Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, the largest evacuation operation in the 
history of PRC began on 22 February. A PLA navy missile frigate, which was 
                                                             
138 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regular news conference, 22 February 2011, 
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participating in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and four military transport 
airplanes were dispatched to Libya as part of the unprecedented evacuation effort. 
This was the first time the Chinese navy has participated in such a mission. Another 
key of the evacuation was the secured assistances from the countries like Greece, 
Malta, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and Jordan, which kindly either provided transportation 
or facilitating temporary shelter. Within 10 days, 35,860 Chinese workers and 2,100 
foreign nationals were evacuated back to China or transferred temporarily to 
politically stable countries neighbouring Libya.139 The swift and nimble evacuation 
mainly attributed to the concerted effort of related ministries, PLA and stated-owned 
companies in Libya. It demonstrated Beijing’s determination for protecting its citizen 
abroad and China’s growing capabilities for overseas military actions.  
 
Besides taking care of Chinese nationals and properties in Libya, China also prompted 
to resolve the Libya Crisis through peaceful means such as a dialogue. In the first 
three months of the war the end result of the civil war was uncertain while the 
civilian casualties and property damage was increasing. The destructive deadlock 
required both sides to sit down and talk, which gave China an opportunity to play a 
larger role as peacemaker. In the beginning of June, Chinese foreign ministry hosted 
Gaddafi’s envoy Abdelati Obeidi, who claimed in Beijing that his government was 
ready to approve of a total ceasefire and hoped China would help broker such a 
temporary peace settlement. Later in the month the Head of the Executive 
Committee of the NTC Mahmoud Jibril visited China. In the meetings with two sides, 
China urged both sides to give priority to the interests of the country and the people, 
take into account the mediation proposals from the world community, cease 
hostilities and restore peace and stability in the country as quickly as possible. 
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However, Gaddafi’s offers to make a truce, hold an election or lead a transitional 
government were all dismissed by the rebels. In the end, Beijing’s attempts at 
mediation had failed since the rebel gradually took the advantage in the war with the 
assistance from the foreign military intervention and thus left Gaddafi no role to play 
in the future of Libya.  
 
Table 9   China’s calculations regarding the civilian intervention in Libya 
Policy options Benefits Costs 
Preventing the 
international intervention 
Pleasing Gaddafi regime Drawing fierce international 
criticism 
Political involvement 
without taking sides 
Solidarity with regional 
actors; in accordance 
with its principles and 
values 
Not clear 
Condemning Gaddafi and 
Supporting rebels 
Pleasing the rebels Breaking its principle and 
values 
 
In sum, China’s response to the outbreak of Libyan Civil War was basically consistent 
with its routine reactions to other similar crises, no matter whether the target 
country had a special relation with Beijing. We can recognize familiar features from 
China’s crisis management in Darfur, such as refusing to openly support one side over 
the other during the conflict, mainly calling for a restoration of peace through 
political dialogues. This is the essential content of the principle of non-interference in 
domestic affairs, and was respected by China in the case of Libya. Even Beijing ’s 
unprecedented evacuation operation was implemented within the boundary of the 
UN Charter, because the rescue of nationals where the territorial State is unable or 
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unwilling to do so, does not infringe the principle of non-interference (Wood 2007). 
Meanwhile, Beijing was flexible enough to accommodate changes in world opinion, 
by voting in favour of Resolution 1970 included the content of civilian intervention. 
However, it was only an expedient, in order to keep the solidarity with dominant 
views of the regional countries which were strongly supporting the UN (non-military) 
intervention in Libya in February. No evidence that Beijing had significantly changed 
its general sceptical attitude toward the practice of foreign intervention or R2P.  
 
The EU’s reaction: Condemning Gaddafi and imposing sanctions as usual  
The European Union was expected to play a major role in dealing with the Libya Crisis. 
On the one hand, the European common foreign and security policy was enhanced 
by the Treaty of Lisbon and the newly established European External Action Service 
(EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative for foreign and security policy 
(HR). However, the EEAS was not formally launched until 1 December 2010 and many 
senior positions remain unfilled when the Libya Crisis broke out. On the other, the 
Libya Crisis was occurring in the EU’s ‘backyard’ right crossing the Mediterranean, 
thus of deep concern for the EU for two reasons. First, in order to prevent the nearby 
conflict from becoming a threat to the Europe’s security, the EU had the 
responsibility to take a quick response, not only evacuated the EU citizen from Libya 
but also resolve the serious crisis. Second, the Libya Crisis in the context of the Arab 
Spring was perceived as a window of opportunity for the EU to promote its long-term 
normative agenda like democratization in its Southern Neighbourhood. 
 
Before this, the EU’s neighbourhood policy for the Southern Mediterranean had not 
consistently followed its normative agenda. Only three years ago in the first summit 
of ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ hosted by France, dictators in the Arab world like 
170 
 
Mohamed Hosni Mubarak and Bachar el-Assad were regarded as the partners of 
Europe. After Gaddafi abandoned the nuclear program and paid the compensation 
to the victims of the terrorist bomb attacks, the EU also lifted all economic sanctions 
and arms embargo against Libya and offered the country to negotiate a new 
framework agreement with the EU (Zoubir 2009). As several analysts argued, the 
EU’s rapprochement with Libya revealed that the EU’s short-term security concerns 
on energy and immigration had overridden the long-term goal of democracy 
promotion (Joffé and Paoletti 2010, Bosse 2011). In fact, within the EU there had 
existed debates and criticism of the strengthening EU-Libya cooperation, concerning 
the dictatorship of Gaddafi and its abuse of human rights, which was highly 
incompatible with the principles in the EU’s external relations as well as the 
Barcelona Process (Lutterbeck 2009).  
 
Notwithstanding the close cooperation with Gaddafi regime before, the Union 
quickly declared its position of supporting Libyan rebels on 21 February, referring the 
Libya uprising as a part of social movements for freedom in the South Mediterranean, 
which was long supported by the Union in its Neighbourhood Policy.140 In a broader 
context, the EU welcomed all the looming democracies in the region by setting up a 
new partnership which “rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to common 
values”.141The most notable decision made in the extraordinary European Council on 
11 March was no longer regarding Gaddafi’s regime as the legitimate government of 
Libya. Instead, the EU recognized the Transitional National Council based in Benghazi 
as an interlocutor with the EU,142 although not as the legitimate government of 
Libya yet. We need to rethink why the EU shifted its cooperative attitude toward the 
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Gaddafi regime and seemed to regain its normative characteristics during the crisis. 
 
The EU’s pro-rebels intervention in Libya was unlikely directly driven by the desire of 
expanding oil interests or eliminating security threats, as the relationship between 
Gaddafi and the West had resumed since 1999. Before the 2011 crisis, the EU had a 
close cooperation with the Gaddafi regime on immigration control and energy supply, 
subject only to a very light political conditionality. Concerning fighting against illegal 
immigration, the EU even provided a little financial assistance and even military 
equipment for Libya, despite its poor record of human rights. The argument that 
overthrowing Gaddafi was necessary to fight terrorism and secure the border was 
less plausible in this case. Regarding the oil supply, Libya became the EU’s third most 
important source of oil supply since 2006. European oil contracts in Libya, in 
particular of Italian oil company ENI, were already ensured before the uprising. Thus, 
it is unreasonable to debunk the EU’s support to the rebels as for oil. 
 
For instance, the Member State had most significant material an interest in Libya was 
not ready to stand by the Union initially. Italy was Libya’s largest import country and 
had widespread economic interests in Libya notably in the energy sector. Rome also 
counted on Gaddafi for enforcing the immigration control. In addition, the Italian 
colonial past in Libya led to the “treaty of friendship, partnership and cooperation”, 
signed between the Berlusconi government and the Gaddafi regime in 2008. The 
treaty was the main concern of Italy at the beginning of 2011 Crisis.143 Obviously, 
Berlusconi government was reluctant to damage the close cooperation and political 
relations with Libya. Therefore, Rome was refrained from condemning the Gaddafi 
regime directly. Berlusconi said in February that he did not want to disturb 
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anyone.144Together with Malta and Cyprus, Italy even held out for a week within the 
EU against the proposal of imposing sanctions against Libya, cautioned that it could 
further weaken the Italian economy (Lombardi 2011:39).  
 
Table 10  Italy’s calculations regarding the intervention in Libya 
Policy options Benefits Costs 
Neutral non-interference 
at the beginning 
Pleasing Gaddafi regime to 
ensure Italian interests 
Breaking its principles; 
Drawing International and 
domestic criticism 
Join the EU intervention to 
support NTC later 
Pacifying the criticism; 
Solidarity with the Union; 
Pleasing the rebels 
Annoying Gaddafi regime 
 
Italy was unable to hold this reluctant position for several reasons. On the 
international level, Rome could not resist the intense lobbying within the EU and the 
mainstream opinion of the Western allies, and finally approved the EU sanction. On 
the domestic level, the central-left party Partito Democratico bashed the inaction of 
Berlusconi government in Libya Crisis, and called for a humanitarian intervention. 
This was echoed by the majority of Italian public opinion (Alessandri & Matarazzo 
2011:4). Concerning the increasing international and domestic pressures, Italy 
government had gradually adopted a critical stance toward Gaddafi regime and ‘de 
facto suspended’ the friendship treaty with Libya (Miranda 2011:14). Later, the 
subsequent changes of the situation on the ground further facilitated Italy’s shift of 
                                                             
144 Reuters, “Opposition lawmakers criticized Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi for 
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position. After the launch of NATO military intervention in March, Rome realized that 
the Gaddafi was unlikely to stay in power thus the cost of betraying Gaddafi 
diminished. Finally, Italy abandoned the Gaddafi regime ‘for national interests, the 
EU’s common interests, and the multilateral solidarity in UN and NATO’.145 
 
Despite the lack of evident material motivation, the EU was efficient in delivering 
humanitarian aids and sanctioning the Gaddafi regime. On the one hand, the EU 
provided more than €80.5 million in humanitarian assistance to the Libyan people, in 
particular massive refugees in a timely fashion. On the other the EU adopted a range 
of restrictive measures against Gaddafi’s regime as the UN Resolution 1970 required, 
and implemented further sanctions on key Libyan financial entities to ensure that oil 
and gas revenues would not reach the regime.146 The scope of EU restrictive 
measures was further widened following the UN Resolution 1973. 147  The EU 
imposed a de facto oil and gas embargo by freezing the assets of the Libyan National 
Oil Company and 26 energy firms. Besides, since Gaddafi was attempting raise fuel 
imports after its refining industry was crippled in the war, six Libyan ports were 
added to the EU’s sanction list.148 In this respect, what the EU did in Libya Crisis was 
almost exactly the same as that in the Darfur Crisis.  
 
Although the EU’s reaction to the Libya Crisis was slow as usual, taking almost one 
month to pull together an emergency meeting after the breakout of the crisis, its 
stance was clear in supporting the rebels to overthrow the Gaddafi’s dictatorship. It is 
well known that the EU had promoted norms like democracy and human rights over 
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decades, and such norms were inscribed in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy 
concerning the relationship with the MENA countries. Therefore, as the Arab Spring 
was framed as the new wave of democratization, and the Gaddafi’s cruel oppression 
seriously violated the human rights, the EU was obligated to stand by rebels. More 
than one official of the EU admitted that for historical reasons the EU and Member 
States could not against the revolution and had to support the Libyan people, 
especially if the crisis was reported by the media and became a public concern.149In 
this respect, the EU’s discourses on Libya Crisis, no matter from the EEAS, European 
Commission, European Council or European Parliament, were generally consistent 
with its principles and norms. In particular, the EU officials emphasized the human 
security concept and R2P doctrine as the Union’s primary motive for action in this 
crisis as some analysts observed in Brussels (Gottwald 2012). However, the gap 
between its rhetoric and actions was still wide, notably concerning the military action, 
which will be addressed in the following section.  
 
Table 11  The EU’s calculations regarding the civilian intervention in Libya 
Policy options Benefits Costs 
Neutral political 
involvement   
Avoiding annoying Gaddafi 
regime 
Breaking its principles; 
Drawing International and 
domestic criticism 
Supporting rebels over 
Gaddafi regime through 
diplomacy and sanction 
Upholding the principles, 
increasing the EU’s prestige; 
Pleasing the NTC to ensure 
their future cooperation. 
Annoying Gaddafi regime 
and damage their 
cooperation if Gaddafi won 
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(II) Military Intervention 
Faced with the continued deterioration in Libya, the international community began 
to discuss the possibility of the military intervention in February. Gaddafi had 
explicitly made a threat of mass atrocities against the civilians, and the force loyal to 
him was overwhelming the rebel force by the air strike and heavy weapons. However, 
the international response to the plan for military intervention was lukewarm. No 
unanimity reached for the use of force within NATO at the beginning of March (Hope 
2011). The division also existed within the great powers as exposed in the G8 foreign 
ministers meeting on 14-15 of March. The meeting’s conclusions agreed to increase 
the pressure on the Gaddafi regime, but made no reference to a no-fly zone 
following the Arab League's backing on it and the request of Libyan revolutionary 
National Council. British and French proposals of no-fly zone were opposed by 
Germany and Russia, while the U.S was not interested in taking the leadership to 
intervene in another Muslim country. 
 
A reluctant international census dealing with Libya Crisis was reached in UN Security 
Council on 17 March. Resolution 1973 drafted by the UK, France, U.S and Lebanon 
was passed with notable 5 abstentions. The controversy was that the resolution 
foresaw military action in particular in the paragraphs 4 and 8 by authorizing UN 
member states “to take all necessary measures” short of the foreign occupation to 
protect Libyan civilians. Germany stood with BRICS countries, emphasizing the great 
risks of the no-fly zone and military intervention.150Russia and Brazil believed the 
resolution had transcended the initial concept and call of the Arab League, opening 
the door for large scale military intervention which might cause large scale loss of life. 
India complained the intensified financial sanction, asserting it would affect regular 
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investment and trade activities and thus mitigate the situation of the Libyan people.  
  
Two days after the authorization, three military operations respectively led by France, 
the UK and U.S began. Later the multinational interventions were gradually 
integrated into the NATO-command operation Unified Protector started on 23 March. 
The initial coalition of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Qatar, Spain, 
the UK and the U.S also expanded to seventeen states. While several allies only made 
symbolic gestures, the U.S, the UK and France contributed the majority of military 
actions. Ironically, Sudan, just faced international intervention for the protection of 
the Darfur people, also provided considerable military, logistical, intelligence 
assistance to the Libyan rebels. 151 The assistance from the foreign military 
intervention, including the no-fly zone, missile strike and naval blockade was vital for 
the rebel to defeat Gaddafi’s force. However, the military intervention was clearly a 
tool for regime change rather than civilian protection. The UN estimates 1,000-2,000 
people died before the intervention, while during the following eight month civil war, 
estimates of the death toll range from 10,000-50,000 (Milne 2011). Although the 
air-strike did not cause more civilian casualties, it undoubtedly failed to stop the 
increase of civilian causalities in the Civil War.152 
 
The division of EU in launching a military operation 
On the basis of the principles and values they agreed at the Union level and promised 
in domestic and international stages, the EU and members were able to reach an 
agreement on the public diplomatic interference in Libya that Muammar Gaddafi 
must step down. However, they soon divided on how to quicken the process in 
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particular whether by using military means. Finally, the plan of enforcing a military 
intervention Libya failed within the EU, largely due to the divergent domestic political 
considerations among the key Member States. After all, any robust action at ground 
level is contingent on the situation, rather than the institution. This section will 
analyse why the EU failed to conduct a military operation in Libya, focusing on the 
calculations of key Member States and the discussion within the EU.  
 
France, and the UK to a certain extent, took a leadership role in the military 
intervention in Libya. Paris’ previous inactive responses toward revolutions of Tunisia 
and Egypt, and the close personal relations between French politicians and Middle 
East dictators were well criticized at home. It was widely believed that the Sarkozy 
administration perceived the Libyan uprising as an opportunity to compensate the 
insignificance of its foreign policy in Tunisia and Egypt (Echagüe, Michou & Mikail 
2011:333, Henry 2012: 412). Therefore, the key motivation of Sarkozy for leading an 
intervention in Libya was to please domestic audiences and boost French 
international reputation, by demonstrating his determined commitment to human 
rights protection and democracy. The similar rationales also applied to the UK. As the 
anti-Gaddafi protests prevailed in the West, ‘the UK could not stand by as Gaddafi 
slaughtered his people’. 153  Otherwise, the prestige of him and the British 
government would be affected. Besides, the big 2 in terms of military power in 
Europe were encouraged by U.S for the burden-sharing. 
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Table 12  France and UK’s motivations for the military intervention in Libya 
Motivations France United Kingdom 
Security Concerns Restoring and strengthening the cooperation with Libya 
on energy, immigration and anti-terrorism  
Economic Rewards Less clear Less clear 
Domestic and 
International 
considerations 
 
Upholding its principles 
pleasing the electorates 
Increasing its prestige 
Leadership in the EU 
Upholding its principles 
Increasing its prestige 
Sharing the burden of U.S 
 
Whether France and U.K were motivated by their pursuits of material interests, such 
as security concerns and economic self-interests? Let us address each in turn. First, 
security concerns were necessary for the military intervention. The instability in Libya 
was directly affecting the two countries and the EU by risking their anti-terrorism, 
immigration control and energy supply. Therefore, according to the Anglo-Franco 
causal belief, military intervention was designed to quickly end the Libyan turmoil 
which had the potential to threaten their security. Secondly, in contrast to the 
widely-cited account of oil-driven intervention, there was no clear-cut pressing 
commercial reason for France and the UK to have the military adventure. Certainly, 
by helping the rebels to defeat Gaddafi, foreign military interveners could establish 
better relations with the new Libyan authority. However, this was hardly their main 
incentive to intervene as the potential economic benefits were minor and 
uncertain.154 The consequence also proved it. After their military intervention, 
France, U.K and U.S did not get oil rewards from the new Libyan authority, as the 
figure bellow corroborates.  
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Figure 5  Libya’s oil exports by destinations before and after the 2011 intervention  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Global Trade Atlas 
 
At the beginning, even France and the UK did not synchronize their moves 
concerning the rapidly changing situation and details of military operation. The idea 
of no-fly zone was first proposed by France and discussed in the Council of the 
European Union on 23 February. President Sarkozy went further than any other 
counterparts in Europe in calling for a military action. But the proposal did not 
receive positive responses from other Member States. The UK was unwilling to adopt 
a belligerent no-fly zone at that point, which might antagonize the Gaddafi’s regime 
and thus risk British and the EU citizens who were not completely evacuated from 
Libya yet. Besides, the UK was concerned that an early military intervention could 
break the international consensus if China and Russia veto it in UN Security Council 
(Watt and Wintour 2011). One week later when the repatriation work was done,155 
the Prime Minister Cameron became more interested in a no-fly zone. Then it was 
the French turn to discourage the plan, claiming that the no-fly zone was not a 
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priority, but humanitarian aid was.156 
 
The Anglo-French consensus dealing with Libya was not reached until 9 March, when 
David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy wrote a joint letter to Herman Van Rompuy and 
copied to their European counterparts before the extraordinary European Council on 
Libya Crisis. The letter included the suggestion of a non-fly zone or other necessary 
options to halt Gaddafi’s violence against civilians.157 However, other Member States 
led by German Chancellor Angel Merkel and EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton blocked the proposal for a non-fly zone in the emergency EU summit. Instead, 
Member States requested to examine all necessary options, provided that there was 
a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region.158In other 
word, even Gaddafi regime was proved guilty of attack civilians with brutal force and 
that deserved a counter-strike, any military intervention under the EU flag must be 
authorized by the UN Security Council, and supported by the African Union and the 
Arab League. Moreover, the NATO also regarded the three principles as the guideline 
for any NATO operation.159  
 
With regard to the regional support, two regional organizations differed over the 
no-fly zone. In the emergency talks in Cairo on 12 March, the Arab League officially 
requested the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone against any military action 
against the Libyan people.160 This was in contrast to the position of the African 
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Union, of which Libya was a founder and Gaddafi was a chairperson from February 
2009 to January 2010. The AU did not support a no-fly zone over Libya, but 
attempted to mediate the conflict by urging restraints on both sides. However, the 
division within the AU on the Gaddafi regime hindered the AU from presenting a 
united stance, plus the AU’s lack of public diplomacy, its peace initiative (the AU 
Roadmap) was omitted by the world community (de Waal 2013).  
 
As the Resolution 1973 was passed, Catherine Ashton161and Herman Van Rompuy162 
declared the three conditions set out by the European Council were satisfied. 
Nevertheless, the EEAS and other EU institutions remained virtually absent from the 
international military intervention mainly due to the rift between France, the UK and 
particularly Germany. Berlin’s overt abstention in the UN and persistent opposition in 
the EU against military intervention in Libya was another symbol of the incoherence 
of the European foreign policy. According to the justification from the German 
foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, Germany championed the values of freedom 
and democracy and principles of international law, thus confirmed that dictator 
Gaddafi committed to humanitarian crimes must step down. However, German 
government believed that the best international intervention was tightening the 
sanctions against the regime, rather than the military action which “risking the lives 
of our soldiers”.163 The vast majority of Member States supported the idea of 
Germany and doubted the effect of military intervention in Libya, as well as the 
hidden agenda of France and UK.164 
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Besides the prudence of the use of military force, the result of Berlin’s cost-benefit 
calculation did not support the military intervention. Concerning the geopolitics, 
Germany was less anxious to the need for intervention in the South Mediterranean 
area which is regarded as France and UK’s sphere of influence.165 Germany and the 
eastern Member States are relatively more concerning the situation in the eastern 
borders like the Crisis in Ukraine. Meanwhile, According to the Athens Mechanism, 
Germany would pay the most for ‘common costs’ (about 10% of the overall mission 
cost) under the GDP scale, therefore Berlin has become increasingly sensitive to the 
costs of missions in areas it does not consider political priorities (Menon 2011:10).  
 
The upcoming elections in France and Germany intensified their divergences on the 
military intervention. Assuming that the democratic European governments are not 
immune to public opinions in their foreign policy makings, the elections would make 
the statesman even more sensitive in the decisions on the particular foreign affair 
which had drawn great publicity during the election campaign. In France, a decisive 
military intervention leading by Sarkozy was regarded as increasing his chances to 
win the presidential election in 2012 (Chrisafis 2011), because the French strategic 
culture goes beyond the civilian power, thus Paris could conduct a military 
intervention without strong domestic criticism. On the contrary, Merkel 
government’s decision on military intervention was restricted by German public 
opinions just 10 days before the federal state elections. For historical reasons, the 
post-war German public opinion is reluctant to the use of force. More than half of 
German polled respondents did not regard military intervention in Libya as a feasible 
option or the best solution to the problem (Rousseau 2011). Considering the financial 
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contribution to the EU military operation, as the German people ‘want their money 
back’ in the context of Euro Crisis, thus was naturally unwilling to sponsor another 
remote European military adventure led by the UK and France (Renard 2011).  
 
Table 13 Germany and other MS’ reasons for the objection of military intervention 
Reasons Germany Most Member States 
General idea of using force Unwilling to use force for 
historical reasons 
Less permissible than 
France and U.K 
Calculation of the 
consequence  
Sensitive to the casualty risks of their soldiers; 
Doubting the effect of air-strikes on the ground 
Geopolitical concerns Less concern in Libya Less concern in Libya 
(except the southern MS) 
Financial concerns Unwilling to cover the 
common costs 
To a less extent 
Election consideration Intensifying the resistance Less clear 
 
Therefore, any military CSDP mission required the unanimous accord of all Member 
States, was difficult to pass within the EU. A concept of ‘military-humanitarian 
mission’ was put on the table on 12 March. Member States generally accepted the 
idea of the plan while Sweden was persisting (Pop 2011). Sweden was in charge of 
the EU’s Nordic Battlegroup (one of the two Battlegroups on the standby at that 
time), which could be deployed in Libya (Bloching 2011). The only EU military 
intervention plan was finally proposed on 1 April and Italy was given the main 
responsibility for organizing the operation.166The EUFOR Libya, a 1,000 troop EU 
operation in support of the UN humanitarian assistance in particular to bring aid to 
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the besieged city of Misrata, was ready to deploy, but required the call of the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). However, the UN was 
not enthusiastic about the offer from the EU and only considered it as the last resort. 
The UN humanitarian chief Valerie Amos said they were able to boost assistance 
through civilian measures at the moment, claiming that the lines between 
humanitarian and military operations should not get blurred.167 
 
Following the formal abortion of EUFOR Libya on 10 November, the EU’s intervention 
in the 2011 Libya Crisis was limited to the civilian means: issuing declarations, 
implementing sanctions and providing humanitarian assistance. In fact, the EU’s 
reluctance or impotence to apply military capabilities in crisis intervention has been 
clearly demonstrated in its pre-existing CSDP missions, most of which were discrete 
civilian measures. First, Member States still dominate the EU military policies by 
making all important decisions on the basis of unanimity after the Lisbon Treaty. The 
Union has to stand on the sidelines when leading Member States disagreed on 
military actions. Second, even the EU institutions could not speak with one voice 
regarding the military intervention. For example, HR Ashton was blamed in European 
Parliament as contradicting President Van Rompuy, who had ‘made it clear’ that the 
aim of the military intervention was ‘regime change’(Banks 2011). The creation of 
EEAS had not changed the inter-institutional squabbling significantly, for the lack of 
its expertise in crisis management and the coordination with the Commission and the 
Council (Koenig 2011:8-9). While Member States like France might pursue the 
reputation of ‘norm carrier’ or ‘value defender’ through military means, the 
principles did not motivate the Union and most of Member States to adopt military 
intervention in Libya. 
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China tolerated, but soon against the military intervention 
Beijing’s position on the military intervention was unclear as its ambiguous 
abstentions on Resolution 1973 in the Security Council. On the one hand, China’s 
abstention was viewed by numerous observers as a significant move further away 
from its longstanding principle of non-interference (see Zambelis 2011). In the past 
20 years, China had not approved of any forcible interventions in the Security Council 
without the consent of the target state, unless the state invaded another country like 
the 1990 Gulf War. Instead, China had used twice (on Zimbabwe and Burma) and 
more frequently threatened to use its veto power to dilute Security Council 
interventions for human rights violations alone. But this time Beijing did not block 
the Resolution 1973 which was solely justified in humanitarian terms. On the other, 
Beijing denied any major alteration of its position on intervention. China reiterated 
that its long-standing respect for the principles enshrined in the UN Charter such as 
the sovereignty and the non-use of force. Chinese representative Li Baodong said it 
was the firm position of the Arab League on the no-fly zone had made China to 
reconsider the special circumstances and opted to abstain in the end.168 Beijing’s 
explanation was largely believable. In other word, China perceived the case of Libya 
as an exception, rather than setting a precedent for military practice of R2P.  
 
For Beijing, the abstention on Resolution 1973 was a middle course—avoiding being 
isolated while sending a message of disapproval. Unlike the long-term civil conflicts 
in Sudan, Zimbabwe or Burma, the Libyan civil war suddenly flared up and was 
deteriorating rapidly. In March the pro-Gaddafi force won a series of victories and 
was marching to Benghazi. The rebel force was teetering on the brink of defeat 
                                                             
168 UN Security Council, S/PV.6498, 17 March 2011 
186 
 
without any foreign military backup. Therefore, there was a growing demand within 
the Security Council for enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya, in particular from some 
Arabic and African states which also had strong economic ties with China. The 
intense pressures during a short period of time left little time for Beijing to bargain 
but follow the mainstream. China finally compromised after some consultations with 
these traditional South-South allies, in order to avoid being isolated in the UN 
Security Council.169 After all, Beijing had no reason to risk for saving the Gaddafi 
regime which was hardly China’s friend. The relations between Beijing and Libya had 
often been awkward. For instance, in 2009 the Libyan foreign minister Musa Kusa 
once criticized some aspects of China’s increasing presence in Africa as invasion and 
colonialism.170Besides, The Gaddafi regime had a close relationship with Taipei that 
surely annoyed Beijing.  
 
China’s initial attitude to the no-fly zone and some clauses in the draft resolution was 
highly reluctant. As the ambassador Li Baodong said, “China has serious difficulty 
with part of the resolution.”171 There are three key reasons that explain China’s 
reluctance. First, to be consistent with its long alleged principle of non-interference, 
China usually questions military intervention against the will of the acting 
government of a sovereign state. Secondly, due to its strong preference to the 
domestic political stability, Beijing was unwilling to support the Libyan rebel. Thirdly, 
China refused to take sides because its economic interests in Libya might be 
threatened by supporting the wrong side. Steering a neutral course could be a more 
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pragmatic option toward the Libya Crisis when the final outcome was uncertain. 
Therefore, Beijing followed the customary practice to apply the principle of 
non-interference. China talked about the respect of sovereignty and no use of force, 
finally abstained from voting in UN Security Council as usual. 
  
Comparing to its dubious attitude to the rebels, Beijing unequivocally opposed the 
Western military intervention by undercutting its legitimacy and result. China’s 
diplomatic criticism was intensified during the course of the NATO campaign. When 
the airstrike started Beijing said that the future of Libya should be determined by the 
Libyan people in a peaceful way rather by the forcible foreign intervention. The 
foreign ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu pointed out the aim of Resolution 1973 was 
protecting civilians, whereas the ongoing military intervention was causing civilian 
casualties.172 When asked whether China’s criticism of the airstrike was inconsistent 
with China’s abstention on Resolution 1973, again Jiang Yu justified China’s 
abstention as a combination of the consideration of regional organizations and the 
reservation on the use of force.173 China’s condemnation of NATO’s misusing the UN 
mandate was clearly declared on 30 March when President Hu Jintao met Nicolas 
Sarkozy in Beijing. Hu Jintao cautioned that the military operation would violate the 
original intention of the UN resolution if it results a bigger humanitarian disaster.174 
 
China’s criticism of Western military intervention was even harsher in its domestic 
media reports, directly questioning the sincerity of Western intentions. An article in 
People’s Daily directly condemned the NATO’s airstrike was using ‘humanitarianism’ 
                                                             
172 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regular news conference, 22 March 2011, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t808563.shtml 
173 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regular news conference, 29 March 2011, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t810580.shtml 
174 China’s State Council, President Hu Jintao met French President Sarkozy in Great hall of 
the people, 30 March 2011, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2011-03/30/content_1834930.htm 
188 
 
as a disguise (Tang 2011). The author, an analyst from the Chinese official think tank 
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), was claiming that 
the international ethic was usually an excuse for the Western intervention which 
aimed at pursuing their own economic interests (in particular oil) or political interests 
(regime change). When the military intervention came to the end in August and the 
outcome was certain, another analyst from CICIR published his comment in People’s 
Daily, emphasized that the negative effect of the Libyan war overweighed the 
positive ones (Tian 2011). According to the author’s arguments, the greatest negative 
aspect of the war was that NATO’s air campaign might break the international law by 
overstepping the mandate of relevant UN resolutions.  
 
China’s complaint of the abuse of the resolution 1973 was echoed by Russia and the 
Africa Union. Beijing and Moscow found a consensus against NATO military operation. 
The Kremlin also had accused Britain, France and other NATO participants as going 
beyond the scope of the UN resolution 1973. In June Hu Jintao and Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev signed a joint declaration on global affairs, which called for all 
parties involved in the Libya Crisis do not “allow the wishful interpretation and 
expanded application” of the UN resolutions.175 More importantly, African leaders, 
who were playing an essential role in adopting the resolutions 1970 and 1973, 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the NATO’s military campaign. South Africa was 
one of three African members which co-sponsored and voted in favour of Resolution 
1973 in March of 2011, mainly considering the principle of R2P that had been 
adopted by the AU and the emergent need to protect civilians in Libya (Mckaiser 
2011). However, ten months later in the same hall president Zuma claimed that the 
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resolution was largely abused in some specific respects and the AU’s political effort 
was completely ignored in favour of bombing Libya by NATO forces.176  
 
Table 14  China’s calculations regarding the military intervention in Libya 
Policy options Benefits Costs 
Supporting the military 
intervention (Voting in 
favour Resolution 1973) 
Pleasing military 
interveners and Libyan 
rebels 
Breaking its principles; 
Drawing domestic criticism 
of compliance with the West 
Acquiescing  the military 
intervention with criticism 
(Abstaining Resolution 
1973) 
Avoiding being isolated 
or taking sides, while 
maintaining its principles 
Annoying interveners and 
rebels to a less extent  
Obstructing the military 
intervention (Vetoing 
Resolution 1973) 
Pleasing the Gaddafi 
regime 
Drawing fierce criticism 
Being isolated from the 
international society 
 
Now we can clearly see China was never a proponent of the military intervention in 
Libya, in particular a NATO-led operation. China’s abstention on Resolution 1973 was 
only a reluctant compromise, mainly the outcome of an ad hoc coordination with 
regional developing countries. In fact, Beijing had the full knowledge that the 
resolution containing the phrase of ‘all necessary means’ might be a pretext for 
regime change achieved by a partial Western military intervention. This was clearly 
against the principle of non-interference and China’s political preference, thus China 
would not go so far as to vote in favour of such a resolution. But besides that, China 
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had no geopolitical or economic motivations to save Gaddafi regime by a veto, which 
would undermine China’s reputation in international community and risk Beijing’s 
relations with Africa and Arab world. China, like other major actors in the world, did 
not have a purely ideational foreign policy.   
 
(III) Political Recognition of the NTC Libya and the aftermath  
The EU embraced the NTC  
The link between the Libyan new authority and the EU was forged step by step. 
France recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative of Libya in March, which 
was criticized by the spokesman of the EU foreign affairs chief as ‘the unilateral rush 
into recognizing groups’.177 The EU opened a liaison office in Benghazi on 22 May. 
Catherine Ashton called the move as “the EU putting words into action”, by 
supporting the Libyan people and the process of democratization led by the NTC.178 
Along with the Arab League and NATO, the EU was a participant of the Libya Contact 
Group, an ad hoc international collective formed in March. In the fourth meeting of 
the Libya Contact Group in July, the participants agreed to deal with the NTC as the 
legitimate governing authority in Libya, henceforth and until an interim authority is in 
place.179 Then the EU officially acknowledged the essential role and responsibilities 
of the NTC as a representative of the aspirations of the Libyan people, including for 
the transition process, and readied to provide financial assistance for the NTC and 
resumed the exports.180 In November, Catherine Ashton visited Tripoli to inaugurate 
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the new Delegation of the European Union in Libya, after the NTC declared the 
liberation of the country. 
 
As the rebels gradually took the power of Libya, the end of deposed Muammar 
Gaddafi became an international concern. The case of Libya was referred to the ICC 
by UNSC Resolution 1970, largely due to the strong political lobbying and outreach 
efforts of the EU Member States (Kreissl-Dorfler 2011: 17). On June 27, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrested warrant for 
Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam, and his military intelligence chief Abdullah Senuss on 
charges of crimes against humanity. Gaddafi was the second sitting head of state 
under the indictment of ICC, after the Sudanese president Al-Bashir. Notably, the AU 
refused to cooperate with the ICC warrant, arguing this warrant dispelled the option 
of Gaddafi’s being in exile peacefully, but also complaining that ICC 
disproportionately concentrated its actions against African leaders. On July 18, the 
EU called the international community for more cooperation with the ICC on the 
arrest warrant, after a meeting of EU foreign ministers.181 After Muammar Gaddafi 
was killed by the rebel fighters on 20 October, the EU urged the NTC to cooperate 
with ICC on the captured Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam. The case of Libya proved again 
that the EU has been a principled supporter of the ICC, no matter whether the ICC’s 
indictment is helpful in practice or accepted by other actors.  
 
The West was overoptimistic about the consequences of the regime change, as the 
replacement of the Gaddafi regime did not better the situation in Libya, as well as 
the EU’s security or economic interests at least in a short-term. After Gaddafi’s 
dictatorship Libya has stepped into chaos rather than peace and prosperity. The 
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country faces a series of serious challenges in the process of reconstruction such as 
economic decline, border control and democratic transitions. Meanwhile, many 
political actors in Libya have further complicated the situation. The chaotic situation 
in Libya thus has been a great matter of concern of the EU, as southern Member 
States in particular Italy and Malta are potentially threatened by the Libyan 
illegitimate immigrants and uncontrolled arms trafficking. The situation became 
pressing when the conflict escalated in northern Mali which may trigger new flows of 
refugees and the return of fighters into Libya (Hatzigeorgopoulos and 
Fara-Andrianarijaona 2013:11). In order to assist the Libyan authorities to improve 
their border management, the EU launched a civilian CSDP mission EUBAM Libya on 
22 May 2013. In 2014, the widespread conflicts in Libya further proved the failure of 
the 2011 military intervention.  
 
Beijing’s belated recognition  
As the Libyan rebels taking over Tripoli with the NATO’s air cover in August, the 
outcome of the Libyan civil war became clear, the Gaddafi regime collapsed. China 
would deal with the NTC in the future, in particular regarding China’s unfinished 
projects in Libya and the country’s potential reconstruction contracts in future. In fact, 
Beijing had already made tentative attempts to contact the rebels since June. China's 
Ambassador to Qatar, Zhang Zhiliang, met with the NTC Chairman Mustafa Abdel Jalil 
in Doha on June 2. Li Lianhe, a Chinese diplomat in Egypt, visited the rebels’ 
headquarters in Benghazi, where he met with Jalil and inspected the humanitarian 
situation and Chinese properties. When Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi met 
Mahmoud Jibril in Beijing, China recognized the NTC as a rowing important political 
force in Libya and an ‘important interlocutor’.182 
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Nevertheless, due to Beijing’s ambiguous attitude to Gaddafi regime, and its 
reluctance to support rebels during the civil war, China was under the risk of being 
excluded in the Libya post-war reconstructions. The rebels stated that they would 
remember their friends and foes, and negotiate deals accordingly. Abdeljalil Mayouf, 
the information manager at Libyan rebel oil firm AGOCO, threatened on August, “But 
we may have some political issues with Russia, China and Brazil.”183On 12 September, 
China became the last permanent member of UNSC to recognize the NTC, while 
other significant economic stakeholders in Libya such as France and Italy had 
recognized rebels months ago. Worse still, a rumour said that China continued to sell 
arms to the Gaddafi regime until as late as July and thus broken the UN arms 
embargo.184 Beijing denied the accusation, but admitted that state-owned weapon 
manufacturers met Gaddafi’s envoy in Beijing in July without the knowledge of the 
government.185  
 
By contrast, Chinese analysts did not worry about China’s business prospect in 
post-war Libya. Yin Gang, an Arab world expert at the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), doubted whether the warning from a middle-ranking official of the 
rebel camp (Abdeljalil Mayouf) represented the official position of the TNC, “They 
would not dare change any contracts”.186Regarding potential reconstruction contracts, 
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Chinese analysts believed that China would have greater opportunities, because 
Chinese companies’ business in Libya had mainly been in the areas of infrastructure, 
in which China's cheaper labour and comprehensive experiences make it more 
competitive than the Western companies in a fair tendering (Jian 2011). The fact 
proved the new Libyan authority did not exclude Chinese companies from the 
reconstruction but offer new contracts. In May 2013 China State Construction 
Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) signed an agreement in Benghazi to resume work 
on 20,000 housing units in the Gwarsha and Khadra districts of the city (Fornaji 2013). 
Nevertheless, the Chinese companies still faces serious challenges in the return of 
Libya. By 2013, thousands of apartments being built by Chinese companies remain 
incomplete throughout Libya as the situation deteriorated again.  
 
(III) Conclusion 
Assessing the role of principles and values with respect the EU and China’s 
engagement in the 2011 Libyan Civil War is like an exercise in counterfactuals. What 
would China and the EU do in Libya if they never adopted such distinct principles and 
embedded them in their institutions? This chapter discussed the possible factors may 
influence the EU and China’s policies in Libya, including their security considerations, 
economic self-interests and guiding principles. Without precluding the impact of 
security and economic concerns, my findings suggest that the EU and China would 
act differently without their principles.  
 
The EU’s material interests in Libya include security (E.g. Immigration and 
anti-terrorist) and economic interests (E.g. Energy and trade). The pre-existing 
EU-Libya cooperation proved that the EU could pursue the above interest either with 
the Gaddafi regime or with NTC. Therefore, the motivation for protecting material 
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interests did not necessarily lead to an interventionist policy of pro-Gaddafi (Scenario 
I: Gaddafi held on to power in Libya) or against Gaddafi (Scenario II: the rebels seized 
the power). What would jeopardize the material interests of the EU was the 
long-lasting chaos in Libya (Scenario III). As a trade partner of Libya, China shared the 
similar rationale with the EU at least considering the economic interests. While 
attempting to mediate the Libyan civil war to avoid the chaotic Scenario III, Beijing 
was really neutral between the Scenario I and Scenario II thus led to a policy of 
non-intervention in Libya Crisis.  
 
It was more likely that normative considerations led to the EU’s preference for rebels 
and Scenario II. During the crisis, the rhetoric of the EU and Member States were 
clearly prioritized the principles of R2P, human security and supporting democracy. 
Though some Member States like Italy had a closer bilateral economic/political tie 
with the Gaddafi regime, they had little room to adopt a hands-off attitude to 
Gaddafi’s suppression (as Berlusconi attempted to do at the beginning). Comparing 
to the EU’s day-to-day cooperation with the Gaddafi regime before, the Libyan 
uprising and oppressing was attracting more attention from abroad and at home as a 
situation of ‘R2P’. Therefore, it increased the public pressures on the EU and national 
governments to stick to their alleged principles, even the principles were not 
completely compatible with their interests. In this respect, the institutional ideas had 
influenced the EU’s behaviour in Libya Crisis by setting the baseline of policy options, 
in particular when the EU’s policy-making became a focus of international and 
domestic society. Moreover, the principle served as the focal point to unite the 
Member States which have divergent material interests. The overt betrayal of the 
principles of the Union would be very costly in the multilateral body. 
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However, the commitment to principles was not the only thing that the EU and 
Member States need to consider regarding the options of intervention. The EU’s 
response to Libya Crisis could be divided into two parts: civilian and military, in which 
the influence of principles differed significantly. Principles such as R2P were able to 
mobilize the EU to adopt an interventionist posture (albeit unevenly) and economic 
restrictive measures, but inadequate to compel a military operation alone. The Union 
itself lacks the commanding resources and instruments, rather than principles, to 
implement military operations and has to rely on Member States in particular the Big 
3. However, Paris, London and Berlin did not act in concert this time. Concerning its 
potential financial and human resource burdens, Germany did not approve of the 
military intervention in Libya. In the end, France and the UK, which faced less 
resistance to conduct military operations, collaborated through the NATO framework 
with the assistance of U.S.  
 
The less influence of principles in military intervention reflected the clear boundary 
between the domain of ‘low politics’ and ‘high politics’ such as security and defence 
where vital national interests are deeply concerned. First, the policy-makers always 
need to make careful assessment of the risks entailed in the military intervention. 
Even though France and the UK were more willing to use force, they selected air 
strike to avoid the high material costs and causality risks of committing ground forces. 
Secondly, geopolitical calculations are also crucial for the selection of military 
intervention, while France, the UK and Germany did not perceive the strategic 
significance of Libya and the broader North Africa to the same level. Thirdly, 
domestic public opinions on military operations, and certain doctrines about the use 
of force should be taken into account by policymakers particularly before elections. 
After all, the CFSP and CSDP are still based on the intergovernmental approach, in 
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which national governments could always endorse their national interests and 
political willingness within the broader system.  
 
The remote Libyan civil war caught Chinese attention by bringing Chinese companies 
a great amount of loss and threatening the safety of Chinese workers, which became 
the specific economic and security concerns of the Chinese government in this 
country. In the absence of strong domestic concerns of human rights and democracy, 
Beijing could choose a pragmatic approach to protect its interests—sitting on the 
fence, hedging their bets until the winner was settled—without clear cost of 
government prestige. This is also China’s usual pattern of dealing with the foreign 
domestic crisis, which is legitimized by its long-standing principle of non-interference 
and commitment to state sovereignty.  
 
However, Beijing’s traditional approach of non-interference of domestic affairs has 
problems. The principle is nearly equal to a de facto support for teetering 
authoritarian regimes, which reduces China’s flexibility in the crisis management and 
has a potential negative impact on the post-crisis bargain (Sotloff, 2012). In the case 
of Libya Crisis, although China’s attachment to the principle was not rigid and kept in 
touch with the rebels, Beijing’s embarrassing position in post-war Libya was regarded 
as evidence that sometimes the strategy of non-interferences could not secure its 
burgeoning economic interests in politically volatile regions (Erian 2012). Therefore, 
it is believed that some Chinese state-owned firms, such as oil companies and China 
Development Bank, have served as the new interest groups to prompt Beijing to 
modify the principle of non-interference to give more space for transnational 
activities (Downs 2011).  
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Although the principle of non-interference had restricted Beijing’s policy options, 
China will not formally abandon this principle in the near future, as long as Beijing 
still strongly against the Western military intervention in the third world. During the 
Libyan civil war, China repeatedly emphasized that Libya's future should be freely 
determined by the Libyan people. This implied that China would be willing to 
recognize the Libyan rebels if it defeats Gaddafi’s force on its own. However, the 
Anglo-French campaign and the U.S lead from the behind, which exceeding the 
authorization of UN Security Council resolution, had totally changed the nature of 
the Libyan uprising and the course of the civil war. This kind of action has been 
delegitimized by Beijing’s narratives and thus Chinese public opinion as ‘Western 
Imperialism” since the 1950s. Moreover, the realist section of Chinese analysts 
generally speculates on the Western plots and the domino effect of military 
intervention – After the West achieved the regime changes in North Africa and 
Middle East, they might attempt to intervene in Iran or Central Asia, which would 
further risk China’s energy security the stability of Western China. No matter whether 
the realist analysis is correct, it further toughened Beijing’s anti-intervention position. 
For instance, China was obviously more sticking to its traditional sovereigntist 
posture in the following crisis in Syria. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications 
 
To answer empirically my research questions and test relevant working hypothesis, 
the dissertation makes a Small-N design based on the two matching cases. The 
principal interest guiding the case study is neither the causes of domestic crises, nor 
the reasons for the success or failure of the intervention. Rather, my main objective is 
to explain the motivation of international actors to intervene in a crisis in a particular 
way. In this regard, Darfur and Libya are good cases, including China’s prevention and 
permission in intervention, the EU’s consensus and division on intervention, as varied 
dependent variables. Yet there are also differences between the two cases. 
Comparing the roles of the EU and China in the two crises, China was a more crucial 
actor in Sudan where it has outstanding economic interests, while the EU and several 
member states has played more significant roles in Libya due to the geographical 
proximity and historical links. Nevertheless, despite of their different levels of 
concerns in different cases, the lack of broad consensus among great powers is the 
most important phenomenon in the age of intervention. Although an element of 
security and economic concerns no doubt has played a part in this outcome, this 
dissertation argues that normative elements must be taken into account in explaining 
why the policies the EU and China adopted were usually different from each other 
while respectively consistent.  
 
The two case studies are motivated by three empirical anomalies in the conventional 
realist explanation, that intervention or non-intervention policies were solely driven 
by material factors, i.e. security and commerce. First is the active intervention policy 
in cases where there was no clear national economic interest or security concern. In 
this situation, the intervention could not increase interveners’ revenues or security 
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and the inaction would not endanger their economy or security. For example, the 
EU’s intervention in Darfur Crisis was hardly involved with pressing economic 
motivations or direct security threats. A second anomaly is that, although interveners’ 
security or commercial interests were at stake in certain crises, their non-neutral 
intervention would not necessarily better their security situation or secure their 
commercial interests. The France-U.K led military intervention in Libya, as well as the 
EU’s support to rebels over Gaddafi, were such an intervention. A third anomaly 
emerges when we turn to the non-intervention policy and ask why certain countries 
are always sceptical of the international intervention, no matter whether its material 
interests were at stake in that case. In spite of its economic interests and political 
links varied in Sudan and Libya, China’s positions on the two international 
interventions were similar.  
 
The conclusion chapter proceeds as follows: First, I draw conclusions from empirical 
case studies, to answer the main research question about how the ideational factors 
influenced the EU and China’s policymaking in crisis intervention. Secondly, I discuss 
the feasibility and legitimacy of current doctrines of international intervention, and 
provide some policy suggestions to the EU and China with regard to their practices of 
crisis management. The dissertation concludes by revisiting the concept of the 
normative power and rethinking the international roles of the EU and China.  
  
(I) The conclusions of the analysis: respond to theories and hypotheses 
In the Chapter 5 and 6, my proposition is that these phenomena cannot be fully 
accounted for without taking into account the development of a normative support 
for humanitarian and pro-democracy intervention in the West, as well as the 
long-lasting normative aversion to the (Western-style) forcible intervention in China. 
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The first set of norms is essential to explain why the EU is generally active in crisis 
intervention since the 1990s. Without the strong norms of pro-intervention, a more 
realist choice for international actors was non-interference in a remote crisis, if the 
crisis did not endanger them; or, hedging their bets and avoid totally supporting one 
side over another during their intervention. The second norm is important to 
understand why China is usually refrained from supporting the international 
intervention against the wills of target governments, and always opposing the 
Western military intervention based on the humanitarian ground. Let us address 
each in turn in this section.  
 
The effects of pro-intervention ideas  
It is widely acknowledged today among decision makers and policy analysts that a set 
of ‘pro-intervention ideas’, mainly including the Responsibility to Protect (in Darfur 
and Libya) and democracy promotion (In Libya) exists in the Western societies and at 
the global level to a lesser extent. The ‘pro-intervention ideas’ refers to a de facto 
permission and promotion to the non-neutral/non-consensual intervention in 
humanitarian crises of foreign countries, and the constraint on the activities of 
preventing such an intervention. In the context of the intervention experience of the 
European Union, the dissertation summarizes the corresponding permissive, 
regulative and incentive effects of ‘pro-intervention ideas’. 
 
The primary permissive effect of the ‘pro-intervention idea’ is defining the boundary 
of acceptable and legitimate policies. For the EU, the oral support to the rebels who 
represented the people (diplomatic intervention), and imposing sanctions against the 
dictators committed to human rights violations (economic intervention) are safely 
within the boundary, while the military intervention without the consent of host 
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government is not sure. Going the other way, the ‘pro-intervention idea’ also exhibits 
several regulative effects, by defining a category of problematic policies, such as 
preventing diplomatic and economic intervention in a humanitarian crisis, and thus 
constraining the policy options of actors to a range that can be justified by the idea of 
human rights and democracy. The permissive and regulative effects of ideas together 
constitute the ‘logic of appropriateness’ in institutions, and essential for the 
formation of actors’ general positions on intervention.  
 
European policy-makers usually take the permissive and regulative effects of these 
ideas for granted—“We just do things like this for historical reasons” —probably due 
to the path-dependence. Here path dependence means that where they go next 
depends not only on where they are now, but also upon where they have been. After 
the experience of the Second World War and the Cold War, the ideas of protecting 
human rights and supporting democracy were embedded in the institutions of the 
EU, and the European political systems. In other word, the institutionalized principles 
of human rights and democracy, was one necessary precursor for the EU’s policy 
preference of pro-intervention, and that antecedent European political/social 
interaction was necessary for this institutionalized principle. That is why the EU’s 
general positions on the Darfur and Libya Crisis, as well as other crises beyond the 
content of the dissertation, were similar—to intervene, at least by civilian measures. 
By contrast, the ‘pro-intervention ideas’ had little permissive and regulative effects 
on China’s foreign policy makings, since China had different historical experience and 
such ideas are never embedded in the Chinese political system.   
 
The permissive and regulative effects of ideas also influence the EU’s choice of 
policies. As I discussed in Chapter 3, Member States were easier to achieve unanimity 
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on diplomatic condemnation and target sanctions. These policy options were 
legitimated and guided by the EU’s pertinent principles, such as the Basic Principles 
on the Use of Restrictive Measures. Although Member States’ supports to the 
interventionist position might be uneven due to their varied economic and security 
concerns in specific cases, they were refrained from violating the EU’s general 
positions, as required by the Treaty of Union. Meanwhile, coercive military 
intervention is less permissive in the EU and even constricted in certain Member 
States such as Germany, which sticks to a pacifist stance (Speck 2011). Member 
States obviously lack a common standard of right or wrong for the use of force. 
Launching a coercive military campaign in foreign countries is not a taboo in France 
and UK, whereas in Germany it is still largely problematic.  
  
Finally, the incentive effect of the ‘pro-intervention ideas’ relates to the ‘logic of 
consequence’. The ‘pro-intervention ideas’ could enter as a factor into the 
cost-benefit calculations of decision makers, through certain vehicles such as public 
opinions, election campaign and social movements. It would be surprising if a higher 
level of public concerns and media reports on a humanitarian crisis, had not 
contributed to a stronger incentive of governments to intervene, through increasing 
the potential benefits of domestic support and through raising the perceived prestige 
cost of inaction. Here the incentive effect of ideas serves as an exogenously given 
factor on the policymaking like other material factors, regardless whether the 
policy-makers deem the idea appropriate. Therefore, the incentive effect of 
pro-intervention ideas is not only applied to the EU, where democratic governments 
are penetrated by public opinions, but also act on China who needs to take the world 
opinion into account and protect its international image from global mass protests.   
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While permissive and regulative effects are longstanding in institutions, the incentive 
effect of pro-intervention ideas usually relies on the window of opportunity. First, the 
crisis must catch the attention of the international community and should be high on 
the agenda. Both the Darfur and Libya Crisis met this requirement. Secondly, 
potential interveners should be in a situation in which it was particularly 
advantageous to intervene or the inaction would be particularly risky at the time. Let 
us remind two examples. The positive incentive: Sarkozy’s election consideration in 
2007 and 2011 had contributed to the French leadership in the two military 
interventions in Darfur and Libya, as leading a robust intervention was supposed to 
increase the domestic support to the government. The negative incentive: The 
anti-Beijing Olympic campaigns during 2007-2008 had increased China’s potential 
prestige cost of inaction in Darfur, thus urged China to take a tougher stance to 
intervene in Sudan.  
 
Table 15  Three types of effects of the pro-intervention ideas 
Effects Definition Mechanism On the EU On China 
Permissive 
Effect 
Defining 
legitimate policies 
The Logic of 
appropriateness, 
Longstanding 
effect on 
institutions 
Formatting 
positions 
N/A 
Regulative 
(constraining)
Effect 
Defining 
problematic 
polices 
Restraining 
violations of 
MS 
N/A 
 
Incentive 
Effect 
Entering into the 
calculations as a 
factor of ‘cost and 
benefit’ 
Logic of 
Consequence, 
The window of 
opportunity 
Calculations 
of domestic 
supports and 
international 
prestige 
Calculations 
of 
international 
image 
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The effect of non-interferences ideas 
China presents the most interesting case of non-interference actors. Beijing has 
embraced the principle of non-interferences for 60 years. It usually abstained on 
proposals of intervention without clear invitations of target countries in the UNSC, 
and has seriously considered or threatened the use of veto to prevent 
non-consensual intervention. Correspondingly, a normative prohibition on 
interference in domestic affairs has developed in the Chinese political system since 
1950s, although its level of compliance with the prohibition varied in different 
periods as I discussed in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the special stigma attached to 
Western coercive intervention was re-emphasized by Beijing in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, especially after the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 
1999. Without this normative opprobrium, there would be less Chinese abstention 
and veto in multilateral fora.   
 
The non-interferences ideas, consisting of the principles of sovereignty, non-use of 
force and the preference of pro-status quo, have permissive and regulative effects on 
China’s policymaking. On the one hand, the non-interferences ideas delegitimize 
coercive forms of intervention against the will of the host government as 
unacceptable measures of conflict resolution. Due to the regulative effect of 
non-interferences ideas, Chinese policymakers clearly felt some inhibitions when 
consider the proposal of non-consensual intervention in the UN. For example, 
concerning the exceptional situation in Libya, China condoned the coercive 
intervention against Gaddafi, but Beijing could not vote in favour of the resolution 
1973 in UN Security Council. By contrast, for the EU and its Member States, the set of 
non-interference ideas was not a compelling reason to refrain from intervention. On 
the other, these ideas permit China’s non-intervention policy and even the 
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obstruction of international interventions. For instance, China’s opposition to 
coercive intervention against Sudan, the strong criticism of the NATO campaign in 
Libya, and notable vetoes on the UN draft resolutions of intervening Syria, were 
legitimized by the Chinese government as defending the international justice, 
sovereignty right of host countries and the UN Charter. I was impressed from 
interviews with Chinese officials and analysts that China’s oppositions were not only 
statements for public consumption or appeasing others’ views, but a genuine belief 
that “We think the Western-style interventions were wrong”, neither desirable 
concerning outcomes nor justifiable regarding procedures.  
  
The non-interferences ideas have incentive effects on China, by decreasing the 
Beijing’s incentive of supporting or leading a coercive intervention. On the domestic 
level, the public indifference to a remote humanitarian crisis, together with the 
widespread aversion to the Western-style intervention, presented a serious political 
obstacle. Ordinary Chinese people would not appreciate China’s contribution to the 
international intervention in humanitarian crisis. As regards the miserable situation in 
Darfur, there was rare domestic pressure on Beijing to intervene for humanitarian 
purposes. In the case of Libya, some Chinese nationalists even criticized Beijing’s 
abstention on Resolution 1973 for compromising its principles and giving in to 
Western demands. On the international level, as China prefers to speak on behalf of 
the developing countries, which traditionally loathe the foreign intervention against 
their wills. Therefore, China’s behaviour of supporting coercive interventions would 
raise the speculation about whether China was casting aside its long held 
non-interference principle, and undermine the very image that Beijing cherishes. We 
find that China’s polices on Sudan and Libya still conformed to its long-term policy 
with Africa and the broader Third World. It should be noted that the 
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non-interference ideas also have an incentive effect on the EU to a lesser extent. 
When seeking the international consensus on intervention in the UN, the EU and key 
Member States needed to take China and Russia’s adherences of non-interference 
into account.  
 
Table 16 Three types of effects of the non-intervention ideas  
Effects On China On the EU 
Permissive 
Effect 
Legitimating 
positions of 
non-intervention 
Permitting China’s 
opposition to 
intervention  
N/A 
Regulative 
(Constraining)
Effect 
Delegitimizing the 
option of coercive 
intervention 
Constraining China’s 
support to coercive 
intervention 
N/A 
Incentive 
Effect 
Concerning 
domestic 
abhorrence of 
interventions  
Maintaining China’s 
international image 
of the 
non-intervener 
Considering 
non-interference ideas 
when seeking 
international consensus  
 
To conclude, although there were multiple reasons for intervention or 
non-intervention, political and ideational factors may have been salient in two 
aspects. First, different principles and norms help the EU and China to define their 
general positions of through the logic of appropriateness. Both the EU and China had 
intrinsic policy preferences on international crisis intervention, due to their particular 
historical experiences and institutional cultures. Secondly, the incentive effect of 
ideas serves as an independent variable in the policy considerations. For the EU, 
perceived public desire to humanitarian intervention in Darfur and Libya made it 
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difficult to evaluate any policy option in a purely security and economic analysis. 
Meanwhile, Beijing needed to balance the negative domestic attitude to the 
intervention with the world opinion (especially from regional actors) of 
pro-intervention in Darfur and Libya.  
 
Finally, regarding the theoretical framework accounting for the policy-making of 
intervention, the prevalent realist explanation is important but incomplete. While 
realist arguments are inclined to exclude or marginalize ideational factors, my 
argument does not exclude material factors such as security concerns and economic 
interests. The ideational factor alone was usually insufficient to explain the forcible 
intervention like Unified Protector operation in Libya, since the EU Member States 
holding similar principles differed significantly about the military campaign. Instead, 
my research argues that a combination of causes, including the incentive effect of 
ideas and security concerns of the Libyan turmoil, were jointly sufficient for the use 
of force in the intervention. Therefore, any sufficient account must synthesize 
material and ideational factors in the decision analysis process. First, the ideational 
factor is essential in analysing the formation of their policy preferences, by drawing 
the legitimate boundary of their positions. Secondly, the ideational factor is 
consistent with the model of rational choice. To explain their final choice of specific 
policy options, we need to test at least three main hypotheses: security concerns, 
economic self-interests and prestige incentives at the domestic and international 
levels, although not necessarily or equally in every case of crisis intervention. 
  
My approach of analysis definitely has limitations. First, I incline to assume that we 
can easily distinguish between material and ideational factors. This may not always 
the case and sometimes problematic in itself. For instance, material factors such as 
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security concerns cannot be understood independently of the prevailing normative 
context. For example, France and the UK made the claim that a democratic Libyan 
authority would better secure the EU’s border than the Gaddafi dictatorship, thus 
conducting regime change in Libya could be explained by security reasons. However, 
this calculation actually reflected their particular causal belief that democracy would 
bring about peace, which was unfortunately not realized in Libya so far. This implies 
that ideational factors may have an indirect impact on the perception of security and 
economic interests. The EU and China obviously disagreed about whether the regime 
change would benefit the regional security and prosperity. Because the ‘objective’ 
prediction of the long-term consequence of coercive intervention in Libya was 
difficult, the EU and China’s calculations were probably influenced by their political 
values and causal beliefs.  
 
Secondly, the dissertation may only provide scant evidence to the rival material 
explanations, as unrevealed interests concerns or strategic reasons of interveners 
may exist. Conspiracy theories would claim that the reason why the rebels in Darfur 
and Libya challenged the governments is they expected the support from foreign 
intervention. Hence, it was the interveners deliberately encouraged the rebellion 
movement in the first place, in order to achieve their policy-goals behind the scenes. 
For instance, a widespread conspiracy theory said that Gaddafi was toppled because 
he planned to introduce a single African currency made from gold that would threat 
the U.S dollar and Euro. To answer this kind of question definitely would require 
evidence not yet available, as relevant archives remain classified and key participants 
have yet to write or tell their story. However, considering the small scale of Libyan 
economy and the limited feasibility of the plan, the dissertation does not discuss 
such argument based on anecdotal evidence. 
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(II) Reassessing the principles of intervention: Implications for the EU and China  
The interventions in crises over Darfur and Libya were belonged to a series of 
international intervention after the Cold War justified on the humanitarian ground. 
They were also two notable cases after the UN embraced the concept of 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit. 
Many experts cited the intervention in Darfur as the first test of R2P practice, while 
the international community was largely failed to protect Darfur people in a timely 
fashion (De Waal 2007, Badescu & Bergholm 2009). With regard to the case of Libya, 
however, several commentators hailed the robust intervention in Libya as the model 
of implementing R2P, which quickly eliminated a major threat to civilians within the 
framework of R2P (Patrick 2011, Daalder & Stavridis 2012). Meanwhile, critical 
accounts of Libyan intervention and its inimical impact on R2P also existed 
(Kuperman 2013). After reviewing the EU and China’s responses in the two crises, 
this section will rigorously assess whether such interventions have achieved the 
humanitarian objective of R2P, and briefly discuss the question of what principles 
should underpin the future international intervention.  
 
As regards the intervention in Darfur, the input/outcome ratio of UMAMID and 
EUFOR Chad/CAR operations was questionable. It could be argued that actions to 
protect Darfur civilians were belated and inadequate. When the international 
community eventually managed to muster political supports and spent huge money 
to implement military interventions in 2008, the climax of the slaughter in Darfur was 
long gone. The complicated situations on the ground were the proxy-conflict 
between Sudan and Chad, the rebel groups against the authoritarian regimes in 
Khartoum and N’djamena, and the displaced people in a desperately poor region. It 
reflected the limitations of the peacekeeping operation as a means of international 
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intervention on the humanitarian ground. Neither the UN nor the EU mission had the 
mandate of political transformation and further resources of development aid to 
resolve these problems. Without a national reconciliation and balanced economic 
development, the humanitarian improvement and relatively peaceful situation in 
today’s Darfur and its neighbouring regions are still reversible in the future.  
 
While the intervention in Darfur was criticized as too slow and less robust, the 
problem of intervention in Libya was too hasty and overacted. Although Gaddafi was 
unambiguously committed to atrocities thus left little uncertainty for applying the 
R2P doctrine, the NATO’s military implementation of the Security Council’s mandates 
in Libya became mired in political controversy. France, the UK and U.S were 
comprehensively assisting the rebel side which repeatedly rejected cease-fires offers, 
and ignoring the original mandate of protecting civilians in the process. Contrary to 
the original intention of UN resolution 1973, NATO’S intervention actually escalated 
the Libyan civil war and prolonged the civilian sufferings to some extent. Without the 
NATO intervention, the Libya civil war would probably ended in victory of Gaddafi by 
the end of March. In short, it was clear that the purpose of the NATO military 
campaign was helping rebels for regime change. Moreover, the long-term outcome 
of insecurity and instability in post-war Libya has further rejected the NATO 
intervention in Libya as the model of R2P implementation. To date, the country is 
suffering from turf battles between rival tribes and commanders, as well as the 
growing radical Islamist groups, which were suppressed under the Gaddafi regime.   
 
Due to the excess of force in NATO intervention and the attendant international 
dispute, the R2P has not reached opinio juris in customary international law 
(Francioni & Bakker 2013). Already during the war, the ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, 
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China and South Africa) explicitly complained that the France, the UK and U.S 
exceeding the limited mandate of the UN and abusing the doctrine of R2P in Libyan 
intervention. The subsequent international divides in Syrian crisis further dampened 
the early optimism on the legal status of R2P. Chinese and Russian vetoes to the 
coercive intervention in Syria were partly attributable to the perceived misuse of 
force and the disastrous outcome of military intervention in Libya. The present 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed that most of China’s vetoes in the UN were 
against unreasonable external interventions in the domestic affairs of developing 
countries. He justifies China’s veto as an altruistic defence of international justice, 
legitimate interests of host countries, as well as the UN Charter (Wang 2014:21). 
 
In order to further clarify R2P and bridge the growing gap between Western 
interventionists and reluctant Russia and China, Brazil articulated the concept of 
‘responsibility while protecting’ (RWP) in the aftermath of Libyan intervention. 
Brazil's Permanent Representative to the UN, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, presented 
the concept note in November 2011.187 While acknowledging the framework of R2P, 
Brazil conditioned its support by introducing the RWP to supplement the 
shortcomings of R2P. The RWP proposed a set of criteria, including a chronological 
sequencing between three pillars, the last resort, proportionality, and balance of 
consequences, for the UN Security Council to authorize military interventions. 
Besides, RWP proposes a multilateral monitoring-review mechanism of the military 
intervention, to ensure the implementation of UN resolutions is seriously conformed.  
 
As sitting in the middle ground between emerging humanitarian intervention 
doctrines and the orthodox principle of state sovereignty, the RWP is likely to face 
                                                             
187 United Nations, A/66/551–S/2011/701, November 9, 2011 
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resistance from both BRICS and Western powers. Within the BRICS, while the 
Brazilian-proposed concept was endorsed by India and South Africa, China and Russia 
had some reservations. Nevertheless, the emergence of RWP reflects the consensus 
that the emerging powers are not going back to the age of absolute sovereignty and 
rigid non-interference. Concerning their growing economic and geopolitical weights 
in the world, the BRICS cannot avoid crisis intervention. Instead, they wish to offer a 
serious alternative to the established powers’ norms, and take more initiatives in 
multilateral bodies. Not surprisingly, U.S and European powers are sceptical to the 
RWP that could impede their use of force. During an informal discussion on RWP in 
the UN, U.S and the EU representatives explicitly against any strict chronological 
sequencing between different policy options of intervention.188 In sum, the RWP is 
also not an easy solution to the dilemma of multilateral intervention, as the change 
of narratives has not changed the underlying political debates.  
 
What are the underlying political debates? The EU-China divergence on intervention 
is neither between who respects human rights in an altruistic manner and who 
disregards human dignity and solely concerns about its selfish interests, nor between 
who defends sovereignty and who attempts to jeopardize the sovereignty of 
developing countries. These biased portrayals are harmful to the two actors and the 
international society as a whole. Rather, the debate is more about the interpretation 
of the situation, the priority content of human rights, the frontier of sovereignty, and 
the expected consequence of an intervention. Two contested principles—the 
Responsibility to Protect, and the Non-Interference in Domestic Affairs—reflect the 
                                                             
188 Remarks by U.S, http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/184487.htm, February 21, 
2012; The EU’s statement, 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/EU%20speaking%20elements%20Responsibility%20while
%20Protecting.pdf, February 21, 2012 
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existence of varying interpretations of state sovereignty, human rights, and foreign 
interventions in the international community. For the proponents of R2P, human 
rights transcend state sovereignty since protecting human rights is the precondition 
of respecting state sovereignty. Thus, a foreign intervention is legitimated if the state 
failed to protect its people. For the advocates of Non-Interference, state sovereignty 
is essential for social stability and economic development. While the human rights 
are important, in most cases it should not be the excuse of coercive intervention 
against the wills of host governments. The debate is not common at the international 
level, but also existed in European and even Chinese foreign policy-makings.  
 
The EU and China are not at the opposite ends of the spectrum, but have space for 
working together. For instance, concerning the crises in Darfur and Libya, China and 
the EU preferred multilateral solutions at either the regional level or global level, to a 
unilateral military intervention and the pre-emptive doctrine in the wake of the Iraqi 
War. This is an important consensus between China and the EU in respect of 
international intervention, as the foundation to further their cooperation in the 
future crisis managements, in particular in Africa. In the following paragraphs, I will 
discuss the potential evolving trend of China/EU’s principles of international 
intervention, and provide some policy suggestions for the EU-China cooperation in 
crisis management and conflict resolution.  
 
China’s Constructive Involvement  
Today, China enjoys the investment and business opportunities in the developing 
world, especially the regions where Western firms have shunned, but also has to 
expose itself to the attendant risk of political instability. It reported that around 5.5 
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million Chinese overseas workers in 2011, up from 3.5 million in 2005.189 A large part 
of them worked in volatile countries and thus under the risk of violent crimes and 
greater chaos, which are contributing to increasing domestic pressure on the Chinese 
government to protect Chinese overseas workers. To a certain extent, China’s foreign 
policy and even military deployment will step up their efforts with respect to protect 
Chinese citizens abroad like the swift evacuation of nearly 36,000 Chinese citizens 
from Libya. Alongside the protection of citizens abroad, Beijing regarded its economic 
interests as equally important. Like other major economic powers, China seek to 
influence the economic policies of the host country in order to promote the interests 
of Chinese multinational firms, of which large part is state-owned. Beijing could use 
various advantages over the host countries, ranging from investments to loans and 
assistances, to ensure the Chinese contracts and energy supplies.  
 
Besides, for security reasons China is also wary of the current spread of the Islamic 
State in the Middle East, and the uncertain future of Afghanistan after the U.S and 
NATO withdrawal. The further deterioration of security situation would have 
potential adverse effects on the stability of bordering province of Xinjiang, where 
activities of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism have occurred. Drug 
trafficking in the Golden Crescent is another non-traditional security threat to China. 
The drug business in Afghanistan is believed as the important sources of funds for 
terrorist groups. In sum, we can expect that in the future China would adopt a more 
active foreign policy toward crises in third countries in which Chinese interests are 
(potentially) endangered.  
 
It should be pointed out that China’s efforts of diplomatic mediation, evacuation of 
                                                             
189 South China Moring Post, “Libya a reminder that citizens must come first”, 4 March 2011, 
http://www.scmp.com/article/739836/libya-reminder-citizens-must-come-first  
216 
 
nationals and economic influences are carefully within the boundary defined by 
principle of non-interference, since these behaviours are not coercive and against the 
wishes of host country apparently. This caution and self-restraint during the Hu 
Jintao era (2002-2012), sometimes was criticized at home as less determined to 
protect Chinese national interests. In the meantime, the international society urged 
China to shoulder bigger responsibilities in global governance, rather than continuing 
to be a ‘free rider’ of the international system (Obama 2014). It reflects that Chinese 
foreign policy has been caught in the dilemma between keeping the low key 
(non-intervention unless absolute necessary) and doing something (Active 
intervention even by coercive measures) since the beginning of the century, as its 
economic strength and international influence are on the rise. Now, it is widely 
believed that China would adopt a more assertive foreign policy in the Xi Jinping’s 
presidency. To this end, Beijing needs to reconcile its formal established policy of 
non-interference, with the substantial Chinese economic involvement all over the 
world. As many analysts (Jakobson 2007, Large 2008) have observed the tension 
between them, particularly in fragile states such as Sudan (Natsios 2012). 
 
Given this background, new diplomatic concepts regarding China’s role in 
international crisis intervention have been introduced into the discussion in recent 
years. The work of Wang Yizhou, a prominent IR scholar from Peking University, has 
been most influential in this regard. He initiated the concept of ‘Creative 
Involvement’ (Wang 2011, 2013). Instead of challenging the established principles 
such as non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, Wang argues that the 
idea of ‘creative involvement’ is a development and enrichment of these policies and 
principles. It calls on China to actively participate in global and regional affairs, while 
emphasizes the need of conforming to the UN Charter, acquiring the consent of 
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target state and the support of regional actors. According to this definition, China’s 
mediation in Darfur and the evacuation in Libya could be categorized as ‘creative 
involvement’. In fact, the main contribution of the concept is not providing new 
strategy for China’s intervention, but explicitly defining the China’s global role and 
diplomacy direction: China should actively involve in foreign issues in particular 
concerning its vital interests, and the principle of non-interference is not an obstacle 
in the way. For, as China’s involvement has respected the host state and its people, it 
would not present the interference in domestic affairs (Wang 2013:82-83). 
 
However, almost all Chinese accounts of crisis intervention bashed recent Western 
military interventions under the banner of ‘humanitarian intervention’ or ‘R2P’. It 
reflects that China cannot adapt to the idea of foreign powers have the responsibility 
or right to intervene in a functioning state especially by coercive measures. Beijing 
would rather believe that once certain powerful countries gain the authority, they 
tend to abuse it. For example, the military intervention in Libya and the threat of 
intervention in Syria were denounced by the vice-president of the China Institute of 
International Studies as ‘irresponsible protection’ (Ruan 2012). Instead of endorsing 
the intervention in Darfur and Libya as the precedent of R2P, China continues strictly 
checking the proposal of international intervention in the UN Security Council on a 
case-by-case basis. In sum, we should not expect a radical departure from China’s 
previous positions and principles of intervention.  
  
For a long time, the principle of non-interference and the practice of constructive 
involvement will co-existed. One the one hand, China will constructively participate 
in the global and regional crisis management by providing initiatives, solutions, rules 
and arrangements in a friendly manner. On the other, Beijing’s traditional adherence 
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to state sovereignty will probably persist. China’s stance of non-interference is not 
equal to total inaction in foreign crises that affect its interests. What differentiated 
Chinese approach of crisis management from Western style intervention is that 
Beijing respects the sovereignty of the host government and restrains itself from 
coercive action without the UN authorization. Besides, unlike Western powers 
showing a strong preference for the ‘democratic’ party in the conflict, China would be 
more neutral and focus on the conflict resolution rather than the agenda of 
democratization. This approach is consistent with the UN Charter, which does not 
impose a certain form of government as the criterion of legitimate members of the 
international community.  
 
European Responsible Protection 
The EU is no doubt at the forefront of international crisis intervention, while the 
priority of the EU is to increase its effectiveness and credibility in intervention. The 
experience of Libyan intervention provides important lessons for the EU. First, the EU 
should insist the prudent restraint in the use of deadly force under the condition of 
uncertainty. Western leaders, particularly from France, the UK and US, sometimes 
regard a coercive humanitarian intervention as a promotion to their reputation at the 
domestic and international level. However, it is a very risky way to do that, as the 
military intervention in a hostile environment is not guaranteed to be a success, and 
nor it is uniformly popular among the international community. Even though the 
interveners could easily achieve the short-term military victory, the long-term 
consequence on the ground is usually out of their control. As the current chaotic 
situation in Libya demonstrates, the toppling of the Gaddafi regime has not bettered 
the living conditions of Libyan civilians in general. This, in turn, decreases the validity 
of Libyan intervention, and jeopardizes the prestige of France and UK in the 
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international community.  
 
Secondly, the decision-making on intervention should be aware of the potential 
misperception and disinformation. In Europe, the public concerns of humanitarian 
crises, especially took place in countries of geographic proximity or former colonial 
ties, play an important incentive role in agenda setting of crisis intervention. However, 
the enthusiastic public in favour of intervention usually did not really know what 
happened on the ground, they were mobilized by the partial media reports.190 For 
instance, the image created by Western media of Gaddafi’s forces initiating violence 
by attacking purely peaceful protesters was largely false. In reality, the rebels aimed 
to militarize these protests and many Libyan protesters were armed from the first 
day of the uprising, while the Libya government force mainly targeted the rebels, 
rather than used force indiscriminately (Kuperman 2013:108-113). 
 
The third problem is that the West-led interventions are often biased in favour of 
rebel militants and tended to evolve into the regime change. On the one hand, this 
has spurred rebellion movement that undermines the country’s stability and the 
security of civilians. On the other, the host regime perceived the danger of regime 
change tends to take an unpromising stance and fight to the end. To mitigate the 
dilemma, the multilateral intervention should encourage all parties, including the 
government of the target state, to comply with the UN resolutions, by providing 
certain guarantees such as no intention of regime change and amnesty deals if 
necessary. In addition, military intervention against the acting government should be 
limited to the rare cases where civilians are intentionally targeted, as opposed to 
where they are the collateral damage of counterinsurgency campaigns aimed at 
                                                             
190 Author’s interview with an expert of Libya from International Crisis Group, Rome, May 
2014 
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rebels (Kuperman 2008). There are prudent reasons for this limitation. After all, 
sovereignty remains the stabilizing force of the world order. The intervention of 
supporting rebels in one country might provoke similar rebellion in other countries.  
 
Anchoring the multilateral intervention is essential for overcoming above three 
challenges exposed in the case of Libya, as well as for the EU-China cooperation in 
future crisis management. First, the forcible intervention should be authorized and 
reviewed within the UN framework. The UN Security council usually sets the bar for 
military intervention high, which could increase the credibility and legitimacy of 
intervention. Secondly, the discussion and negotiation in the UN Security Council, is 
helpful in circulating information from different perspectives. Finally, the 
UN-authorized coercive intervention could focus its mandate on peace-making and 
civilian protection, rather than regime change.  
 
However, we need to be aware of the inherent shortcoming of multilateral 
intervention: The response speed of UN Security Council has often been much slower 
than the acts of the perpetrators, as demonstrated in the case of Darfur. To avoid the 
common procrastination in multilateral organizations and the potential delay from 
any party in the conflict, the proposal of international intervention should include a 
concrete but flexible time-table depended on the situation on the ground. Besides, 
as I mentioned in the Chapter 1, the multilateral intervention from the regional 
organizations is an important supplement to the UN intervention, especially when 
the Security Council is incapable because of the veto to respond to the crisis. If its 
purpose is to fulfil pre-existing obligations and to stop or prevent egregious atrocities, 
the multilateral intervention from regional organizations, such as the NATO and OSCE 
in Europe, the AU and ECOWAS in Africa, the OAS in America, or the SCO in Central 
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Asia, could be permissible even without the UN Security Council authorization in 
advance.  
 
Creating the EU-China cooperation space in Africa  
Africa is the key region of crisis intervention where the EU and China have a high 
level of presence, including in the field of peace and security. As the crises in Darfur 
and Libya demonstrated, the EU and China’s security and economic interests were 
challenged by the state failure, civil war and mass atrocities in Africa. Hence, both the 
EU and China have a strategic interest in maintaining stability in the continent. 
Meanwhile, the heterogeneity of China and the EU’s norms and interests in Africa, as 
the obstacles to the EU-China cooperation in responding African security challenges, 
is well observed (Hoslag & Van Hoeymissen 2010, Liu 2011). The dissertation argues 
that in spite of their divergent official rhetoric of African policies, in reality both the 
EU and China engaged in multilateral crisis management in Africa in a less divergent 
way. For example, both the EU and China acknowledge and commits to support the 
regional organizations such as the African Union on local crisis management. Their 
common support to the ‘African solutions to African problems’ could create space for 
the EU-China collaboration in crisis intervention. 
 
For China, the strategy of ‘security free-riding’ in Africa would become less feasible in 
the future, considering its all-round engagement in the continent. Involving in the 
African security governance the through the framework of the AU, could dispel the 
worries of African countries and maintain the validity of its non-interference principle 
in the Third World. At the present stage, China’s support to AU security governance 
mainly includes financial assistance and training program. Relatively, the potential 
Chinese military presence in Africa, such as establishing permanent overseas military 
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bases, is more controversial in the eyes of the African countries that stressed the 
principle of local ownership. Therefore, the Sino-African military cooperation should 
develop at a steady pace, and avoid aggravating the geopolitical competition of great 
powers in the continent.  
 
In contrast to other regional organizations like ASEAN deeply attached to the 
principle of non-interference, both the EU and the AU have reacted positively to the 
crisis intervention and the concept of R2P. Through the instrument of the African 
Peace Facility established in 2004, the EU has funded the AU on peace support 
operations, capacity building, early response mechanism and other contingencies. By 
contributing to enable the AU to manage their internal crises, the EU and key 
members such as France and the UK could share the burden of intervention and 
temper the criticism of interventionism and neo-colonialism. Moreover, compared to 
its intrinsic weakness in adopting coercive intervention, the EU could take a more 
prominent role in conflict prevention and peace building in Africa.  
 
The priority of EU-China cooperation in African security should be given to their 
complementarities in supporting crisis management. For instance, while China is 
relatively abundant in human resource, the EU has more experience in multilateral 
operations and African affairs. Therefore, the EU training program for Chinese 
peacekeepers could be developed (Stahl 2012:165). Alongside the ongoing UN 
peacekeeping missions in South Sudan and Mali, an EU-China joint operation was 
launched off the coast of Africa, to fight against the piracy in in Somalia offshore 
areas, where a ‘vacuum of sovereignty’ exists. Leaving aside the long-existing 
principle divergences, such pragmatic cooperation serves the EU-China common 
interests. A coordinator of EU-China naval cooperation from ESDP admitted that the 
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two actors had slightly different working methods the Gulf of Aden, but he is 
optimistic about the prospect of EU-China security cooperation at the bilateral and 
multilateral level.191 This prospect was already foreseen in the EU-China 2020 
Strategic Agenda for Cooperation in 2013.192  
 
(III) Normative power, Hegemony and Status: Rethinking China and the EU’s 
international roles 
In the concluding section, let me revisit the concept of normative power in the 
international relations, since I raised the question of EU-China ideational divergences 
in the beginning and the study of interventions provides some new reflections on it. 
As my case study demonstrates, neither the EU nor China is purely ‘a power of 
ideational nature’ in Manners’s original definition (2002), which would pursue the 
normative goals without the incentives of its material interests. In fact, the mixture 
of norms and interests, the tension between rhetoric and action, were common in 
their foreign policy practices. Apart from the routine challenge to the policy 
consistence of a so-called ‘normative power’, an alternative solution is to understand 
the normative power as an ideational resource of power, that major international 
actors can access in principle (Keene 2013: 942). Within empirical studies, I argue 
that the normative power is better being understood as the ability (rather than the 
actor or unit), to use given norms and principles to persuade others and shape what 
passes for normal.193 For instance, the international actor could use their normative 
power to define what elements constitute a normal and legitimate crisis intervention, 
and persuade sufficient members of the international society to endorse such an 
                                                             
191 Author’s interview with an official in EEAS, June 2014, Brussels 
192 The full text, http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf, 
November 23, 2013 
193 This approach is in line with Foresburg’s distinction (2011) between ‘power as a powerful 
actor’ (puissance) and ‘power as ability to cause effect’ (pouvoir), and similar to the 
understanding of normative power as ‘the exercise of power’ (Larsen 2014) 
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intervention. In this light, the concept does not only apply to the sui generis EU, but 
also to other traditional international actors such as China.  
 
If the normative power is an ability and a resource of power, how can we distinguish 
it from the established concept of ‘soft power’? Nye (1990) has described the ability 
to attract and co-opt others to obtain the desired outcomes without the use of 
coercion and payment. I make the boundary of normative power in two ways. First, 
different from soft power, my redefinition does not reduce the normative power to a 
strategic instrument at the disposal of actors. The selection of ideas and values is not 
free choice, but rather self-bounded by the societal and institutional identities. As 
the chapter 3 and 4 have shown, the EU and China’s principles of intervention are 
deeply embedded in their institutions and societies for decades, rather than an ad 
hoc tool picked by policy-makers.  
 
Secondly, the normative power needs to stand up to the challenge from Realists, who 
would argue that, whether such principles and norms could be imposed on others 
and enforced to international system solely depends on the military and economic 
capabilities of their ‘norm entrepreneurs’. For example, a hegemon usually provides 
public goods including norms at the global or regional level. My answer is to 
understand the conception of hegemony in a Gramscian sense, as ‘a relation, not of 
domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological 
leadership’ (Simon 1982:21, quoted from Diez 2013: 200). In this way, the redefined 
normative power, as a power of consensus, has an indispensable place in the 
hegemony. In sum, the hegemony is composed of military, economic and normative 
power, although their exact mix varies regarding different actors.  
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Table 17  A proposed Ingredients of the Hegemony 
Sources of Power Military Strength The Scale of Economy Ideas and Values 
The Ability to Use Military Power Economic Power Normative Power 
Other 
Categorizations 
Hard (Material) Power  
 Civilian Power 
 
From this perspective, the EU-China ideational divergence is best seen as a nascent 
contestation of hegemonies on normative power. The issue here is not merely about 
being a normative power or becoming a hegemon, but also about the (normative) 
power relations of different international actors, for example, whether one’s 
normative power is recognized or challenged by others. Unlike military power and 
economic power, the normative power is not ‘an intrinsic property of an actor, but 
depends on the kind of interactions it has in specific contexts’ (Kavalski 2013: 250). 
These interactions usually work through discourses and dialogues at the bilateral or 
multilateral levels. In practice, the EU is more able to project its normative power in 
the realm of enlargement and neighbourhood partnership to a lesser extent. 
However, in the context of the international intervention beyond the European 
geographic scope, while the EU is applying its normative power based on the human 
security/R2P doctrines and democracy values, China’s reaction is generally negative, 
which has weakened the EU’s normative power in this field.  
 
The fundamental difference between the EU’s and China’s normative powers is well 
elaborated. As Kavalski (2013) suggested, the EU’s normative power is rule-based, 
while China elaborates a relationship-based normative power. The EU explicitly 
emphasizes a series of norms of appropriateness (human rights, democracy, rule of 
law, market economy, etc.). Brussels often enforces theses (supposed beneficial) 
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norms and rules in its external relations, such as the enlargement, the 
neighbourhood policy (ENP) and the Cotonou Agreement. In other word, the EU has 
a superior position and the others need to learn to adopt these EU-advocated norms, 
rather than vice versa. By contrast, China has embraced the mutual respect as ‘the 
cardinal virtue of normative relations’ (Womack 2008: 266), and generally refrains 
from imposing its values on others in its bilateral relations. In dealing with global 
affairs, China respects the consensus of concerned parties and the majority opinion 
of the international community. The two cases of intervention in the dissertation 
illustrate the differences again. China’s insistence of respecting sovereignty and 
non-interference, even regarding the pariah states like Sudan and Gaddafi’s Libya, 
was in line with its normative power. For the EU, the partial stance of supporting 
rebels in the two crises was also an attempt to project its normative power in the 
international arena and settle the internal disputes over intervention.  
 
In the end, let us ask an interesting question: which side is at advantage in the 
struggle of normative power now? My tentative answer is the EU. Regarding the 
EU-China ideational divergences, the EU usually has the advantage of the carrier of 
‘universal value’ like human rights over the China which passively defends its 
alternative value such as non-interference. At the global level, the Europeans also 
won some normative battles, for instance, successfully introducing the ICC and R2P 
into the UN system against the will of China. Here I borrow the three assessment 
criteria from Keene (2013) to explain why the EU has more of normative power than 
China so far. The first criterion is the logical validity: whose set of principles and 
norms is intrinsically better and more reasonable? For last two decades, there is 
heated debate regarding whether the history is end with the victory of 
liberal-democracy or China provides an alternative model. However, no consensus 
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has been achieved and putative ‘universal values’ remain contestable assertions. The 
second criterion is the political rhetoric, underscoring the capabilities of ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ to persuade others. Again, the point is whether the capability of 
persuasion mainly depends on the material resources as realists argue. Certainly, 
ample resources are helpful for norm diffusion, and also rhetorical skills matter. 
Regarding this criterion, both the EU and China are relatively strong in money, while 
each has its merits and demerits regarding the rhetorical skills. Here I have no space 
to explore this point, but for me it is a very close run between the EU and China.  
 
What finally differentiates the EU from China is probably the third criterion, their 
status in the international society. As two significant economic powers in the world, 
both the EU and China have a relatively high class position in the world. However, the 
status of the international actor is not equal to the class situation thus only depends 
on its wealth, but also regards the state lifestyle, the style of dealing with its 
domestic and foreign affairs. Here I argue that currently the EU still has a higher 
status than China in the world society, or has a stronger ‘ability to establish itself as a 
prestigious, high-status actor in international politics (Keene 2013: 949). The status 
gap, in my opinion, is mainly because the EU comprises of developed countries not 
only in the economic term, while China is still a developing country on many aspects. 
As a model of peace and prosperity after 1945, as well as the successor of a world 
hegemony of past four centuries, the EU is very attractive to many less developed 
countries and war-torn regions. Besides, by introducing the Neo-Weberian term 
‘Social Closure’, Keene (2013: 947) highlights the attempt of currently superior actors 
to ‘restrict access to social power to a particular group’, which may involve exclusion. 
The particular lifestyle of the EU has distanced itself from other traditional 
international actors, especially non-Western actors like China.  
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Regarding the debate over the principles of international intervention, the liberal 
imperialistic tendency in the international legal system also plays the role of social 
closure. The liberal imperial project is on a contemporary basis of the unequal status 
of nations and states, such as the distinction between pre-modern, modern, and 
post-modern states (Cooper 2002). According to this definition, the intervened states 
like Sudan and Libya belong to the pre-modern world, where civil conflicts prevail 
and the efficient governance lacks, while China is a typical case of modern state 
holding the traditional understanding of sovereignty and the EU represents the 
postmodern world embraced cosmopolitan values. Based on the hierarchy system, 
Robert Cooper suggested the postmodern world to get used to the double standard 
in foreign policy. Therefore, the certain rules can be only applied between 
‘reasonable’ nation-states, especially when the coercive action on the demand of 
human rights protection is constrained by the current interpretation of international 
law (Delcourt 2008: 185-186).  
 
As Keene (2013: 948) suggested, in the pre-modern society the social closure was 
usually based on collective characteristics such as race and religion, while today the 
form of social closure relies on individual characteristics such as property and 
credentialism. In this light, the EU is different from the European empires in the 19th 
century conducted the mission civilisatrice in the barbaric non-white and 
non-Christian world. Accordingly, China has the hope of ‘social mobility’ in the 
international society through continued economic growth and political reforms 
toward the democratic ‘good governance’. However, although China is motivated by a 
higher international status today, whether Beijing will pursue the status in a Western 
defined way is highly questionable. As the study on international interventions shows, 
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China is increasingly confident about its own principles and norms in dealing with 
global affairs. The increase of China’s hard power and the corresponding revival of 
Chinese exceptionalism emphasizing the ‘harmonious inclusionism’ (Zhang 2011), 
undoubtedly pose a challenge to the current domination of liberal values in the 
international society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 
 
Bibliography  
Adler, E (2010), ‘Europe as a civilizational community of practice’, in Katzenstein, P 
(ed.) Civilization in World Politics: Plural and pluralist perspective, Routledge.  
 
African Union (2004), Press Release 51/2004, Addis Abeba, 28 May 
African Union Peace and Security Council (2011), PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI), 22 February  
 
Aggestam, L. (2008) ‘Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?’ International Affairs, 
84(1):1-11 
 
Aldin, C & Large, D (2013), ‘China’s Evolving Policy towards Peace and Security in 
Africa: Constructing a new paradigm for peace building?’ in Berhe, M & Liu, H (ed.) 
China-Africa Relations: Governance, Peace and Security, Institute for Peace and 
Security Studies: Addis Ababa, pp. 16-28 
 
Alessandri, E & Matarazzo, R (2011), ‘Hanging Between Hope and Fear: Italians at the 
Heart of International Crisis’, Documenti IAI, 11/13, October 
 
Allen, D (2012) ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in Jones, Menon and 
Weatherill (eds.), Oxford Handbook of the European Union, Oxford University Press, 
pp.643-660  
 
Amnesty International (2007), ‘Sudan: Arms Continuing to Fuel Serious Human Rights 
Violations in Darfur’, 8 May 
 
Anderson, S & Seitz, T (2006), ‘European Security and Defence Policy Demystified: 
Nation-Building and Identity in the Europe Union’, Armed Force and Society, 
33(1):24-42  
 
Andersson, H (2008), ‘China 'is fuelling war in Darfur’, BBC News, 13 July 
 
Asharq Al-Awsat (2009), Q & A with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, 10 
November, 
http://www.aawsat.net/2009/11/article55252921 
 
Badescu, C & Bergholm, L (2009), ‘The responsibility to protect and the conflict in 
Darfur: The big let-down’, Security Dialogue 40(3):287-309. 
 
Bai, J and Xu, S (2007), ‘Liu Guijin: The essence of Darfur issue is issue of 
development’, Xinhua Agency, 29 May, 白洁，徐松：《刘贵今：达尔富尔问题实质
是“发展的问题”》  
 
Balducci, G. (2008), ‘Inside Normative Power Europe: Actors and Processes in the 
European Promotion of Human Rights in China’, EU Diplomacy Papers, College of 
231 
 
Europe. 
 
Banks, M (2011), “Barroso leaps to defence of EU foreign chief”, The Parliament.com, 
5 April, 
http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/barroso-leaps-to-def
ence-of-eu-foreign-chief#.Um9umhCP8Y8  
 
Barkin, J (1998). ‘The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty and the Emergence 
of Human Rights Norms’, Millennium, 27(2): 229-252. 
—— (2003), ‘Realist Constructivism’, International Studies Review, No.5:325–342. 
 
BBC (2004), ‘France opposes UN Sudan sanctions’, 8 July 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3875277.stm 
—— (2007), ‘Chad rejects a UN military force’, 28 February, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6405543.stm 
—— (2011a), ‘Libya protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit’, 22 February, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12544624 
—— (2011b), ‘Libya Unrest: British Evacuation’, 28 February, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12568976 
—— (2011c), ‘Libya: France recognizes rebels as government’, 11 March, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12699183 
 
Beatty, A (2007), “EU urged to increase sanctions on Sudan”, European Voice, 14 June 
2007, 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/eu-urged-to-increase-sanctions-on
-sudan/57680.aspx  
 
Bennett, A and Elman, C (2008), ‘Case Study Methods’, in in Reus-Smit, C and Snidal, 
D (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford, pp. 499-517.  
 
Björkdahl, A & Strömvik, M (2008), ‘The Decision Making Process behind Launching 
an ESDP Crisis Management Operation’, DIIS Brief, April, Danish Institute for 
International Studies 
 
Blas, J (2011), “Oil groups prepare to close down in Libya”, Financial Times.com, 21 
February, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/702f5730-3dd7-11e0-ae2a00144feabdc0.html#axzz
2lzv06pmU  
 
Bloching, S (2011), “CSDP and EU Mission Update, April 2011”, European Security 
Review – ESR Briefing, No. 3, 15 April 
 
Borger, J (2007), “Blair wants no-fly zone enforced over Darfur”, Guardian, March 28, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/mar/28/sudan.politics  
232 
 
 
Bosco, D (2013), “Why is the International Criminal Court picking only on Africa?”, 
Washington Post, 29 March, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-is-the-international-criminal-court-pi
cking-only-on-africa/2013/03/29/cb9bf5da-96f7-11e2-97cd-3d8c1afe4f0f_story.html  
 
Bosse, G (2011), “From ‘Villains’ to the New Guardians of Security in Europe? 
Paradigm Shifts in EU Foreign Policy towards Libya and Belarus”, Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society, 12(4):440-461 
 
Bouchard, C and Peterson, J. (2011) ‘Conceptualizing Multilateralism: Can We All Just 
Get Along?’, MERCURY E-paper series, No.1.  
 
Breuer, F (2010), ‘Between Intergovernmentalism and Socialization: The 
Brusselisation of ESDP’, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS/48 
 
Brummer, K. (2009). “Imposing sanctions: The not so ‘normative power Europe’”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, 14(2): 191-207 
 
Bull, H (1982), ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 21(2):149-164 
 
Cabestan, J (2009). ‘China’s Foreign- and Security-policy Decision-making Processes 
under Hu Jintao’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 38(3):63-97 
 
Cardoso, F. and Faletto, E (1979), Dependency and development in Latin America, 
University of California Press 
 
Carlson, A (2006), ‘More Than Just Saying No: China’s evolving approach to 
Sovereignty and Intervention since Tiananmen’, in Johnston, A and Ross, R (ed.) New 
Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press. 
 
Cameron, D (2011), ‘Libya statement’, September 5, 
http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2011/09/05/david-cameron-libya-state
ment-in-full 
 
Cameron, D & Sarkozy, N (2011), ‘Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to 
Herman Van Rompuy’, 10 March, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/10/libya-middleeast  
 
Carpenter, R (2007), ‘Studying Issue (Non)-adaption in Transnational Advocacy 
Networks’, International Organization, 61(3):643-667. 
 
Carr, E (1946), The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
233 
 
International Relations, 2nd edition, New York: St Martin’s Press. 
 
Chandler, D. (2012), ‘Resilience and human security: The post-interventionist 
paradigm’, Security Dialogue, 43(3): 213-229. 
 
Chatham House (2007), ‘The Principle of non-intervention in Contemporary 
International Law: the non-interference in a state’s internal affairs used to be a rule 
of international law: is it still’, Chatham House International Law discussion group 
meeting, 28 February. 
 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), Ambassador Wang Guangya talked about 
the new UN resolution on Darfur, 20 September  
 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011a), Regular news conference, 22 February 
—— (2011b), regular news conference, 22 March  
—— (2011c), regular news conference, 29 March  
—— (2011d), regular press conference, 24 May 
—— (2011e), regular news conference, 5 September  
—— (2012f), regular press conference, 15 November  
 
China’s Mission to the UN (2011), ‘Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Li Baodong 
after Adoption of Security Council Resolution on Libya’, 17 March, 
http://www.china-un.org/eng/gdxw/t807544.htm 
 
China’s State Council (2006), ‘China's African Policy’, 12 January  
—— (2011a), ‘President Hu Jintao met French President Sarkozy in Great hall of the 
people’, 30 March, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2011-03/30/content_1834930.htm 
——(2011b), ‘Chinese Foreign Aid’, April, 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-04/21/content_1850553.htm 
—— (2011c), ‘China-Russia Joint declaration on current international situations and 
major global issues’, 16 June, 
http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2011-06/16/content_1886233.htm 
—— (2011d), “Yang Jiechi met the chairman of the executive board of ‘National 
Transitional Council’”, 22 June, 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-06/22/content_1890480.htm 
—— (2014), ‘Xi Jinping’s speech at the conference marking the 60th anniversary of 
‘the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’”, June 29, 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-06/29/content_2709613_2.htm 
 
Chrisafis, A. (2011). “Sarkozy hopes Libya can boost France’s reputation- as well as his 
own”. The Guardian, 11 September. 
 
Contessi, N (2010), ‘Multilateralism, Intervention and Norm Contestation: China’s 
Stance on Darfur in the UN Security Council’, Security Dialogue, 41(3): 323-344 
234 
 
 
Cooper, R (2002), ‘The new liberal imperialism’, The Observer, 7 April  
 
Council of the European Union (2003), Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, 16 
June  
—— (2004a), Council Common Position 2004/31/CFSP, 9 January  
—— (2004b), ‘Action Plan of the follow-up on the Common Position on the ICC’, 
Document 5742/04, 28 January 
—— (2004c), ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)’, 
10198/1/04 REV 1, 7 June  
—— (2005a), Council Common Position 2005/411/CFSP, 30 May  
—— (2005b), Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP, 20 July  
—— (2008), ‘EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS’, 1 January 
—— (2011a), Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of 
the European Union on events in Libya, Brussels, 20 February, 6795/1/11 PRESSE 
—— (2011b), Press Release of 3069th Council Meeting, Brussels, 21 February  
—— (2011c), Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP, Concerning restrictive measures in 
view of the situation in Libya, Brussels, 28 February  
—— (2011d), Declaration of the Extraordinary European Council, D/11/2, Brussels, 
11 March 
—— (2011e), President Address, PCE 075/11, Paris, 19 March  
—— (2011g), Council Decision 2011/178/CFSP, Concerning restrictive measures in 
view of the situation in Libya, Brussels, 23 March  
—— (2011g), Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP, Brussels, 1 April  
—— (2011h), Council Conclusions on Libya, 3106th meeting 18 July  
 
Cox, R (1981), ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10(2):126–155. 
 
Daalder, I and Stavridis, J (2012), ‘NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an 
Intervention’, Foreign Affairs, 91:2:2-7 
 
Delcourt, B. (2006), ‘Pre-emptive Action in Iraq: Muddling Sovereignty and 
Intervention?’, Global Society, 20(1): 47-67 
—— (2008), ‘The Liberal Imperialism Doctrine as a Normative Framework for the 
Union’s Foreign Policy ?’, in Ruiz-Fabri, H, Jouannet, E & Tomkiewicz, V (eds), Select 
Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, Hart Publishing, pp. 
181-207 
 
De Waal, A (2007), ‘Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect’, 
International Affairs, 83(6): 1039-1054. 
—— (2013), “African roles in Libya conflict of 2011”, International Affairs 
89(2):365–379 
 
235 
 
Deng, F (1995), ‘Frontiers of Sovereignty: A Framework of Protection, Assistance, and 
Development for the Internally Displaced’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 
8(2):249-286.  
 
Deng, Y (2008), China’s Struggle for Status: the Realignment of International 
Relations, Cambridge. 
 
Diez, T. (2013), ‘Normative power as hegemony’, Cooperation and Conflict, 
48(2):194-210. 
 
Dobbins, J (2008), ‘Europe's Role in Nation Building’, Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, 50(3):83-110 
 
Donnelly, J (2008), ‘The Ethics of Realism’, in Reus-Smit, C and Snidal, D (ed.) The 
Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford, pp. 150-162. 
 
Dover, R (2013), The European Union’s Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy’, in Cini, 
M and Borrangan, N (eds), European Union Politics, Oxford: 240-253 
 
Downs, E (2011), “New Interest Groups in Chinese Foreign Policy”, Brookings, 13 
April,http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2011/04/13-china-companies-d
owns  
 
Duchêne, F. (1972), ‘Europe's role in world peace’, in Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe 
Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, London: Fontana, pp.32-47. 
 
Echagüe, A; Michou, H & Mikail, B (2011) “Europe and the Arab Uprisings: EU Vision 
versus Member State Action”, Mediterranean Politics, 16(2): 329-335 
 
Eleftheriadis, P (2003) ‘Cosmopolitan Law’, European Law Journal, 9(2): 241–263. 
 
Erian, S (2012), ‘China at the Libyan Endgame’, Policy, 28(1):49-52 
 
EU Observer, ‘UN says EU soldiers could endanger aid workers’, 21 April = 
http://euobserver.com/foreign/32224 
 
EurActiv (2012), ‘Syria crisis tops EU-Russia summit agenda’, 4 June  
 
European Union (2004), ‘A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona 
Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, Barcelona, 15 
September  
—— (2005), ‘EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s 
development’, COM(2005) 489 final, 12 October 
—— (2006), ‘The European Consensus on Development’, Official Journal of the 
236 
 
European Union, C46/1, 24 February 
—— (2009), ‘EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African 
Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)’, March  
—— (2010), The European Union and the International Criminal Court, Expert Series, 
Belgium.  
 
European Commission (2006), ‘European Union response to the Darfur crisis’, 
Factsheet, July 
—— (2011a), ‘Joint Communication on Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, Brussels, 8 March 
—— (2011b), SPEECH/11/195, 18 March  
—— (2011c), P/11/625, 22 May  
—— (2012a), ‘Humanitarian aid and civilian protection in Libyan Crisis’, Factsheet, 11 
January,  
—— (2012b), ‘European Union and Syria’, Factsheet, Luxemburg, 15 October, 
 
European External Action Service, Ongoing missions and operations, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm  
—— (2013), ‘EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation’ November 23, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf 
 
European Parliament (2011), Resolution on the Southern Neighbourhood, and Libya 
in particular, including humanitarian aspects, P7_TA-PROV(2011)0095, 10 March 
 
Evans, G. ‘The Unfinished Responsibility to Protect Agenda: Europe’s Role’, 
EPC/IPPR/Oxfam Policy Dialogue, 5 July 2007.   
 
Feichtinger, W and Gerald, H (2011), “EUFOR Tchad/RCA Revisited – A Synopsis”, in 
Feichtinger, W and Gerald H (eds.), EUFOR Tchad/RCA Revisited. Vienna, Institut für 
Friedenssicherung und Konfliktmanagement, pp. 19-34 
 
Finnemore, M. (2004),The purpose of intervention: changing beliefs about the use of 
force, Cornell University Press. 
 
Flint, J and de Waal, A (2008), Darfur: A New History of A Long War, Zed Books Ltd 
 
Forsberg, T. (2011), ‘Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of 
an Ideal Type’.  Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(6): 1183-1204. 
 
Fornaji, H (2013), “China’s new Libyan ambassador faces big challenges on stuck 
contracts”, Libya Herald, 6 August, 
http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/08/06/chinas-new-libyan-ambassador-faces-big-c
hallenges-on-stuck-contracts/#axzz2qcVNTqAm 
 
237 
 
Fox, J. and Godement, F (2009), ‘A Power Audit of EU-China Relations’, Policy Report 
for the European Council on Foreign Relations, London 
 
Francioni, F & Bakker, C (2013), ‘Responsibility to Protect, Humanitarian Intervention 
and Human Rights: Lessons from Libya to Mali’, Transworld working papers, 15, April 
 
Freeman, D & Geeraerts, G. (2011), ‘Europe, China and Expectations for Human 
Rights’, Chinese Journal of European Studies, 29(2):73-87. 邓肯·弗里曼，古斯塔
夫·盖拉茨：《欧洲与中国的人权观差异》，《欧洲研究》2011 年第 2期。 
 
Gegout, C (2009), ‘EU Conflict Management in Africa: The Limits of an International 
Actor’, 
Ethnopolitics, 8(3-4): 403-415 
 
Germany Federal Foreign Office (2011), ‘Policy statement by Foreign Minister Guido 
Westerwelle in the German Bundestag on current developments in Libya (UN 
Resolution)’, 18 March  
 
Gionet, M (2012), ‘Canada’s Role in the Conceptual Impetus of the Responsibility to 
Protect and Current Contributions’, in Hoffmann, J and Nollkaemper A (eds) 
Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice, Amsterdam University Press 
 
Glaser, B and Medeiros, E (2007), ‘The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in 
China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of “Peaceful Rise”’, The China 
Quarterly, No. 190, pp. 291-310 
 
Goldstein, J and Keohane, R (1993) (ed.) The idea and Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, 
institutions, and political change, Cornell University Press. 
 
Gottwald, M (2012), “Humanizing security? The EU’s responsibility to protect in the 
Libya Crisis”, FIIA Working paper, No.75, April 
 
Grevi, G. and de Vasconcelos, A. (2008) (eds) ‘Partnerships for Effective 
Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia’, EU Institute for 
Security Studies, Chaillot Paper, No. 109 
 
Gries, P. (2005) ‘Nationalism and Chinese foreign policy’, in Yong Deng& Feiling Wang 
(ed.), China rising, Lanham, pp. 103-120 
 
Gu, Guoping and Dong Jirong (2010), ‘Chinese and U. S. Positions and Policies on the 
Darfur Issue—An Interpretation of Their Official Statement’, International Forum, 
12(1): 27-34. 顾国平，董继荣：《中美在达尔富尔问题上的立场和政策：基于双
方发言的解读》，载《国际论坛》2010年第1期。 
 
238 
 
Hall, P and Taylor, R. (1996) ‘Political science and the three new institutionalisms’, 
Political Studies, XLIV, pp.936-957 
 
Hatzigeorgopoulos, M and Fara-Andrianarijaona, L (2013), “EUBAM Libya: story of a 
long-awaited CSDP mission”, European Security Review, No.66 
 
Haukkala, H (2008), ‘The Russian Challenge to EU Normative Power: The Case of 
European Neighbourhood Policy’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of 
International Affairs, 43(2):35-47 
 
Hay, C. (2006) ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’, in R. Rhodes, S. Binder, B. Rockman 
(ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford, pp.56-74. 
 
He, Y (2007), ‘China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations’, Asia Paper, 
Institute for Security & Development Policy, July, Stockholm 
 
Helly, D (2009), ‘EUFOR Tchad/RCA’, in Grevi, G. Helly, D and Keohane, D (eds) 
European Security and Defence Policy The First 10 years (1999-2009), European 
Union Institute for Security Study 
 
Henry, J (2012) “Sarkozy, the Mediterranean and the Arab Spring”, Contemporary 
French and Francophone Studies, 16(3): 405-415 
 
Hill, C. (1993), ‘The capability–expectations gap or conceptualizing Europe's 
international role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (3): 305–328 
—— (1998) ‘Closing the capability–expectations gap’, In Peterson, J and Sjursen, H 
(ed.) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, London: 
Routledge. pp. 18-38. 
 
Hill, C and Smith, M (2005), International Relations and European Union, Oxford 
University Press 
 
Hoffman, S (2009), ‘Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: 
The Case of NATO and ESDP’, Perspective on Politics, 7(1):45-52 
 
Hollis, R. (2012), ‘No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 
‘Arab Spring’, International Affairs, 88(1): 81-94. 
 
Holslag, J (2008), ‘China's Diplomatic Maneuvering on the Question of Darfur’, 
Journal of Contemporary China, 17:54, 71-84 
 
Holslag, J & Van Hoeymissen, S. (2010). ‘The limit of socialization: The search for 
EU-China cooperation towards security challenges in Africa’. Brussels: Institute for 
Contemporary China Studies, May 
239 
 
 
Holsti, K. (1996), The State, War and the State of War, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hope, C (2011), “Libya: Cameron plan for no-fly zone shunned by world leaders”, The 
Telegraphy, 2 March, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8355849/
Libya-Cameron-plan-for-no-fly-zone-shunned-by-world-leaders.html   
 
Hurd, I (2008), ‘Constructivism’, in Reus-Smit, C and Snidal, D (ed.) The Oxford 
handbook of international relations, Oxford, pp. 298-316. 
 
Hyde-Price, A (2006), ‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 13(2):217-234. 
 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), The Kosovo Report: 
Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned, Oxford University Press.  
 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005), Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Geneva, 25 
January 
 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The 
Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.  
 
Jackson, P (2004), ‘Bridging the Gap: Toward a Realist-Constructivist Dialogue’, 
International Studies Review, No. 6, pp.337–352. 
 
Jackson, P. and Nexon, D (2004), ‘Constructivist Realism or Realist Constructivism?’ 
pp.337-341, in Jackson, P. (eds) ‘Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist 
Dialogue’, International Studies Review, No. 6, pp.337–352. 
 
Jakobson, L (2007), ‘The burden of non-interference’, China Economic Quarterly, 
11(2):14-18. 
 
Jakobson, L and Knox, D (2010), ‘New Foreign Policy Actors in China’, SIPRI Policy 
Paper, No.26, September 
 
Jamnejad, M and Wood, M (2009), ‘Current Legal developments: The Principle of 
Non-intervention’, Leiden Journal of International Law, (22): 345-381  
 
Jian, J (2011), “China’s second coming in Libya”, Asia Times online, 31 August, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MH31Ad01.html  
 
Jiang, Z (2000), ‘The speech in the summit meeting of UN Security Council’, 7 
240 
 
September, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel2/17/20000908/223916.html 
 
Joffé, G and Paoletti, E. (2010), Libya’s Foreign Policy: Drivers and Objectives, 
Mediterranean Paper series, GMF, October 
 
Juncos, A and Reynolds, C (2007), ‘The Political and Security Community: Governing 
in the Shadow’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 12: 127-147 
 
Kagan, R (2003), Paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order, 
London: Atlantic 
 
Kagan, R. (2002) ‘Power and Weakness’, Policy Review, No.113 
 
Kahnema, D and Tversky, A (1979), ‘Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under 
risk’, Econometrica, 47(2):263-291. 
 
Kaldor, M, Martin, M, & Selchow, S. (2007), ‘Human security: a new strategic 
narrative for Europe’, International affairs, 83(2): 273-288. 
 
Kambudzi, A (2013), ‘Africa and China’s Non-Interference Policy: Towards Peace 
Enhancement in Africa’ in Berhe, M & Liu, H (ed.) China-Africa Relations: Governance, 
Peace and Security, pp. 29-45 
 
Kapila, M (2004), “Mass rape atrocity in west Sudan”, BBC, March 
19,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3549325.stm  
 
Kavalski, E. (2013), ‘The struggle for recognition of normative powers: Normative 
power Europe and normative power China in context’, Cooperation and 
Conflict, 48(2):247-267. 
 
Kastner, P. (2007). “ICC in Darfur-Savior or Spoiler”, ILSA Journal of International & 
Comparative Law, 14: 145-188 
 
Keene, E. (2013), ‘Social status, social closure and the idea of Europe as a ‘normative 
power’. European Journal of International Relations, 19(4): 939-956. 
 
Keith, A (2007), “The African Union in Darfur: A African Solution to A Global Problem”, 
Journal of Public and International Affairs 18: 149-164 
 
Keohane, R. (1990) ‘Multilateralism: an Agenda for Research’, International Journal, 
45: 731- 764. 
 
Kessler, G (2007), “Bush Approves Plan to Pressure Sudan”, Washington Post, 
February 
241 
 
7 ,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/06/AR2007020
601935.html   
 
Kirn, A. (2011) ‘The European Union’s Role in Promoting and Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect in Africa: Turning Political Commitments into Effective 
Action’, College of Europe, BRIGG Papers, No.1 
 
Koenig, N. (2011) ‘The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence?’ IAI Working 
Papers 11/19, July 
 
Kratochwil, F. (2003), ‘The monologue of science’, pp.124-128 in Hellmann, G (ed.) 
‘The forum: are dialogue and synthesis possible in international relations?’, 
International Studies Review, No.5, pp.123-153. 
 
Kreissl-Dorfler, W. (2011), ‘Report on the EU support for the ICC: facing challenges 
and overcoming difficulties’, European Parliament, A7-0368/2011 
 
Kreutz, J. (2005), ‘Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European 
Union 1981-2004’, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Paper 45 
 
Kubicek, P. and Parke, D. (2011) ‘European Union and Humanitarian Intervention: 
Bosnia, Darfur, and Beyond’, EU External Affairs Review, July: 60-70 
 
Kuperman, A (2008), ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from 
the Balkans,’ International Studies Quarterly, 52(1):49-80. 
—— (2013), ‘A Mode Humanitarian Intervention: Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign’ 
International Security, 38(1):105-136 
 
Mark Langan (2012), ‘Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa–EU 
Ties: A Conceptual Reorientation of ‘Normative Power’, New Political Economy, 
17(3):243-270 
 
Lanz, D. (2011), “The EU and the “Darfurisation” of Eastern Chad”, Building Peace 
across Borders Accord, (22): 39-42 
 
Lapid, Y (1989), ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a 
Post-Positivist Era’, International Studies Quarterly, 33(3): 235-254. 
 
Large, D (2008), ‘China & the Contradictions of Non-interference in Sudan’, Review of 
African Political Economy, No. 115:93-106 
 
Larsen, H. (2014). ‘Normative Power Europe and the importance of discursive context: 
The European Union and the politics of religion’, Cooperation and Conflict, published 
online 22 May, pp.1-19 
242 
 
 
Lederer, E (2006), ‘UN Affirms Duty to Defend Civilians’, The Washington Post, April 
28, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/28/AR200604280
1833.html  
 
Legro, J (2005), Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Lenin, V (1916), Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, 
Moscow,http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/  
 
Li, A. (2007), ‘China and Africa: Policy and Challenges’, China Security, 3(3): 69 – 93 
 
Lightfoot, S. & Burchell, J. (2005), ‘The European Union and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development: Normative Power Europe in Action?’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 43(1):75-95. 
 
Liu, L (2011), ‘The dilemma of the EU and China’s engagement in Africa’, EUISS 
Occasional Paper, No.93, August 
 
Lombardi, B (2011). The Berlusconi Government and Intervention in Libya, The 
International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46(4):31-44 
 
Lucarelli, S & Manners, I (2006), Values and principles in European Union foreign 
policy, Routledge 
 
Lutterbeck, D (2009), “Migrants, weapons and oil: Europe and Libya after the 
sanctions”, The Journal of North African Studies, 14(2): 169-184 
 
MacDonald, J (2012), ‘EU leader pushes for Chinese help on Iran, Syria’, Associate 
Press, 14 February  
 
Major, C. (2008), ‘EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience 
of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006’, EU Institute for Security Studies: Occasional Paper, no. 
72, Paris, September 
 
Manners, I (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 40(2):35-58. 
—— (2006), ‘Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads’, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 13(2):182-199. 
 
March, J and Olsen, J (2006), ‘Elaborating the New Institutionalism’, in R. Rhodes, S. 
Binder, B. Rockman (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, pp. 3-22. 
243 
 
—— (2009), ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’, ARENA Working Papers, No.4, Centre for 
European Study, University of Oslo 
 
Marchal, R (2009), “Understanding French policy toward Chad/Sudan? A difficult 
task”, June 
4,http://africanarguments.org/2009/06/04/understanding-french-policy-toward-cha
dsudan-a-difficult-task-1/   
—— (2011), “An assessment of EUFOR Chad/CAR, in Feichtinger, W and Gerald, H 
(eds.): EUFOR Tchad/RCA Revisited, pp. 19-34 
 
Martin, M. & Owen, T. (2010), ‘The second generation of human security: lessons 
from the UN and EU experience’, International Affairs, 86(1): 211-224. 
 
Matlary, J (2008), ‘Much to do little: the EU and Human Security’, International 
Affairs, 84(1): 131-143 
 
Matthews, M. (2008), ‘Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: The 
Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’. Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review, 31(137) 
 
McDevitt, M (2010), “Journalistic Influence in Moral Mobilization”, in Mody, B (ed) 
The Geopolitics of Representation in Foreign News: Explaining Darfur, Lexington 
Books  
 
McDoom, O (2007), “China's Hu tells Sudan it must solve Darfur issue”, Reuters, Feb 2, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/02/idUSMCD261331  
 
McKaiser, E (2011), “SA response to the Libya Crisis, an analysis”, The 2011 Ruth First 
Memorial Lecture, Johannesburg, 17 August, 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=251
952&sn=Detail  
 
Men, J.(2011), ‘Between Human Rights and Sovereignty: an Examination of EU–China 
Political Relations’, European Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 534–550. 
 
Menon, A. (2009), ‘Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten’, International Affairs, 
85(2): 227-246 
—— (2011), “European defence policy from Lisbon to Libya”, Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy, 53(3), 75-90 
—— (2012), ‘Defence Policy’, in Jones, Menon and Weatherill (eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of the European Union, Oxford University Press, pp.585-599 
 
Milne, S (2011), “If the Libyan war was about saving lives, it was a catastrophic 
failure”, The Guardian, 26 October, 
244 
 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-saving-lives-cat
astrophic-failure 
 
Miranda, V (2011), “Striking a Balance between Norms and Interests in Italian Foreign 
Policy: The Balkans and Libya”, IAI Working Papers 11, May  
 
Moravsik, J (1997), ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: a Liberal Theory of International 
Politics’, International Organization, 51(4): 513-553 
—— (2008), ‘The New Liberalism’, in Reus-Smit, C and Snidal, D (ed.) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Relations, Oxford, pp. 234-254. 
 
Morgenthau, H (1954), Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd 
edition, New York: Alfred Knopf.  
 
Morrison, M (2012), ‘China’s Foreign Policy Institutes: Influence on Decision-Making 
and the 5th Generation Communist Party Leadership’, Yale Journal of International 
Relations, September, pp.77-86 
 
Morse, J. & Keohane, R. (2014), ‘Contested multilateralism’, The Review of 
International Organizations, pp.1-28, March 
 
NATO (2011), Press Conference, by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
10 March, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_71419.htm 
 
Natsios, A. (2012), ‘China in Sudan: The Challenge of Non-Interference in a Failed 
State’, Georgetown Journal of International Relations, No. 13, pp.61-67 
 
Nye, J (1990), Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: 
Basic Books.  
 
Obama, B (2014), “China as a Free Rider”, Interview by The New York Times, 9 August 
http://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000003047788/china-as-a-free-rider.ht
ml 
 
Olsen, G. (2009). “The EU and military conflict management in Africa: for the good of 
Africa or Europe?”, International Peacekeeping, 16(2):245-260. 
 
Osman, M (2007), “Darfur Rebels Attack Oil Field, Warn Chinese to Leave Sudan”, The 
Washington Post, October 25, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/25/AR200710250
2510.html  
 
Paltiel, J (2010), ‘Structure and Process in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implications for 
Canada’, Canadian International Council, China Papers, No.8, March 
245 
 
 
Pan, Z (2010), ‘Managing the conceptual gap on sovereignty in China–EU relations’, 
Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 227-243. 
 
Pan, Z and Gao, X (2011), ‘The Conceptual Gap on Sovereignty and Its Implications on 
China- Europe Relations’, Chinese Journal of European Studies, Vol.29, No.2, pp.61-72. 
潘忠岐，高兴伟：《中欧主权观分歧及其影响》，《欧洲研究》2011年第 2 期。 
 
Pan, Z and Zhu, M (2011), ‘Shared Ideas in Need and in Making: An Overview of the 
International Symposium on Conceptual Gaps in China- EU Relations’, Chinese Journal 
of European Studies, Vol.29, No.2, pp.88-97. 潘忠岐，朱鸣：《共有观念的缺失与构
建：“概念分歧与中欧关系”国际研讨会综述》，《欧洲研究》2011 年第 2 期。 
 
Pang, Z. (2009), ‘China's Non-Intervention Question’, Global Responsibility to Protect 
1, 237-252 
 
Parello-Plesner, J., & Pantucci, R. (2011). China's Janus-faced Response to the Arab 
Revolutions, ECFR Policy Memo 
 
Patey, L (2007), “State Rules, oil companies and armed conflict in Sudan”, Third World 
Quarterly, 28(5):997-1016 
 
Patrick, S (2011), ‘Libya and the future humanitarian intervention: How Qaddafi fall 
vindicated Obama and RtoP’, Foreign Affairs, 88(4) 
 
Peterson, J and Lavenex, S (2012), ‘The EU as a Security Actor’, in Bomberg, A, 
Peterson, J, and Corbett, R (eds.) The European Union: How does it work? Oxford 
University Press 
 
Pop, V (2011), “Foreign ministers wary of EU military role in Libya”, the EUobserve, 12 
April,http://euobserver.com/defence/32165  
 
Qu, X. (2012), ‘the UN Charter, R2P and the issue of Syria’, International Studies, 
39(2): 6-18. 曲星：《联合国宪章、保护的责任和叙利亚问题》，载《国际问题研
究》2012 年第 2 期。 
 
R2Pcs Project, ‘Excerpts of Government Statements on the Responsibility to Protect 
Europe 2005-2007’, Institute for Global Policy 
 
Reeves, E (2006), “China in Sudan, Underwriting Genocide”, Testimony before the 
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Role in the World: Is 
China a Responsible Stakeholder?” August 3 
 
Reichard, M (2006), The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective, 
246 
 
Ashgate 
 
Ren, P & Wang, Y (2004), “Two Chinese compete for bids aboard leaving both parties 
suffer.” Economic Information, June 28. 任鹏宇，王永增：《两大石油巨头海外打响
遭遇战，竞相压价两败俱伤》，《经济参考报》，2004 年 6 月 28 日 
 
Renard, T (2011), “Libya and the post American world: Implications for the EU”, 
Security Policy Brief, No.20, April 
 
Rettman, A (2007), “Ex-commissioner attacks EU verbalism on Darfur”, euobsever, 
March 20,http://euobserver.com/foreign/23740  
 
Reus-Smit, C (2001), ‘The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory’, European 
Journal of International Law, 12(3): 573-593. 
 
Reuters (2011a), ‘Opposition lawmakers criticized Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi for failing to condemn violence in Libya and saying he did not want to 
‘disturb’ Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi during the revolt in his country’, 20 
February, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/20/us-italy-libya-berlusconi-idUSTRE71J1L
H20110220 
——(2011b), ‘France urges aid, not military action for Libya’, 1 March, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/03/01/idINIndia-55234520110301 
——(2011c), ‘Arab League Calls on U.N to impose Libya no-fly zone’, 12 March, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/12/us-libya-arabs-idUSTRE72B1FI2011031
2 
——(2011d), ‘EU adds six ports to Libya sanctions list’, 7 June, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/07/us-eu-libya-idUSTRE7563E520110607 
——(2011e), ‘TEXT-Excerpts from Libya Contact Group Chair's Statement’, 15 July, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/15/libya-meeting-excerpts-refile-idAFLDE7
6E0W120110715 
——(2011f), ‘ENI leads Libya oil race, rebels warn Russia, China’, 23 August, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/22/ozatp-libya-oil-idAFJOE77L0DN201108
22 
——(2011g), ‘China urges Libya to protect investments’, 23 August, 
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE77M0PD20110823?pageNumber=1&
virtualBrandChannel=0 
 
Risse, T. (2000), ‘Let’s argue! Communicative Actions in World Politics’, International 
Organization, Vol.54, No.1, pp.1-39 
 
Roberts, A. (2004) ‘United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention’, in Welsh, J. (eds), 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, Oxford University Press.  
 
247 
 
Rose, G (1998), ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 
51(1):44-172. 
 
Rousseau, R (2011), ‘Why Germany Abstained on UN Resolution 1973 on Libya’, 
Foreign Policy Journal, 22 June, 
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/06/22/why-germany-abstained-on-un-re
solution-1973-on-libya/  
 
Ruan, C (2007), ‘The truth in Darfur which was distorted by U.S’, Phoenix TV, 18 
October.阮次山：《被美国歪曲的达尔富尔问题真相》，凤凰卫视 
 
Ruan, Z (2012), ‘The responsible protection: building the safer world’, China 
International Studies, 54(3):9-22, 阮宗泽：《负责任的保护：建立更安全的世界》，
《国际问题研究》，2012 年第 3 期。 
 
Ruggie, J. (1992) ‘Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution’, International 
Organization, 46 (3): 561-598.  
 
Sanders, E (2006), ‘Historical Institutionalism”, in R. Rhodes, S. Binder, B. Rockman 
(ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, pp. 39-55. 
 
Saving Darfur Coalition (2007), ‘Save Darfur Coalition Urges Continued Chinese 
Engagement on Darfur Crisis’, 7 September  
 
Schmidt, V. (2008), ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and 
Discourse’, The Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 11, pp.303-326. 
 
Security Council Report (2006), ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, Update 
Report No. 1, March 8, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4
FF96FF9%7D/Update%20Report%208%20March%202006_POC.pdf  
 
Seibert, B (2010), Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and the EU's Common Security and 
Defence Policy, Strategic Strategy Institute monograph 
 
Shambaugh, D (2002), ‘China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure 
and Process’. The China Quarterly, No. 171, pp. 575-596 
 
Shichor, Y (2007), “China’s Darfur Policy”, China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, 
May 1, http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/3039.html  
 
Siddig, K. (2011), “From Bilateral Trade to Multilateral Pressure: A Scenario of 
European Union Relations with Sudan”. Middle East Development Journal, 3(1):55-73. 
 
248 
 
Simon, R. (1982), Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction. London: Lawrence & 
Wishart 
 
Simpson, G (2008), ‘The Ethics of The New liberalism’, in Reus-Smit, C and Snidal, D 
(ed.) The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford, pp. 255-266.  
 
Skinner, Q (2002). Vision of Politics (Volume 1): Regarding Methods, Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Smith, G. (2011), ‘China offered Gaddafi huge stockpiles of arms: Libyan memos,’ The 
Global and Mail, 2 September, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/china-offered-gadhafi
-huge-stockpiles-of-arms-libyan-memos/article2152875/ 
 
Smith, M. (2004), ‘Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy 
Cooperation’, European Journal of International Relations, 10(1):95-136.  
—— (2011),‘A liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, purpose and the EU's 
changing global role’, Journal of European Public Policy, 18(2):144-163 
 
Solana, J. (2003), ‘A secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, 
Brussels, 12 December.  
—— (2008), ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: 
Providing Security in a Changing World’, Brussels, 11 December 
 
Sotloff, S (2012), “China’s Libya problem”, the Diplomat, 14 
March,http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china%E2%80%99s-libya-problem/  
 
South Africa Presidency (2012), ‘Statement by President Jacob Zuma on the occasion 
of the UN Security Council Summit Debate’, 12 January 
http://www.presidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=5564 
 
South China Moring Post (2011), ‘Libya a reminder that citizens must come first’, 4 
March, 
http://www.scmp.com/article/739836/libya-reminder-citizens-must-come-first  
 
Speck, U (2011), ‘Pacifism unbound: Why Germany limits EU hard power’. FRIDE 
policy brief, 75, May. 
 
Stahl, A. (2012), ‘Contrasting Rhetoric and Converging Security interests of the 
European Union and China in Africa’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 40(4): 
147-173. 
 
Stähle, S. (2008), ‘China's shifting attitude towards United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. The China Quarterly, 195: 631-655. 
 
249 
 
Sterling-Folker, J (2002), ‘Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, 
Reconstructing, or Rereading’, International Studies Review, 4(1):73-97.  
 
Sudan Tribune (2006), ‘China Pushes Sudan to Let UN Troops into Darfur’, September 
15, http://www.sudantribune.com/China-pushes-Sudan-to-let-UN,17596 
—— (2009a), ‘Sudan formally withdraws from Cotonou Agreement amendments’, 23 
June, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article31608 
—— (2009b), “China defends decision not to veto Darfur ICC referral”, 10 November, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33085 
——(2011), ‘Bashir said Sudan armed Libyan rebels’, 27 October, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article40547 
 
Sullivan, A (2007), “U.S. envoy to Darfur praises Chinese role”, Reuters, September 
19,http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/19/us-usa-darfur-idUSN1930145320070
919  
 
Sun, Y. (2013), ‘Chinese National Security Decision-Making: Processes and Challenges’, 
Brookings Institution, CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper, May  
 
Taliaferro, J (2004), Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University.  
 
Tang, Z (2011), “They are using ‘humanitarianism’ as a cover”, People’s Daily (oversea 
edition), front page, 22 March. 唐志超：《他们打着“人道主义”的幌子》，《人民日
报》（海外版），2011年 3 月 22 日。 
 
Taylor, I (2006), “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa”, International Affairs 82(5):937–959 
 
Telò, M (2007), Europe: A Civilian Power? Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Thomas, J (2000), The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions, Oxford 
University Press,  
 
Tian, C (2001-2011), “Annual Analysis of China’s Oil Import and Export”, International 
Petroleum Economics 
 
Tian, W (2011), “Reflect the negative effect of the Libyan war”, People’s Daily, page 3, 
24 August. 田文林：《反思利比亚战争的负面效应》，《人民日报》，2011 年 8 月
24 日。 
—— (2012), “People paid dearly for the Arab Spring”, People’s Daily (oversea edition), 
front page, 5 July. 田文林：《阿拉伯之春使民众付出巨大代价》，《人民日报》（海
外版），2012 年 7 月 5日。 
 
Toje, A. (2008a). ‘The consensus–expectations gap: explaining Europe's ineffective 
250 
 
foreign policy’. Security Dialogue 39 (1): 121-141 
—— (2008b). ‘The European Union as a Small Power, or Conceptualizing Europe’s 
Strategic Actorness’, Journal of European Integration, 30(2):199-215 
 
Tonra, B (2006), ‘Conceptualizing the European Union’s global role’, in Cini, M and 
Bourne, A (ed.) Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, 
pp. 117-130. 
 
Tull, D (2008), “The Chad Crisis and Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR”, SWP Comments 2 
 
Tyagi, Y. (1995). ‘The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited’, Michigan 
Journal of International Law Vol. 16: 883-910  
 
Udombana, N (2006), “An Escape from Reason: Genocide and the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur”, International Lawyer 40(1): 41-66  
 
United Nations (1945), The Charter of the United Nations 
—— (1948), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
9 December,  
——Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Glossary of UN Peacekeeping Terms”, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/glossary/p.htm 
——(2008), Secretary-General Ban Ki-moons Press Conference, 7 October, 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=3463  
 
United Nations General Assembly (1965), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
Independence and Sovereignty, A/RES/20/2131, 21 December 
—— (1970), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, 24 October  
—— (1981), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the 
Internal Affairs of States, A/RES/36/103, 9 December 
—— (1998), Statue of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July  
—— (1999), A/54/PV.8, 22 September  
—— (2005), ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’, A/RES/60/1, 15 September 
—— (2009), A/63/PV.98, 24 July  
—— (2011), A/66/551–S/2011/701, November 9 
 
United Nations Human Rights Council (2011), A/HRC/S-15/2, 25 February 
 
United Nations Security Council (1973), S/RES/340, 25 October  
—— (1991), S/RES/688, 5 April 
—— (1992), S/RES/788, 19 November 
—— (2004a), S/PRST/2004/18, 12 May  
251 
 
—— (2004b), S/RES/1547, 11 June 
—— (2004c), S/2004/611, 28 July 
—— (2004d), S/PV.5015, 30 July 
—— (2004e), S/RES/1556, 30 July 
—— (2004f), S/2004/703, 30 August  
—— (2004g), S/PV.5040, 18 September  
—— (2004h), S/RES/1564, 18 September  
—— (2004i), SG Report, S/2004/763, 28 September 
—— (2004j), SG Report, S/2004/787, 4 October 
—— (2004k), SG Report, S/2004/881, 2 November  
—— (2004l), S/RES/1574, 19 November  
—— (2005a), S/RES/1585, 10 March  
—— (2005b), S/RES/1588, 17 March  
—— (2005c), S/RES/1590, 24 March  
—— (2005d), S/PV.5122, 29 March  
—— (2005e), S/RES/1593, 31 March  
—— (2005f), S/PV.5158, 31 March 
—— (2006g), S/RES/1672, 25 April 
—— (2006h), S/PV.5423, 25 April 
—— (2006i), S/RES/1674, 28 April  
—— (2006j), S/PV.5439, 16 May 
—— (2006j), S/RES/1679, 16 May  
—— (2006k), S/PV.5519, 31 August  
—— (2006l), S/RES/1706, 31 August  
—— (2007a), SG Report, S/2007/97, 23 February  
—— (2007b), S/RES/1769, 31 July  
—— (2007c), S/PV.5727, 31 July  
—— (2007d), S/RES/1778, 25 September  
—— (2011a), SC/10180, 22 February 
—— (2011b), S/PV.6490, 25 February  
—— (2011c), S/PV.6491, 26 February  
—— (2011d), S/RES/1970, 26 February  
—— (2011e), Meeting Coverage, SC/10200, 17 March  
—— (2011f), S/PV.6498, 17 March  
—— (2011g), S/RES/1973, 17 March 
 
United States Mission to the UN (2012), ‘Remarks by the United States at an Informal 
Discussion on Responsibility while Protecting’, February 21, 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/184487.htm 
 
United States’ Office of Foreign Assets Control (2009), “Effectiveness of U.S. 
economic sanctions With Respect to Sudan”, Report to Congress, January, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/sudan_report_0305
09.pdf 
 
Venesson, P (2007), ‘Europe's Grand Strategy: The Search for a Postmodern Realism’, 
252 
 
in Carsani, N and Musu, C (ed.) European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International 
System: the Road towards Convergence, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.12-26. 
 
Versluis, E, van Keulen, M & Stephenson, P (2011), Analyzing the European Union 
Policy Process, Palgrave Macmillan                               
     
Wagner, W (2003), ‘Why the EU's common foreign and security policy will remain 
intergovernmental: a rationalist institutional choice analysis of European crisis 
management policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4):576-595 
 
Wald, J (2004) “Security Council endorses resolution on Sudan: plan aims to end 
conflicts in south, Darfur region”, CNN, June 11, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/06/11/sudan.un/  
 
Wallerstein, I (1974), The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Academic Press. 
 
Waltz, K (1979), Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House 
—— (1996), ‘International Politics is not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies, 6(1):54-57. 
 
Wang, C (2004) “U.S and Europe proposed to sanction Sudan and China’s possible 
loss of its significant interests”, China Youth News, August 10 
 
Wang, F. (2005) ‘Beijing’s Incentive Structure: The Pursuit of Preservation, Prosperity, 
and Power’, in Yong Deng& Feiling Wang (ed.), China rising, Lanham, pp. 19-49. 
 
Wang, J (2011), “How much the Chinese investment in Libya”, Global Finance, 
11(5):69-70. 王金岩：《中国在利比亚有多少投资》，《环球财经》2011年第 5 期。 
 
Wang, M (2005) “Crisis Management: The Challenge and Opportunities of China’s 
Foreign Policy in the Case of Darfur”, World Economies and Politics 27(6): 35-40 王猛：
《达尔富尔危机：中国外交转型的挑战与契机》，《世界经济与政治》2005 年第 6
期。 
 
Wang, Yi (2014), “Adhere to the Path of Peaceful Development and Foster a 
Favourable International Environment for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese 
Nation”, China International Studies, 56(1):8-23, 王毅：《坚定不移走和平发展道路
为实现民族复兴中国梦营造良好国际环境》，《国际问题研究》，2014 年第 1 期。 
 
Wang, Yizhou (2011), Creative Involvement: A New Direction in China's Diplomacy, 
Peking University Press. 王逸舟：《创造性介入中国外交新取向》，北京大学出版社     
—— (2013), Creative Involvement: the Evolution of China's Global Role, Peking 
University Press. 王逸舟：《创造性介入：中国之全球角色的生成》，北京大学出
版社 
253 
 
 
Watt, N & Wintour, P (2011), “Libya no-fly zone call by France fails to get David 
Cameron's backing” The Guardian, 25 February, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/23/libya-nofly-zone-david-cameron  
 
Wendt, A (1992), ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power 
politics’, International Organization, 46(2): 391-425. 
—— (1999), Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press 
 
Wessel, R (2012), ‘Initiative and Voting in Common Foreign and Security Police’, in 
Blancke, H and Mangiameli, S (eds.) The European Union after Lisbon: Constitution 
Basis, Economic Order and External Action, Springer, pp.495-516 
 
Wheeler, N. (2000), Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society, Oxford University Press 
—— (2004), ‘The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the 
Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in 
International Society’, in Welsh, J. (2004) (eds), ‘Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Relations’, Oxford University Press.  
 
Womack, B. (2008), ‘China as a normative foreign policy actor’. In Tocci, N (ed.) Who 
is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners, 
CEPS Paperback Series No.3, pp. 265–300 
 
Wohlforth, W (1993), The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold 
War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
—— (2008), ‘Realism’, in Reus-Smit, C and Snidal, D (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations, Oxford, pp. 131-149.  
 
Wolff, S & Dursun-Özkanca, O. (2012), ‘Regional and International Conflict Regulation 
Diplomatic, Economic and Military Interventions’, Civil Wars, 14(3):297-323 
 
Wood, M (2007), ‘The Principle of Non-Interference in Contemporary International 
Law: Non-interference in a State’s Internal Affairs used to be a Rule of International 
Law: Is It Still?’ Speech in Chatham House, 28 Feb, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20
Law/il280207.pdf 
 
Wood, S (2011), Pragmatic power EUrope?’, Cooperation and Conflict, 46(2): 242-261 
 
Xinhua Agency (2006), ‘Hu Jintao said that China will expand its aids to Africa’, 4 
November, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2006-11/04/content_5288695.htm 
Xinhua Agency (2007a), ‘China plans to forgive 33 African countries’ debts before the 
end of 2007’, 29 January, 
254 
 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-01/29/content_5669614.htm 
——(2007b), ‘Hu Jintao talked with Sudanese president al-Bashir’, 2 February, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-02/02/content_5688877.htm 
——(2008), ‘China supports the UN Security Council to suspend the ICC indictment 
for Sudanese leaders’, 2 August 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-08/02/content_8905093.htm 
——(2009), ‘Chinese envoy: ICC's arrest warrant disturbs Sudan's stability’, 5 March, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/05/content_10951598.htm 
——(2011a), ‘35,860 Chinese evacuated from unrest-torn Libya’, 3 March, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/03/c_13759456.htm 
—— (2011b), ‘EU urges cooperation with ICC on Gaddafi arrest’, 19 July 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-07/19/c_13993177.htm 
 
Youngs, R. (2001), The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Zambelis, C. (2011). ‘A Swan Song in Sudan and Libya for China’s ‘Non-Interference’ 
Principles’, China Brief, 21(15):10-13 
 
Zhang, F. (2011), ‘The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations, 
European Journal of International Relations, 19(2): 305-328 
 
Zhang, H (2009) “China’s Non-Political Conditionality Aid Principle: Theory and 
Significance”, Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies 18(6): 93-105 张海滨：
《论中国援外不附加政治条件原则的理论基础及现实意义》，《当代亚太》2009
年第 6 期。 
 
Zhang, J (2007), ‘Zhai Juan: The Weapons in Darfur is not from China’, CRI online, 17 
April. 张娟：《翟隽：达尔富尔地区武器来源帽子扣不到中国头上》，国际在线。 
 
Zhu, Y (2005), ‘The early days of China’s return to UN’, China Newsweek, August, 
pp.28-30. 朱雨晨：《中国重返联合国之初》，《中国新闻周刊》，2005年第 35 期 
 
Zimmermann, H. (2007), ‘Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about 
China's and Russia's WTO Accession’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(4): 
813-832. 
 
Zoubir, Y (2009), Libya and Europe: Economic Realism at the Rescue of the Qaddafi 
Authoritarian Regime, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 17(3): 401-415 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
Acknowledgement 
First and foremost, I want to thank my tutor in LUISS Raffaele Marchetti, for 
continuously supporting (and tolerating) me for these past three years. I appreciate 
all his contributions of time and ideas to shape my PhD dissertation. I’m also thankful 
for the excellent example he has provided as a diligent and active scholar. Besides, 
two co-supervisors from ULB, Glen Newey and Barbara Delcourt have contributed to 
my thesis work. I’m very grateful for their patience and immense knowledge. 
 
I have to thank the other members of my oral defence committee, Franco Mazzei, 
Gaëlle Pellon and Mario Telò for their participations, insightful comments and hard 
questions. Mario Telò is also the central coordinator of the GEM PhD program. With 
his encouragement and coordination, my timely thesis submission and oral defence 
become possible. Along with Mario, Johan Robberecht and Frederik Ponjaert from 
the GEM central office help to provide a high-level PhD program.  
 
I particularly want to thank four faculties in LUISS and ULB: Tom Bailey, Lorenzo De 
Sio, Christian Olsen and Frederik Ponjaert. Despite having no formal mentor/mentee 
relationship with me, they respond to my quick questions and give some insightful 
comments on my research project. In this light, I also would like to appreciate all my 
interviewees in academic and policy circles. A number of feedbacks from Beijing, 
Brussels, Shanghai and Rome have enlightened my research.   
 
I appreciate the present and past doctoral fellows in LUISS and ULB: Ali Emre Benli, 
Johanna Bergström, Silvia Cavasola, Pola Cebulak, Anna Chuang, Yuan Feng, Coraline 
Goron, Manohar Kumar, Silvia Menegazzi, Sebastian Rudas, Shunsuke Sato, Maja 
Savevska, Michele De Vitis, Giovanni Vezzani, Hikaru Yoshizawa and Chenchen Zhang, 
for the stimulating discussions on the Counter Seminar/Café Doctoral, and all the fun 
we have had in the past three years.  
 
I gratefully acknowledge the funding source that made my PhD experience possible. 
In the last three years, I was fully funded by the Erasmus-Mundus Fellowship from 
the European Commission.  
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their unconditional love and 
support since the first day of my life.  
